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ABSTRACT

Will China become a multiparty democracy? This is the research problem of
this dissertation. My hypothesis is this: the greater the extent that Chinese elite thinking
on development and change reconciles the tension between Chinese nationalism and
collectivist, family-like ethics on the one hand, and the western democratic ideals based
on each self-seeking individual’s subjectivity on the other hand, the greater the chance
that China’s political development will lead to a multiparty democracy. The dissertation
includes two parts: Chapters two to five are historical analyses, and chapters six to eight
are the interviews. It is my assumption that Chinese elite thinking on China’s
development and change has been influencing the Chinese practice of democracy since
the Opium War (1839-1842), and will continue to have great impacts upon the Chinese
pursuit of democracy in the next 20 years. I use chapters two to five of my dissertation,
the historical analyses, to demonstrate the causal relationship between Chinese elite
thinking on the development and change of Chinese society on the one hand, and Chinese
historical practice of democracy (from 1839 till the current time, including “Leninist
ii

democracy”) on the other hand, the former being the independent variable and the latter
being the dependent variable. The method used in chapters two to five is historiography, I
develop my causal analysis based on extensive reading of historians’ and social
scientists’ works. And then I use chapters six to eight of my dissertation , the interviews,
as the most current information that reveals Chinese social trends toward the next 20
years, and make an assessment of whether, in the next 20 years (2004-2024), China will
become a western style, multiparty democracy—and if the answer is yes, what that
democracy will look like.
For example, one could argue that such a democracy will be a combination of
western democracy (based on the value of individualism) and Chinese culture (based on
the value of collectivism). My judgment is based on chapters two to five, the historical
analyses of the long-term trend, and chapters six to eight, the information gained from the
interviewees. The method used in chapters six to eight is face to face, in-depth interviews.
The interviewees come from the four elite groups in the current Chinese society:
government officials, the enterprise people, media professionals, and intellectuals. The
interview question does not directly ask question about democracy; rather, it asks the
interviewee’s personal opinions about “the positive or negative factors that have been
driving or limiting the development and change of X city (in the context of development
and change of Chinese society since 1839), carrying it toward the next 20 years.” So the
interviewees do not directly talk about democracy—they just express their views on
positive and negative factors that might influence the development and change of the city
that they are in. Because in urban development one can best experience the tension
between traditional values and modern values, the development and change of a city (in
iii

the context of the development and change of Chinese society since 1839) and how
people deal with it in their thinking should reveal information about the social trends.
The major findings are these: 55.5 % of the interviewees are pro-democracy;
22.2 % of them are not pro-democracy; 16.6 % of them are not concerned about the issue
of democracy in China; and 5.5 % of them are uncertain. I have found substantial
evidence of favorable prospects for democracy. So my conclusion is: China has favorable
prospects for becoming a multiparty democracy; any democratic system that emerges
likely will be a Confucian democracy (communal or social democracy); the Chinese
culture will become a combination of liberalism and Confucianism; the balance of
traditional elements (Confucianism) and modern elements (liberalism) will depend on
each individual’s free will and free choice; the process of democratization will start with
the intellectuals, and then spread to the whole nation. Finally, this democratization
process will likely happen in the next 20 years (2004 to 2024), based on responses from
the person I interviewed.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

(1) Research Question
Will China become a multiparty democracy? This is a topic for
continuous debates. In a recent publication, scholars comment on Professor Pan Wei’s
proposal of a consultative rule of law regime and debate about whether China’s political
reform should and will finally lead to western style multiparty democracy or stay on a
course of rule of law as Professor Pan suggests. 1 The former position is supported by the
empirical events of the third wave of democratization, 2 and the latter position, Professor
Pan’s argument, is inspired by the developmental example from Singapore and Hong
Kong, two Chinese societies that succeed in modernization without adopting democracy.
Professor Pan rejects the possibility of multiparty, competitive electoral democracy for
the direction of China’s political reform by presenting a theory that would trace polity
type to its social origins. Pan states: “A particular regime is rooted in a particular social
1

Suisheng Zhao (ed.), Debating Political Reform in China: Rule of Law vs. Democratization (Armonk,
New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2006).
2
Samuel P. Huntington, “Democracy’s Third Wave,” in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.), The
Global Resurgence of Democracy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
1

structure and a particular value system; and both are rooted in a particular division of
labor, as well as a particular mode of production.” 3 A regime type serves the need of
social organization; different societies have different needs of social organization and this
difference determines the choice of a particular regime type.
Chinese traditional society was composed of “scattered, free, equal,”
“selfish,” and “self-sufficient” “small farm families” that are difficult to organize (interest
groups or classes). Therefore, consciousness of social class or interest group is alien to
Chinese people. In contrast to pre-modern western Europe where Estates formed social
cleavage and the church became a source of checks and balances of political power, thus
forming pluralistic sociopolitical power structure, pre-modern China lacked meaningful
social cleavages and this fact had prevented the emergence of pluralism. Chinese people
did not have the need to form an interest group or party to protect or promote their own
interests. And because of this, Chinese people did not develop a belief in the fairness of
open power competition and majority rule. In other words, the value system developed
from Chinese traditional, agricultural society lacks an appreciation of power politics and
checks and balances. Because there was no fundamental conflict of interests among the
“scattered, free, equal,” “selfish,” and “self-sufficient” “small farm families,” the
3

Pan Wei, “Reflections on the ‘Consultative Rule of Law Regime,” in Suisheng Zhao (ed.), op cit., p. 247.
2

government they wanted was one that would represent the interests of all the people, and
the fairness principle in such a collectivist value system required that their government
(which was believed to be their father) must not lean to a particular interest—citizens (the
peasant families) were like brothers and sisters, no one could enjoy more privilege over
others. 4
In addition to a lack of social cleavage among equal, free small farm
families, there was also no basic conflict between the ruling elite (imperial civil service
government officials) and the ruled peasant citizens (small farm families). The social
division of labor was quite simple: the ruling group’s job was to maintain order, peace
and harmony in society without disturbing peasant citizens’ ordinary life except by
necessary taxation and modest levels of community services. The ruled peasant citizens
enjoyed high levels of freedom as long as they fulfilled their duties regarding taxes and
services and complied with the social order without committing criminal conduct such as
theft, robbery, or murder. Social mobility between these two groups, in the longer term,
was not very hard, and the chance was open to every citizen. Everyone, theoretically, had
equal chance of social mobility by mastering Confucian scriptural knowledge and
4

Pan Wei, “Toward a Consultative Rule of Law Regime in China,” in Suisheng Zhao, op cit., pp. 3-40.
About the difficulty of social organization in traditional Chinese society, and the contrast between Chinese
traditional ways of social organization and the ways developed in the western modernity, please see a
useful overview of Chinese history: Ray Huang, China: A Macro History (Armonk, New York: M.E.
Sharpe, 1988).
3

competing with others to pass qualification examinations for imperial Civil Service.5
Since there was basically equal chance for social mobility, there was no meaningful
conflict of interest between the upper and the lower levels of the social stratum. One day
you were the ruled citizen, and another day you might become a member of the ruling
elite, depending on how hard you worked to master official Confucian knowledge. Thus,
there was harmony between the ruling and the ruled groups, except for the excessive
corruption of the political regime often seen at the latter end of one dynasty.
Another important reason for such harmony between the ruling elite
and the ruled citizens was the ideas of Confucian teachings. Confucian teachings see the
emperor-subject relationship as that of father-son; thus the family ethics of filial affection
from son to father and merciful love from father to son were the moral basis of social
order and were extended to political life, so that the emperor-subject relationship would
reflect the family ethics and display such affection and love. Ethics in political life should
reflect the ethics of social life based on family ethics, and it is in this way that politics is
rooted in culture and social structure based on family, lineage, clan ties, and other social
bonds of patron-client relationship that also simulated the ethics of father-son relationship.

5

One might be able to climb the ladder of social status via a conscious cultivation of patron-client
relationships, but this was not a typical channel that an ordinary citizen was able to expect in his life unless
members from his families, lineage or clan, or village community had been a member of the ruling group.
4

Therefore, the whole society is interpreted as a family: the ruling elite should display
merciful love and bear the responsibility of taking good care of all the citizens like a
father, and the citizens should extend their filial affection toward the ruling elite like a
son or daughter. There were thus no clear divisions or meaningful boundaries between the
ruling group and the ruled citizens. Thus state-society dichotomy did not appear in
traditional Chinese society, and this social-political oneness, the whole society being one
family where social-political harmony was seen as crucial for social-political life, has
become the cultural-psychological basis of contemporary Chinese politics. 6 One
implication of this is a continuous debate over whether an independent and autonomous
civil society, and later, a multiparty democracy, will be able to emerge and form in the
reforming Chinese society. 7 Scholars inspired by the third wave of democratization tend
to give a positive answer to the above question, but most of them focus on the virtue of
democratic institutions and few of them take serious the arguments from cultural and
social structural perspectives, as evidenced by Pan Wei’s critics. 8 In contrast, scholars

6

Lucian Pye, The Dynamics of Chinese Politics (Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1981), Asian
Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimension of Authority (Cambridge: Hardvard University Press, 1985),
and The Mandarin and the Cadre: China’s political Cultures (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, the
University of Michigan, 1988).
7
See Suisheng Zhao, op, cit.; Chih-yu Shih, State and Society in Chinese Political Economy: The Cultural
Dynamics of China’s Socialist Reform (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), Zhongguo Wenhua Yu Zhongguo De
Min (Chinese Culture and Chinese Citizens) (Taipei, Fongyun Luntan Publishers, 1997), and Shuping
Zhongguo (Book Reviews on China Studies) (Taipei: Hanlu Publishers, 1998).
8
Suisheng Zhao, op cit.
5

who argue from cultural and social structural perspectives tend to be skeptical about the
positive answer. I find myself identifying with cultural and social structural perspectives,
but less skeptical about a democratic outcome appearing in China in the years ahead.
Both Japan and Taiwan are Asian societies that have similar Asian values and
patron-client social structures, and both have become multiparty democracies while
staying very much Asian (a dialectical integration of modernity and tradition). 9 So at
least theoretically, one cannot exclude multiparty democracy as a possible outcome of
China’s political development. My research question, therefore, is: given this particular
cultural psychology and patron-client social structure, will China’s political development
lead to a multiparty democracy?
(2) My Hypothesis
Chinese culture places great emphasis on the role of the elite in leading
and educating the mass peasants 10 to live a moral life that complies with the natural law
of the universe. If you follow the natural law, not only at the micro-level you and your
family will be blessed by heaven to succeed in farming production (reaping rich harvest)
or climbing the social ladder (raising yourself to the upper level of the Civil Service), but
9

Chie Nakane, Japanese Society (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1970). About the
integration of modernity and tradition , please see chapter nine of this dissertation.
10
Elite-mass (intellectuals-peasants, or , rulers-citizens), patron-client, senior-junior, men-women,
father-son, these are similar relationships in terms of the Confucian family ethics described in the first
section: the mutual flowing of filial affection (from son to father) and merciful love (from father to son).
6

also at the macro-level the whole society and political regime will receive blessings from
heaven so that peace and prosperity will be bestowed upon the whole civilization. If you
live a life or govern the society against the natural law, there will be negative results. This
knowledge has been conveyed through Confucian scripture and Confucianism-influenced
historical writings. In real life, who is to convey such knowledge? The two most
important sources of knowledge are the intellectual elite (Confucian students) through
teachings and the political elite (the emperor and his imperial officials) through political
practice. 11 Therefore, it is both intellectual and political elites that are responsible for the
cultural life of a particular period of time.
When China first encountered the challenge of modernization
through the material advantages of western weapons (a series of military defeats since the
Opium War in 1839 by invading western powers who were driven by commercial
interests), it was once again the intellectual and political elites that first felt the imposing
pressure from the western powers, and the urgent need of modernization. Such a feeling
of urgency to catch up with the West has since occupied Chinese elites’ minds and hearts,
and eventually spread to the whole civilization’s citizens. Nationalism thus dominated
11

The first four emperors of Qing dynasty (1644--1795) are sincere believers of these Confucian religious
teachings on the natural law and heavenly blessings for the civilization. All four ruled the civilization by
sincerely following the natural law, and had attained the highest achievements since the age of Confucious.
All four are Confucian intellectuals themselves.
7

Chinese minds and became the most powerful driving force of the society’s development
and change. Up until now, generation after generation of Chinese intellectual and political
elites have been thinking and practicing different prescriptions to save this country. 12
National wealth and power has become the shared, collective goal for the whole nation to
pursue.
How will China fulfill that goal of national wealth and power? This is
the single most important issue that has been driving Chinese elites to seek answers, and
different prescriptions and projects for China’s development and change have been
formulated, which lead to different practice of democracy in modern Chinese history.
Such practice of “democracy” includes: late Qing dynasty’s constitutional monarchy,
multiparty parliamentary democracy in the early years of the Republic of China, Chiang
Kai-shek’s single-party dominated constitutionalism, Mao Zedong’s version of Leninist
democracy (including People’s Democratic Dictatorship and Proletarian Dictatorship),
and the socialist democracy plus rule by law in the reform era. Because Chinese cultural
characteristics emphasize the role of the elite in leading the citizens in political, social,
and cultural lives, all the historical practice of “democracy” has been significantly

12

Chinese worldview and self-image has changed from being the center of human’s civilization to being
only a member of the international world composed of modern nation-states.
8

influenced by Chinese elite thinking on development and change, which has been driven
by an aspiration to save China—in other words, nationalism. Now because of elite
leadership and teachings, nationalism has spread across the whole population. Whether
China’s political development will lead to a multiparty democracy will depend on how
Chinese elites reconcile the ideals of democracy and Chinese nationalism. I see culture as
an ongoing process of social construction in which the ideas of the elite play the most
crucial role--this is especially true in a Chinese cultural context that emphasizes top-down
education or mobilization to carry out political-social-cultural civilization ideals. My
hypothesis, therefore, is this: the greater the extent to which Chinese elite thinking on
development and change reconciles the tension between Chinese nationalism and
collectivist, family-like ethics on the one hand, and western democratic ideals based on
each self-seeking individual’s subjectivity on the other hand, the greater the chance that
China’s political development will lead to a multiparty democracy.

(3) Literature Review
The development of analytical models in China studies goes from
the totalitarianism model in the 1950s and 1960s; to the pluralist approach in the 1960s

9

and 1970s which includes the factionalism model and structural-functionalism; and then
to new institutionalism in the 1980s and 1990s. All three periods bear the imprint of
liberalism and carry an expectation that China will someday become a liberal democracy.
Therefore, the fourth category will include different versions of cultural and social
structural perspectives that provide views different from the previous three categories.
1. The Totalitarianism Model 13
In the 1950s and 1960s, it was the cold war atmosphere of
confrontation between the free camp of liberal democracies and the communist bloc of
totalitarianisms that influenced the researchers’ perspectives. The totalitarianism model
conveyed an image of China where individuals did not have any channel or space for
political participation. All policies and institutions were decided by the communist party.
Decision-making was top-down, and the communist regime was able to penetrate and to
completely control the whole society. A typical research question was: through what
kinds of means could the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) attain such total control of
Chinese society? 14 Analyses were devoted to the understanding of ideological control,

13

Most of the analyses and citations in the next paragraph, are from Chih-yu Shih, “The Faith in
Individualism in University of California Press for Thirty Years,” in Chih-yu Shih, Shuping Zhongguo
(Book Reviews on China Studies) (Taipei: Hanlu Publishers, 1998), pp. 25-26. But the last sentence is a
comment on this model from Yu-shan Wu, see footnote 18.
14
The most famous work is: Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1963).
10

dogmatization of society, the scale of brainwashing, 15 the purge and crackdown after the
building of the People’s Republic of China, 16 and how peasant nationalism was exploited
by Mao Zedong to help his rise to power in China. 17 This model assumed that the CCP
leadership was united, and policy was based on consensus. 18
Despite its virtue, there are several problems with this model. Firstly,
focusing on the means and skills that the communist regime used to attain the capability
of total control of the citizens leaves one thing unexplained: why were people willing to
be mobilized? Why did Chinese people choose the CCP during the civil war when they
had an alternative, the KMT? The capability of control after the building of the PRC had
to do with the CCP’s great popularity among Chinese people even before it had won the
regime. Chinese people wanted Mao and the CCP to lead them out of the
hundred-year-long national humiliation that had taken place since the Opium War. It was
this aspiration for national liberation that constituted the strong popular support for Mao

15

Some examples are: Robert Lifton, Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalitarianism (New York:
Norton, 1961); Rensselaer W. Lee III, “The Hsia Fang System: Marxism and Modernization,” The China
Quarterly 28 (October-December 1966): 40-62; Franklin Houn, To Change a Nation (Glencoe, III.: The
Free Press, 1961).
16
Karl Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957); Ellis Joffe, Party and
Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949-1964 (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1965); Doak Barnett, China on the Eve of Communist Takeover (New York:
Praeger, 1963).
17
Chalmers Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1962).
18
Yu-Shan Wu, Russian Transitions 1992—1999: A Political Economic Analysis (Taipei: Wu-Nan
Publishers, 2000), p. 48.
11

and the CCP, and it was because of such almost unconditional support that the CCP was
able to carry out any of its projects, because the Chinese people believed that this was for
the good of the whole nation. It might be brainwash, it might be propaganda, but the real
reason for its success was much more than just means, skills, and excellent strategies.
One can imagine, if this aspiration and strong support turn to a belief in liberal
democracy (through elite education) someday, what a blessing will this be to the
democratic promise for China! In short, a belief in individualism had prevented the
researchers from paying attention to the causal power of this strong collectivist aspiration
for national liberation.
Secondly, the model implies that the CCP had fully penetrated
Chinese society, thus the total control of it. If this was the case, why was it that during the
Great Leap Forward many local cadres were able to fabricate production figures to cheat
the center? And this cheating generated significant political outcomes since it misguided
the leadership into believing in the correctness of this movement, which turned out to be
a great disaster. Whether the CCP fully penetrates Chinese society was one of the heated
debates of the 1980s. 19 Thirdly, the model assumed that the CCP leadership was united,
and policies were based on consensus. During some periods of time this might be the case,
19

See the third category of analytical model: new institutionalism.
12

whereas in other periods, factionalism prevailed. This leads us to the second category.
2. Pluralism (Factionalism Model, and Structural-Functionalism)
(1) Factionalism Model 20
In the 1960s and 1970s, cultural revolution and the open dispute
between China and the Soviet Union made the totalitarianism model inapplicable. The
assumption of a united leadership and consensual policies had been questioned. There
seemed to exist serious conflicts within the ruling elite, and plural political forces
competing in the power arena for self-interests seemed to be relevant; thus the
factionalism model emerged to replace the previous totalitarianism model. 21 Factions
were seen as small groups, and therefore interest group analysis seemed to apply. 22 The
organizations and resource distribution of factions were analyzed; the power politics
behind the shift of policies were presented. 23 And China’s sudden change of foreign
policy from pro-Soviet to pro-US was a good subject for analysis. 24

20

Most of the analyses and citations in the next paragraph are from Chih-yu Shih, “The Faith in
Individualism in University of California Press for Thirty Years,” in Chih-yu Shih, Shuping Zhongguo
(Book Reviews on China Studies) (Taipei: Hanlu Publishers, 1998), pp. 26-27.
21
Andrew Nathan’s work could best represent this new turn to factionalism. See Andrew Nathan, “A
Factionalism Model for CCP Politics,” China Quarterly, no. 53 (January-March 1973), pp. 34-66.
22
Martin King Whyte, Small Groups and Political Rituals in China (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1974).
23
Andrew Nathan, “Policy Oscillations in the People’s Republic of China,” China Quarterly 68 (1976).
24
See Thomas Gottlieb, “Chinese Foreign Policy Factionalism and the Origin of the Strategic Triangle,”
Rand Report, R-1902-NA (November 1977) (Santa Monica, Ca: Rand); Kenneth G. Lieberthal,
“Sino-Soviet Conflict in the 1970s,” Rand Report R-2342-NA (July 1978) (Santa Monica, Ca: Rand); John
Garver, China’s Decision for Rapproachment with the United States, 1968-1971 (Boulder: Westview, 1983);
Roger Brown, “Chinese Politics and American Policy,” Foreign Policy 23 (Summer 1976): 2-24.
13

There are two problems with this model, and both relate to
researchers’ lack of cultural sensitivity. Firstly, the above pluralist factionalism model
was based on individualism: it assumed that each self-seeking individual had his own
policy position based on his self-interests, that those individuals who had similar policy
positions would come together to form a faction, and because there existed plural
conflicting interests, different policy positions based on different interests would conflict
with one another and engage in power competition. In this model, the final policy
outcome would reflect the outcome of such power competition behind policy disputes.
Therefore, factions could be classified according to different policy orientations. In short,
policy positions were prior to the formation of factions, and a particular faction reflected
a particular policy position. Policy position was the cause, and factional competition was
the effect.
However, because of Chinese collectivist culture, the reality in China
seemed to be the opposite: the formation of factions was prior to policy positions, and
policy positions were determined not by each individual’s policy preference, but by the
immediate leader of a faction to which each individual belongs. In Chinese culture, an
individual does not see himself as an independent, self-seeking entity with a subjectivity

14

that cannot be penetrated by any collectivity; instead, each individual sees himself as a
part of various social relationships that he enjoys being a part of and is ready and willing
to make contribution by devoting himself to the collective good. Part of this devotion
may come from social or collective pressure, and part of it may be out of sincerity.
Whether it is a moral pretension out of collective pressure or an affectionate enjoyment
out of sincere heart, open pursuit of self interests and open competition for a particular
interest is both embarrassing and uncomfortable, and in some occasions unbearable.
Therefore, factional competition is usually carried out in a very subtle, informal way,
unless the highest central authority has lost its neutral status and involves itself in the
competition. This would lead to open conflicts since the highest leader can no longer be a
neutral arbitrator for the dispute. Therefore, policy positions are determined by a factional
leader, or patron who competes with and defeats opponent factions, and the lower level
followers or clients will comply. Even when an individual has not come to full
understanding of the moral implications or material benefits of a particular policy
position, in his heart he has already decided to support such policy position because of his
trust in his leader or because he is willing to show his filial affection (loyalty) to his
patron. And in return, his patron will take good care of him. Such mutual relationships

15

involve both material interests and adoring love, and are thus more than just rational
cost-benefit calculations. In short, factional competition develops prior to policy positions,
and instead of a particular faction reflecting a particular policy position, factions use
policy positions to engage in power competition: factional competition is the cause, and
policy position is the effect.
Secondly, the above pluralist factionalism model explains foreign
policy by tracing the decision-makers’ foreign policy considerations back to “domestic
political ecology and balance of power.” 25 Here the image of a decision-maker is a
rational individual who is only engaged in a cost-benefit analysis of the domestic reality
of relative power advantages; the moral principles stated in China’s foreign policy were
not taken seriously by the researchers cited above. Such analyses based on rationalism
and individualism may only convey part of the truth and neglect that an important part of
choice-making may come from identity. In the case of China’s foreign policy, national
identity and sub-national collective identity may offer rich accounts for the policy
outcomes. 26
25

Chih-yu Shih, “The Faith in Individualism in University of California Press for Thirty Years,” in
Chih-yu Shih, Shuping Zhongguo (Book Reviews on China Studies) (Taipei: Hanlu Publishers, 1998), p.
27.
26

See Lowell Dittmer and Samuel Kim (eds.), China’s Quest for National Identity (Ithica, N. Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1993); also, Chih-yu Shih, China’s Just World: The Morality of Chinese Foreign Policy
(Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1993), and The Spirit of Chinese Foreign Policy: A Psycho-cultural View
16

(2) Structural-Functionalism
According to Harry Harding, the kinds of messages at hand will
determine researchers’ research content. Indeed, the lack of information available in the
1950s and 1960s contributed to an interpretation of China as under the total control of a
totalitarian, united regime. In the 1970s academic interest in systems theory had turned
researchers’ attention to policy inputs, and such research interest coincided with the
appearance of many refugees in Hong Kong, which offered researchers an unprecedented
opportunity to carry out in-depth interviews and thus research the roles that individuals
played in the policy input process. 27
Structural-Functionalism conveys an image of China as a system,
and various phenomena in society as inputs to the system, which generates policies as
outputs. In the general model, input functions include interest articulation and interest
aggregation, the former being “the way interests are expressed typically in either spoken
or written discourse by individuals and the groups or parties to which they belong,” 28 and
the latter being “performed by political parties and other groups as structures, each
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grouping holding at least some interests in common.” 29 Then through political
participation (competitive elections in democratic countries), these interests will be
represented in the congress and compete with one another to become rules. So output
functions include rule making, rule application, and rule adjudication, and they are
“performed respectively by the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of
government.” 30 The political process is launched by atom-like, self-seeking individuals
and is thus bottom-up participation, from society to state. But in the case of China, not
only the input functions were carried out by a mono structure (communist party), but also
the output functions. Political participation was usually through top-down mobilization
launched by the elite, thus in this model China was seen as incompletely differentiated,
and its participatory culture was categorized as subject culture which belonged to a less
developed category. 31
Critics of this model have long pointed out its weaknesses. 32 Among
them, ethnocentrism is the most severe criticism. In the case of China, just stating that
29
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China’s political system is incompletely differentiated did not guide researchers to
understand the real input functions (like, consultation function) and some subtle practice
of output functions (like, the dilution or intentionally misinterpretation of the center’s
policy spirit at the local or lower working level instead of open resistance of a policy) that
occurred under the current institutions of democratic-centralism. It did not help
researchers to appreciate the pressure that decision-makers faced in a collectivist culture:
for example, Mao had to pretend to keep a neutral moral position among the competing
factions, but at the same time was able to promote the policy that he really wanted, like:
the decision to shift from leaning to the Soviet Union to a pro-United States foreign
policy, during cultural revolution when the aura of the time was still one that was filled
with the extreme sentiment of anti-American imperialism. It did not direct researchers to
be sensitive to China’s usually subtle political language that may signal significant
changes about to occur. 33 Finally it failed to bring researchers into close observation of
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changes in China’s political development. Without the functions and plural structures
listed in this model as necessary for an advanced, fully developed system, and without
bottom-up political participation based on each individual’s interests to be qualified as an
advanced civic culture, the political system and participatory culture in China would be
interpreted as underdeveloped and seen as static, with little change going.
Nevertheless, this model still had its virtue. Some scholar tried to
refine this model and combine some of its elements with other conceptions (incentive
types in sociology, and incentive direction in new institutionalism) to make it a useful
design to account for the change of the communist regime to democratic institutions. This
might have important implications for China’s political development. 34
3. New Institutionalism 35
In political science, there are three versions of new institutionalism:
rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism, and sociological
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institutionalism. 36 Most researchers in China studies who adopt new institutionalism as
an analytical approach belong to the rational choice version. So in this section, when I
refer to new institutionalism, it will mean rational choice institutionalism. Beginning
from the 1980s, China’s reforms had changed the academic impression of a totalitarian
regime, and although the phenomenon of factional competition was still occurring, the
main concerns in China seemed to be centering on economic and political reforms, both
involving the prospect of institutional change. And at the same time, mainstream
academic interest in the 1980s has turned from a pluralist approach (including group
analysis and structural-functionalism, popular in the 1960s and 1970s) to a state-centered
approach consisting of the state-society analytical model and new institutionalism.
Therefore, in China studies, new institutionalism became popular. New institutionalism
emphasized that institutional design could change, strengthen, or sustain a person’s
behavior and values, by the direction of incentive structure. It conveyed an image of
Chinese politics based on the patron-client (cadre-citizen, or central cadre-local cadre)
reciprocal relationship, instead of based on a one-way relationship of state’s total control
of citizens, as described by the totalitarian model. It did not assume that political flow
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was bottom-up (from citizens to state) and interest groups were necessary structure to
perform input functions, as structural-functionalism depicted. The patron-client
relationship described in this model was based on individualism and materialism where
the superiors who had resources in their command reached out to the inferiors to build a
patron-client relationship by a particular means of resource sharing. The unit of analysis
is individual and the incentive for actions is material; the superiors and the inferiors
depended on each other for their personal self interests, so both benefited from such a
relationship. Researches of this kind were conducted in both industrial and agricultural
sectors.
In the industrial sector, a research on factory political culture
discovered such a relationship. A cadre and a worker searched for each other just like two
individuals searching for each other in the market. The cadre wanted to develop his own
relationship network with workers in the factory, and among workers there were some
activists trying to become the chosen ones by performing well in carrying out production
missions and especially in the factory’s political learning sessions. The cadres relied on
these activists to convey political message to workers and feedback message from
workers back to the cadre; and the activists relied on the cadre to favor them with the
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distribution of social, economic, and political welfare. So this was a reciprocal
relationship based on mutual benefits, instead of a one-way, top-down total control; it
was vertically structured rather than the horizontally structured interest groups in a
pluralist model. It was unlike the traditional Chinese patron-client relationship which was
based on ethical order, so such a decision-making culture was named
“neo-traditionalism.” 37
Neo-traditionalism was criticized, however, by another researcher
who offered a different image of the cadre-worker relationship. This was named “unit
socialism.” In neo-traditionalism, the activist workers (the clients) were depicted as
faithful followers of the state cadres (the patrons) in the factory, and such a relationship
naturally strengthened and consolidated the political authority of the state. In contrast,
“unit socialism” emphasized the autonomy and self protection of a factory (as a
community) against the state. Workers in most cases were lifetime employees of a factory
and their material welfare (the basic needs of life, including income, residence, marriage,
and retirement fund) was dependent upon the factory. Factory cadres could not dismiss
these lifetime employees, and cadres themselves usually had to stay at a factory for many
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years before transferring to another enterprise or being promoted to higher position, so
they needed to develop a harmonious relationship with workers in order to attain effective
management. A factory became a community and both state cadres and workers
developed a collective identity of the factory; the most crucial political issue in the
factory, therefore, was the collective income of this enterprise and bonus distribution.
Any decision, thus, was attained by the consensus between cadres and workers. So the
decision-making culture depicted in unit socialism is unlike the patron-client image in
neo-traditionalism. The latter was criticized as a coating of the totalitarianism model
since factory cadres’ resources depended upon the communist party and ultimately it was
the party that commanded the factory decisions. 38
In the agricultural sector, there was a parallel debate between new
institutionalism and neo-classicalism. New institutionalist researcher Oi held a similar
view of patron-client relationship between state cadres, village cadres, and peasant
citizens. Before reform, village cadres and villagers needed to maintain good
relationships with state cadres in a planned economy in order to gain favorable treatment
regarding the quantity and quality of grains levied; in many occasions, villagers had to
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sacrifice their interests to meet the state commissioned production mission. The village
appeared weak and lacked any autonomy before the state. After reform, the property
rights were transferred from the state to the village, and thus enhanced the bargaining
power of village cadres when facing the state cadres. Therefore, a new type of
patron-client relationship had developed where the villagers became loyal to their
immediate village leaders. The role of the state began to withdraw, and village
communities gained more autonomy. 39 Neoclassical scholar Shue, in contrast, saw village
communities, before the reform, as autonomous from the state. Peasant cadres were
always able to find ways to deceive the state and engaged in various economic activities
that benefited the local village community. The Communist party, before, did not really
penetrate Chinese society, and citizen peasants were still only loyal to traditional gentry
now disguised as village cadres under communism. In short, traditional regional
protectionism did not change under the communist state. But after reform, the penetration
of the market was so powerful that it changed villagers’ loyalty to the gentry. Now village
peasants could themselves become free competitors in the market, and no longer relied on
local gentry to raise their living standards. The state became more powerful in exerting its
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influence on village communities due to its ability to influence the market using financial
policies as leverage tools. The role of the state began to rise, and the autonomy of village
communities was weakened. 40 Later, Oi was criticized for neglecting the power of the
market. 41 In response to that critique, Oi argued that lots of non-market means (using
social relationships, including “backdoor economy”) were being utilized, and she
accounted for such phenomena by appealing to each individual’s rational considerations
of material interests. This is a typical argument of new institutionalism in downgrading
the market myth of neoclassicalism. 42
Despite their debates, all the above researchers did not question their
assumption of individualism and materialism. In analyzing the formation of a
patron-client relationship or the bargaining between state cadres and local village cadres,
the unit of analysis was always individual, and the individual actor’s considerations were
always about personal material interests: welfare, job promotion. What was neglected
was that an individual might not be a self-seeking subject as assumed by rationalism.
This is similar to the formation of a faction discussed previously in the factionalism

40

Vivienne Shue, The Reach of the State: Sketches of the Chinese Body Politic (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1988)
41
Nee Victor, “A Theory of Market Transition: From Redistribution to Markets in State Socialism,”
American Sociological Review 54, 5 (1989): 663-681.
42
Jean Oi, “Rational Choice and Attainment of Wealth and Power in the Countryside,” in Goodman and
Hooper (eds.) (1994): pp.64-79.
26

model. Workers and cadres were not like individuals searching for each other in the
market and forming a relationship based only on materialist concerns. Before the
formation of the network in a factory, social relationships had already existed. Factory
network, like factions, were an

opportunity for the existing social relationship to utilize.

Behind the formal factory network were private relationships coming from relatives,
lineage or clan linkage, neighbors, or old factional acquaintance during the Cultural
Revolution. It was after a worker had become a member of the formal network that he
began to develop the kind of activism being observed by Walder, in order to honor the
existing, informal, social relationship as an expression of his filial affection. This was in
opposition to Walder’s theory that he tried to be active, performing well in order to attract
the attention from the cadres, for more material gains. Therefore, researchers’ assumption
of rational individualism created blind spots in the appreciation of the decision-making
culture in the factory. Similarly, a research agenda of existing social relationships
between the bargaining cadres was not included in Oi’s research; thus the rich bargaining
information collected was only interpreted in terms of two independent individuals’
personal interests. The collectivity that the bargaining cadre represented, and the pressure
generated from such collective identity, was absent in the analyses, which was pitiful in
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terms of the time and energy devoted, and the rich information collected in the field work.
Similar rationalist analyses had been presented in several other studies of the
power-money exchange between state cadres and enterprise cadres, 43 or policy
coordination between central and local cadres, 44 but again, each individual cadre was
seen as representing himself and his personal considerations were limited to personal
gains. 45 Still another researcher, Yang, sticking to the position of new institutionalism,
interpreted the abolishment of the commune system in the village as liberalization,
bottom-up development. But he actually understood the importance of political power
struggles in launching reforms, which had little direct relationship with the transaction
cost of the commune system. So he termed village reform as a path “rupture” from the
previous path of the commune system to the current liberal one. The problem is, instead
of a “rupture,” the reform is actually a return to a traditional collectivist path (the small
farm system) where peasants’ concerns were usually based on another collective identity.
In short, despite his good understanding of Chinese collectivist reality, his position of
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new institutionalism guided him to claim that village reform was the achievement of the
maximization of individuals’ interests. 46
In addition to the issue of the patron-client relationship and path
rupture, another important study concerns the issue of property rights. For new
institutionalism, different arrangements of property rights offered different incentive
structures, and thus different opportunities for each self-seeking individual to maximize
his personal interests. Designing clear norms of property rights would enhance each
individual’s personal incentive to pursue efficiency, and thus enhance efficiency at the
macro-level; the normative implication of this was, therefore, a call for democracy in the
process to truly guarantee the protection of private property rights. In contrast, cultural
and social structural perspectives would notice the crucial role of social relationships in
accounting for an individual’s concerns over his social relationships (moral incentive or
moral pretension that generated pressure for upholding, or being not affordable to neglect,
the collective identity and collective interests), and the resulting behavior of using the
opportunities offered in different design of property rights to seek benefit for the
collectivity that he represented, or to consolidate the relationship that he was a part of. So
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the same kind of behavior might have different interpretations from a new
institutionalism perspective versus the cultural and social structural perspectives.
Granick thought that the difference in the arrangement of property
rights would account for both the phenomena that Chinese enterprises had many
“mothers-in-law,” and the extent that enterprises exceeded their quota of work in
production missions. 47 That is, he used the change in property rights to explain the
change both in the environment of enterprise administration, and in enterprise behavior.
The problem was that he might have confused with cause and effect.

Because his

starting point was the change in property rights, he failed to analyze the policy
negotiations among central agencies, local governments, and enterprises that had led to
the existence of or a change in the property rights. When there was a change in property
rights, a researcher should first discover who (the mothers-in-law: which central agencies,
which local governments) had launched the change, and when the local government had
obtained or returned a particular enterprise’s property right, it would mean that all parties
in the policy negotiation had achieved policy consensus about how to distribute the
production missions and interests, and how to define the responsibilities of administration
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and guidance. Therefore, change in property rights was an effect, and the agreed policy
by all negotiating parties (mothers-in-law) was the cause. And how a particular enterprise
would change its production behavior was also an effect of the policy that had determined
the quota of production missions and left the room for extra-production. So researchers
had to first discover who the negotiating parties were, and what collective interests each
negotiating individual represented.
Another scholar, Lee, presented a three-layer patron-client
relationship to analyze interactions among state cadres, enterprise cadres, and workers,
and observed their behavioral adjustment under different property rights institutions. Lee
understood Chinese social relationships (insiders’ conspiracy for collective gains), but
again, like Walder, he saw those social relationships only as tools for each individual to
exploit when taking advantage of the unclear state of property rights. It was seen as a
conspiracy between self-seeking individuals, the unit of analysis being each individual.
Instead, a cultural and social structural view would see any such opportunity as a chance
to be grabbed by an existing social relationship. Any activity, policy, or business would
carry the imprint of interactions among many existing social relationships. The unit of
analysis is each such relationship of which an individual sees himself as a part. Such a
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collectivist spirit may or may not change in the future, but up until now it is still a very
important source in accounting for Chinese people’s behavior. 48
Adopting a purely analytical path (no normative implications
involved), Wu tried to compare four Leninist-party led areas (Mainland China, Hungary,
the Soviet Union, and Taiwan) and see their different developmental paths under the
change in property rights. 49 In order to keep his commitment to a purely analytical
attitude, he developed an abstract classification of three types of property rights. But in
the real world the states of property rights were actually vague, so Wu claimed that his
analysis would not be a structural analysis, but a process analysis, which emphasizes
dynamics and details. But emphasizing dynamics and details caused further problems
because it was very hard to build causal linkage between abstract classification (clear
state of property rights) and the dynamic world in process (constant change of the states
of property rights). So Wu attributed the change of property rights to four outside factors:
ideology, national security, agricultural type, and international financial pressure. In this
way Wu departed from the orthodox new institutionalist position. But he tried to return to
an individualist position and said that each individual maximized his personal interests
48
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under the restrictions structured by these four outside factors. Like other new
institutionalists, Wu did not believe that social relationships accounted for people’s
behavior. Huang , Wu, and Lee all assumed that government officials, managers, and
economists were all commissioned by the state, and that their personal interests lay in the
fulfillment of state directives in raising productivity, and thus getting career promotions.
But many of them took advantage of the unclear states of property rights for personal
gains which would threaten the state interests. The problem is that such opportunism
actually reflected both the unclear state of property rights and the ongoing operation of
the existing social relationships. Without analyzing the operation of the existing social
relationships, the interpretation would not get to a full understanding of the influence of
change in property rights: that is, how these collective social relationships contribute to or
restrict the direction of change in property rights, and how after the reform of property
rights people used new arrangements of property rights to consolidate the existing social
relationships. Institutions, in whatever type, new or old, changed or unchanged, are all
opportunities for people to benefit and consolidate the existing social relationships.
Therefore, one may well be skeptical about the claim that the introduction of democratic
institutions would bring about the behavioral adjustment expected by new
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institutionalism.
4. The Cultural Approach (Cultural-Psychological Model) 50
The above three categories of models are the mainstream models that
have been popular in China studies since the 1950s. There have been very few scholars
adopting a cultural psychological model in China studies. Here I will divide

the cultural

approach into two groups: the first group does not take a teleological view of China’s
political development, and therefore the position is closer to cultural relativism, on the
issues of human rights, the appearance of a civil society based on pluralism, and the final
transformation of China’s political institutions to a multiparty democracy. In short, it
rejects the modernization school, both the initial and sophisticated versions. The second
group is from the modernization school that believes China’s authoritarian culture will
need to change to a democratic culture with economic development and differentiation of
social interests. Here I will present Chih-yu Shih to represent the first group and Lucian
Pye to represent the second.
Chih-yu Shih has long been reminding the academic circle that
liberalist approaches (whether it is totalitarianism model, pluralism in the form of
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factionalism model or in the form of structural-functionalism model, state-centered
approaches in the form of state-society analysis or in the form of new institutionalism)
have all carried a cultural bias based on rationalism and individualism. A good study of
China should be able to enter into the Chinese mindset and the Chinese people’s hearts,
which were formed in the millennia-long cultural tradition and in the century-long clash
of civilizations between China and the West. Both collectivism (from cultural tradition in
the past several millennia) and nationalism (from clash of civilizations in the past century)
should be taken seriously. A collectivist perspective will need to start with the social
relationships that an individual’s identity has been rooted in, which will mean that an
individual’s cognition of “self” may not be independent from the social relationship that
he belongs to. Nationalism should not be seen just as one element of national interests,
because nationalism is a strong collective identity instead of a tool for rational calculation
like the discourse of national interests would present it to be; also, it may not be pertinent
to see nationalism as an antithesis of democracy, though in many occasions it appears so,
which actually comes from clashes of civilizations between modern China and the West.
In his examination of the change in Chinese traditional political
culture under the practice of a socialist economy, Shih argued that the change had been a
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change in nature, not just a cyclical turn that would turn back after some time of
departure, and this was because of the practice of socialist economic institutions. In a
word, there had been a permanent decline, since the Production Great Leap Forward, in
traditional cultural psychological belief in the political regime as a moral regime. The
decline of such a belief was due to the regime’s abuse of moral calling power (calling
people to make tremendous sacrifice to pursue the moral goal of communism that turned
out to be a fake image) to coercively develop communist economic institutions. After that
attempt had failed, the regime still stayed in power and pretended that the moral goal of
communism was still in process and was about to succeed, which made people, from
cadres up to central leaders all become cognizant of the fact that the regime had been
only pretending its moral teachings. The Cultural Revolution which aimed at saving the
regime’s legitimacy (as a moral regime pursuing communism for the benefit of the people)
further led the society into moral bankruptcy, the result of which was the Three
Credibility Crises (Sanxinweiji). Twelve years of reform had proved that the regime was
unable to rebuild moral authority in the political domain. Therefore it seemed that the
moral decline (both of the regime and of the political culture) since the Production Great
Leap Forward had not been just a temporary phenomenon, but a continuous normalcy.
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The proof was all the phenomena occurring in the reform era, which included the wane of
the monoist value system, the openness of factional power struggle , the irrelevance of
ideology, the maturity of regional economic forces, the universalization of market
behavior, the establishment of enterprise identity, the relaxation of the plan system, the
appearance of the local elite, and the loss of people’s goal of life. 51
In a work that questioned the effectiveness of the popular
state-society analysis, Shih presented a theory of two “partial selves” to account for the
seemingly cyclic turns of China’s political-economic development. Each individual,
especially the middle-level cadres (like the enterprise leadership or the village cadres), in
current Chinese society had within his heart two conflicting “partial selves”: one is a
collective identity with the state and its interests, and the other is a collective identity
with the enterprise community or village community that he was in. These two “partial
selves” were in constant struggle within his heart. The way to reconcile such conflicts
was to take turns to satisfy each “partial self” at different time, in different occasions, and
on different issues. In one occasion, he might need to prove himself as a very spiritual
person that had only the state interests at heart, and in another occasion he might just
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forget his identity as a state official and turn to a citizen that very much cared about the
material interests of his community or his personal social relationships. Thus the
macro-level political-economic development would take turns to reflect the rotational
expression of the two partial selves at the micro-level. So each individual in current
Chinese society actually acted as the agent of the state at one moment, and as the agent of
society at another moment, thus making the model of state-society analysis not an
effective or relevant one. In the logic of such an analysis, the expectation of the
appearance of a civil society, and later, democratization in China is groundless, and could
be self-deluding, because people had their own way to pursue their private material
interests (as described above), they wound not need an autonomous civil society, let alone
democratic institutions to protect their private interests. 52
Shih’s other works center on similar concerns about the bias of
liberalism in China studies. His cultural understanding of the Chinese mindset and
Chinese heart made him very skeptical about the expectation of democratization in
China’s political development. In short, Shih emphasized the particularity of Chinese
cultural psychology. China’s political development, Shih argued, might lead to feudal
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pluralism (plural social forces based on collective identity, instead of self-seeking
individual’s subjectivity) and collective democracy (under a single communist party). 53
Long famous in the circle of China studies, Lucian Pye interprets
communist China’s authoritarian political culture as an offspring of traditional imperial
ideology coming from Confucianism. Even the subtle way of factional politics during
Cultural Revolution could be successfully accounted for by Pye’s political psychological
analysis. 54 The reform in the 1980s did not change Pye’s belief in the applicability of
traditional Chinese collectivist culture. 55 For Pye, Chinese political culture of
authoritarianism is rooted in the unique way Chinese saw power. Power was related to
social status. Those who had higher status would not seek power openly, because that
would be seen as selfish; rather, power was devoted to them automatically by those who
had lower status. The leadership only needed to pretend to be moral, neutral, and
representative of all the people without caring about their personal interests or leaning to
one particular faction’s interests. Harmony needed to be maintained on the surface,
though factional politics might be going on heatedly. If factions engaged in open
53
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competition, it would have serious moral implications because that would mean the
highest leader had lost his moral calling power to harmonize the competing interests. This
would in turn cause anxiety across the whole society whose order was based on the
harmonious relationships among citizens and between the moral ruling elite and the
materialistic, selfish peasant citizens. Social mobility is actually moral mobility. Higher
status usually implied higher moral knowledge. Thus the breaking of harmony is the most
unbearable thing. Not only would open competition among citizens not be encouraged,
open challenge to the leadership was something unthinkable-- the leadership represented
the whole society, the whole civilization. Since factions would not engage in open
competition, they would compete in all kinds of subtle ways, for example: hiding behind
policy positions to pretend to compete for moral principles contained in each policy
position. Similar patterns of behavior appeared in the reform era. Negotiation style was a
reflection of social relationships, and material pursuit was an expression of collective
identity and interests. In short, this was a collectivist society and collective identity
needed to be taken seriously. Finally, Pye was a believer of the modernization school,
though a sophisticated one. He expected a change of authoritarian culture would
gradually happen with increasing differentiation of social interests. His interpretation of
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democratization in Taiwan was this: Taiwan was a good example of the traditional thesis
of the modernization school, that economic development would lead to the emerging of
the middle class, which in turn would lead to increasing level of political participation,
which was the process of democratization. 56 Obviously, this would be his expectation of
China’s political development.
(4) Methodology
The title of my dissertation is Chinese Democracy: How Elite
Thinking on China’s Development and Change Influences Chinese Practice of
Democracy (1839—the Current Time). It includes two parts: chapters two to five are
historical analysis, and chapters six to eight are the interviews. The methodology is
qualitative methodology, involving case studies based on historical methods for chapters
two to five, and face-to-face, in-depth interviews in field research for chapters six to
eight.
It is my assumption that Chinese elite thinking on China’s
development and change has been influencing the Chinese practice of democracy since
the Opium War (1839) and will continue to have great impacts upon the Chinese pursuit
of democracy in the next 20 years. I use chapters two to five of my dissertation, the
56

From Pye’s lecture in 1991 (citation to be checked)
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historical analysis, to demonstrate the causal relationship between Chinese elite thinking
on the development and change of Chinese society on the one hand, and Chinese
historical practice of democracy (from 1839 till the current time, including “Leninist
democracy”) on the other hand, the former being the independent variable and the latter
being the dependent variable. The method used in chapters two to five, therefore, is
historiography. I develop my causal analyses based on extensive reading of historians’
and social scientists’ works. And then I use chapters six to eight of my dissertation, the
interviews, as the most current information that reveals Chinese social trends toward the
next 20 years, and make an assessment of whether, in the next 20 years (2004 to 2024),
China will become a western style, multiparty democracy—and if the answer is yes, what
that democracy will look like. For example, one could argue that such a democracy will
be a combination of western democracy (based on the value of individualism) and
Chinese culture (based on the value of collectivism). The method used in chapters six to
eight, therefore, is face-to-face, in-depth interviews.
Whether the argument given in the above example is true is subject to
empirical examination of future events, but it is my job to make a judgment at the present
time in my dissertation, and the judgment is based on chapters two to five, the historical
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analyses of the long-term trend, and chapters six to eight, the information gained from the
interviewees. Although the interviewees (in chapters six to eight) were not necessarily
elites, they came from the four elite groups in current Chinese society: government
officials, intellectuals, businessmen, and media professionals. Their views, I believe,
could represent those views commonly shared by current Chinese elites, and therefore,
according to my assumption, would have significant impacts upon the Chinese pursuit of
democracy in the next 20 years. The interview question did not directly ask question
about democracy; rather, it asked the interviewee’s personal opinions about “the factors
that have been driving or limiting the development and change of X city (in the context of
development and change of Chinese society since 1839), carrying it toward the next 20
years.” So the interviewees did not directly talk about democracy—they just expressed
their views on positive and negative factors that might influence the development and
change of the city that they were in. Because in urban development one can best
experience the tension between traditional values and modern values, the development
and change of a city (in the context of the development and change of Chinese society
since 1839) should reveal valuable information about the social trends.
The interviewees were advised to follow the four-point guideline
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included in the questionnaire: (1) general understanding (the general answer to the
question asked); (2) state role (positive and negative) in the process of development and
change; (3) self role (positive and negative factors for self fulfillment), including career
role (positive and negative), with both roles placed in the bigger picture of the society’s
development and change; (4) expectations for the future (positive and negative). The talks
were open-ended, and semi-structured as described above. From the talks, one could gain
an understanding about the relative weight that an interviewee placed on the state and self
(including his profession). From that, one could make judgments on the social trends:
whether the society was moving toward a culture that will place more emphasis on
individual rights, whether collectivist ethics would still strongly dominate Chinese
people's minds, and if both individualism and collectivism were elements of the value
system of this society, what would be the balance or combination between them? Such
information would include very useful clues for one to judge on the future of the Chinese
practice of democracy (Leninist democracy? western style democracy? or what
alternative routes would emerge?)
The interviewees included four groups of people:
(1) Government officials: those who were employed by the government, worked at a
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government agency or department, and gained their regular income from the
government because of their service in governmental office. This group included the
party cadres.
(2) Scholars (intellectuals): those who taught at universities, and conducted research as
their regular activities besides teaching. This group included those who worked for
research institutes and only conducted research without regular teaching obligations.
This group also included graduate students.
(3) Enterprise people (businessmen): those who owned a company, or worked for an
enterprise. The enterprises included state-owned, collectively owned, privately owned
enterprises, and joint ventures owned by Chinese and non-Chinese.
(4) Media professionals: journalists and program broadcasters who worked for
newspapers, magazines, televisions, or broadcasting networks. This group included
dramatists.
These were face-to-face interviews. Each participant talked for about thirty minutes, or
more if he or she so chose. The interviewee's responses were open-ended; I just took
notes and did not intervene during his or her talks except in necessary situations or for the
purpose of clarification (making sure what I had heard was the same as what he or she
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had just said). It was the interviewee's thoughts and feelings that I wanted to learn from. I
adopted a role like a student to humbly learn from the interviewees, with full respect to
their expressed thoughts and feelings.
I have collected around 120 interviews, and in this dissertation, I
present 18 of them 57 drawn from Shanghai as representative cases, based on my own
judgment that these 18 persons’ opinions can best represent the richness and diversity of
the four groups I am examining. The reason for limiting my initial focus to Shanghai is
that if democratic ideas are to take root in China as a whole, they likely will take hold
first in major, cosmopolitan cities like Shanghai. Although this dissertation is limited to
these 18 cases, I will continue this project in my post-doctoral research on the prospects
of Chinese democracy using the data and other new information from other cities like
Beijing and Guangzhou that are not included in this dissertation. In other words, this
dissertation is only the first part of the project; there will be other parts in the days ahead.
Why do I choose Shanghai instead of Beijing or Guangzhou to
represent China’s future? Compared with Shanghai, Beijing has very little modern
elements: its bureaucrats lean too much toward ideology and its people toward
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See chapters six to eight.
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narrow-minded nationalism; 58 Guangzhou is more business-focused and is not concerned
very much with the issue of democracy.59 Democracy is less likely to begin in these cities.
Shanghai is the most advanced and the most westernized city in the big cities of China. I
believe that the future of China likely will be a fusion of Chinese culture (the traditional
elements) and the western culture (the modern elements). So there are three reasons that I
choose Shanghai. (1) Shanghai has a character that is able to include and intermingle all
kinds of different elements; historically it has achieved a good fusion of Chinese culture
and western culture, so the fusion of different cultures is not unfamiliar to this city. (2)
The tension between traditional elements and modern elements is best represented in the
development of this city, so this city’s residents must learn how best to tackle such
tension to achieve a balance. (3) The problems emerging in the process of
modernization 60 in this fastest growing city are the most obvious, so its citizens
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See chapter eight, the talks from interviewee No. 15.
Here is the reason why:
The Chinese academic field has been placing their greatest hope for social reformation on
the class of private business owners. However, considering how business owners survive in China, one
can easily see that they have developed a symbiotic relationship where their interests depend on the
political elite. For many of them, instead of accumulating wealth through market competition, they
become rich as a result of favors bestowed by government officials. The government officials who
have the power to allot formally national or collectively owned resources have become the ones to
‘create the rich.’ The white-collar and high-tech elites who work in foreign enterprises regard ‘staying
away from politics’ as their core value. They are only interested in becoming rich and having fun and
do not want to endanger the very source of their income.
See He Qinglian, “The New Myth in China: China’s Rising Middle-class Will Accelerate
Democratization.” In (http://www.danke4china.net/ywwz/15.htm).
60
Like lacking concerns of the relationship between human beings and nature, lacking concerns of the
relationship between development and stability, lacking concerns about health or quality of life, and lacking
concerns about each individual’s psychological maturity in the developmental process. See chapter 7, the
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experienced those problems the most closely. From the above three reasons, I believe
Shanghai likely could best represent the future of China as a fusion of Chinese culture
and the western culture. From these 18 interviewees from Shanghai we can see how the
people of Shanghai deal with such tension between tradition and modernity in their
thinking, which may give us a clue about what the future of China (as a fusion of Chinese
culture and western culture) will look like. 61

talks from interviewee No. 13.
61
See chapter nine.
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Interview Question

What are the factors that have been driving (or limiting) the development and change of
this city, carrying it toward the next 20 years?

1. general understanding
2. state role (positive and
negative)
3. self role (positive and
negative), including
career role (positive and
negative)
4. expectations for the
future (positive and
negative)
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The interviewees include four groups of people:

(1) government officials
(2) scholars (intellectuals)
(3) enterprise people (businessmen)
(4) media professionals

Each person can answer the question for about 30 minutes, or more if he or she so
chooses. The question is open-ended and semi-structured, as shown above.
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(5) Outline of the Chapters
Chapter One: Introduction
Chapter Two: The Qing Dynasty in Crisis (1839—1911)
Chapter Three: The Politics in the Republic of China (1912—1949)
Chapter Four: The Years under Mao Zedong (1949—1976)
Chapter Five: The Reform Years (1978—the current time)
Chapter Six: The Interview Cases in Shanghai (1)
Chapter Seven: The Interview Cases in Shanghai (2)
Chapter Eight: The Interview Cases in Shanghai (3)
Chapter Nine: Conclusion
In chapters two to five, I will demonstrate the causal link between the
elites’ views of China’s development and change and the practice of democracy; both
domestic and international contexts will be discussed, so that the formation and change of
elites’ thoughts (the evaluations of and prescriptions for China’s challenges in face of the
West) will become clear. Both collectivism (the elites’ cultural ideals) and nationalism
(the elites’ aspirations to save China) will be included in the analyses. In chapter two,
the late Qing dynasty’s imperial officials and Confucian intellectuals were forced to face
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the power of modernity imposed on them by the invading western powers. The
intellectual and political elites’ views of western advantages have changed from material
weapons to political institutions. Constitutional monarchy was suggested, promoted with
failure, and finally adopted by the late Qing regime. But the regime did not have chances
to seriously practice it, because it was overthrown in just a few years. Before the final
adoption of constitutional monarchy, there was a big debate between the elites about
which path China should follow: keep the imperial system, or revolutionary change to a
republic system? This will be discussed.
In chapter three, the practice of multiparty parliamentary democracy
and the reason for its final failure will be analyzed. After the building of the republic,
both the reformist and the revolutionary intellectual elites were engaged in party politics
in the parliament. The Chinese were bent on democracy, and the spirit of republicanism
dominated the intellectuals’ minds. Then Yuan Shikai, with his personal, selfish ambition,
destroyed this newly budding democracy by trying to bring the nation back to its old
imperial path and becoming the Emperor himself. Both the reformist and the
revolutionary intellectuals, cherishing the hard built republic and the enlightened spirit
contained in it, actively devoted themselves to military revolts against Yuan, and finally
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saved the republic. The subsequent politics, up until 1949, did not offer a chance for
China to continue its practice of democracy, but the spirit of republicanism had been
inherited by the intellectuals of the May Fourth Movement (1915-1923), and carried by
generation after generation of liberal intellectuals.
In chapter four, Mao Zedong Thoughts and the Communist Party’s
practice will be analyzed. As argued before in this chapter (chapter one), the CCP had
been popular and won the mind and heart of Chinese people. And it was because of such
unconditional support from the Chinese people that communist party was able to carry
out any project, as long as the Chinese people continued to believe that it would benefit
the whole nation. Nationalism accounted for such strong support, which gave Mao an
unprecedented opportunity to experiment with his utopian romanticism. It turned out to
be a great disaster. How did history develop like this? The reason behind this will be
analyzed.
Chapter five discusses the institutional origin of the major problems
that China has been facing in the reform years. The problems will be classified into four
categories: the economy, the social structure, the politics, and the culture. These problems
have to do with the communist party’s insistence on the one party dictatorial rule. Deng
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Xiaoping Theory will be investigated, and Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represent” discourse
and Hu Jintao’s ideas of “scientific development” and “the harmonious society” will be
briefly discussed.
In chapters six to eight, the interview information will represent the
most current views and attitudes on the social trend toward the next 20 years (2004 to
2024). How will an individual see himself? Is there a difference between generations?
How will people reconcile nationalism and individualist values? How will people see the
state’s role? In chapter nine, I will try to detect whether there is a trend in elites’ ideas to
reconcile nationalism and democracy, and then make my own judgment of China’s
political development. From 1839 to the current time, and further to the next 20 years
(2004 to 2024), there must be a trend, I assume, and the empirical information will give
us the answer.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE QING DYNASTY IN CRISIS (1839-1911)

As stated in chapter one, the Chinese intellectual elite, the educated
stratum, has been both the political and/or cultural leaders of the society and the driving
force of societal change. In traditional, dynastic China, an important part of the ruling
elite--the imperial bureaucracy--had been composed of and recruited from intellectual
elite who mastered in Confucian doctrine on how to govern a society based on a set of
moral principles that was believed to be rooted in the natural law of the universe. Thus,
traditionally an intellectual 62 had two ways of self fulfillment: he could either join the
imperial bureaucracy and become a member of the ruling elite (the political and cultural
elite), or stay outside of the officialdom and become a member of the cultural elite by
engaging in teaching or illuminating Confucian knowledge and spreading it to the whole
society and generation after generation of Chinese to come. The role of the Chinese
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Chinese intellectuals are always Confucian intellectuals. Some of them might be interested in Taoism and/or

Buddhism, but for the most part they will still master in Confucianism, because that is the only way of social mobility,
and because the whole society was built upon Confucian moral principles.
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intellectuals, thus, has been to carry a missionary spirit of safeguarding and spreading
Confucian teachings of civilization ideals for the whole of mankind. It is because of this
missionary spirit that Chinese elite (both intellectual and political) had difficulty in
modern time (i.e., from the Opium War onward) in coming to terms with the seeming
superiority of the western civilization to the Chinese one.
(1) The International Factors
Traditionally China never faced a challenge coming from the ocean;
its threats always came from the mainland, especially the northern nomadic tribes.
Challenges from the ocean, posed by the western imperialist powers in the 19th century,
seemed to be far more serious than the traditional ones. The threats contained three
aspects: material, institutional, and cultural. Materially, the western powers were superior
in national wealth and military power; institutionally, their constitutionalism with a
parliamentary system seemed to operate better and more efficiently for the benefit of the
citizens; and culturally, the doctrines and spiritual faith underpinning their civilization
seemed to work better than the Confucianism that had been so central in the Chinese
elites’ spirit. These three aspects had in turn occupied the mind and heart of Chinese
elites in the modern time--that is, since the Opium War (1839-1842).
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Chinese elites, in their cause of “saving China,” had continually
presented different types of prescriptions, respectively in different periods, to meet the
challenges posed by the invading western powers. China had been militarily weak in the
face of the advanced military technology of the West, so the first type of prescription,
responding to the perceived material advantages of the west, focused on the military
building with advanced weapons and gunboats. 63 This was the core of the
Self-strengthening Movement (1860-1893), led by several famous imperial officials (the
political elite who were also Confucian intellectual elite) who had successfully defeated
the intractable Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), and other rebellions. 64 The efforts of the
Self-strengthening Movement proved to be a thorough failure in a series of humiliating
defeats in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895); the Northern Fleet that marked the
military efforts of the past thirty years was totally destroyed. China, with its old ways,
proved to be unfit for competition in the survival game in the new world. 65 Thus came
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The efforts also included railroad building and mining.
They are the Nian Rebellion (1853-1868) , the Southwest Muslim Rebellion (1855-1873), and the
Northwest Muslim Rebellion (1862-1878)
At the final stage of the determinant naval battle (in Feb., 1895), when Chinese commander-in-chief,
with his high-ranking subordinates, was prepared to kill himself as a martyr for the Court, he even
received a letter of persuasion of surrender from his Japanese counterpart that explained the reasons why
China failed again and again in both land and naval battles. The reasons lay, according to the Japanese
commander-in-chief, in the differences between China and Japan in the attitude in learning from the west,
and therefore, China had to change its old ways and institutions, like Japan, in order to survive in the
new world.
This letter, with its persuasion and mocking sarcasm. . . coming from the chief of the enemy
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the second type of prescription: political reform (the institutional change).
The first effort at political reform was led by Kang Youwei and his
student, Liang Qichao, both outstanding intellectuals from the southern intellectual group.
Kang and Liang, inspired by the British model, wanted to change the Chinese imperial
system to a constitutional monarchy. They sent their ideas (in the form of a petition) to
the young Emperor in 1895 and organized a very powerful association, Qiangxue Hui
(the Association of Learning on National Power) that won the support of several famous
and powerful Court mandarins, including the teacher of the Emperor. The supporters of
this association actually represented the intellectual elite of China at that time; this was
because after the desperate defeat in 1895, the whole of the Chinese intellectual elite
were aspiring to institutional change, seeing this as the only way to lead China to become
a strong nation. 66
In 1898, Kang and Liang gained an opportunity to fulfill their dreams.
that had completely destroyed both Chinese army and its naval forces, was really a blow of ‘shock
therapy’ to the long paralyzed Chinese political and intellectual elite, leading the defeated nation to
awaken, to the message that ‘political reform’ was far more important than ‘technological
reform.’ . . . And from then on, the call for ‘institutional reform’ was thus like an irresistible tempest,
and thus emerged the environment for Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao.
For the citations here (italics by me) and the text of the letter of persuasion of surrender, See Degang
Tang, Wanqing Qishi Nian, San: Jiawu Zhanzheng Yu Wuxu Bianfa (The Seventy Years in Late Qing
Dynasty, Book 3: the War in 1894 and the Institutional Chang in 1898) (Taipei: Yuanliu Publishers, 1998),
pp. 128-130.
66
Unfortunately, Kang was not good at handling human relationship. Almost all Court mandarins were
pushed away by his uncompromising dogmatism in Confucian knowledge, which seriously damaged the
political base of the Association. The Association was impeached and forced to be dismissed in 1896.
The collapse of the Association had sown the seed of failure in the Hundred Days Reform in 1898. See,
Degang Tang, op cit., pp.179-189, 192-195, 199-200.
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The international powers had recognized the internal weakness of the old Court after its
defeat in 1895, and fearlessly, since 1897, engaged in carving up its territory into spheres
of influence; China was facing the crisis of partition. The young Emperor was eager to
save this country. Thus occurred the historic Hundred Days Reform. Both the Emperor
and Kang were so eager to conduct a complete, radical, immediate change that it
stimulated tremendous resentment among the old, obstinate bureaucrats, who brought
their hatred to the Empress Dowager Ci Xi, the emperor’s “mother” and the real powerful
figure despite her recent retirement from the Palace, and strongly asked her to come back
to the Palace. The factional politics thus undermined the Hundred Days Reform, with a
tragic end that witnessed the Emperor being placed in confinement, Kang and Liang
fleeing to Japan, and six figures related to the Reform getting killed 67 .
Both Kang and Liang were unsuccessful in their efforts to build a
new China. After fleeing to Japan, Liang became the most influential figure in bringing a
whole generation of Chinese youth to enlightened thoughts by his tremendously attractive
articles 68 . From 1899-1901, Liang advocated constitutional monarchy and attacked the
Court politics. But staying long in Japan gave Liang an opportunity to broaden his ideas.
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Kang’s younger brother had nothing to do with the Reform, but he was among the six that were killed.
For the story in this paragraph, please see: Degang Tang, op cit., pp. 190-200.
Liang started several publications sequentially to convey his ideas since 1899.
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He contacted many Japanese, read extensively on western learning, and met Sun Yat-Sen
and was moved by revolutionary ideas. From 1901-1902, Liang became an ardent
advocate of revolution and therefore separate from his teacher Kang Youwei, though he
did not leave Baohuang Hui ( The Association of Protecting the Emperor) 69 . But
beginning in 1903, after his trip to America, Liang changed again and returned to the
camp of constitutional monarchy. Liang was disappointed by American democracy and
what he saw as the low quality of overseas Chinese in America. If overseas Chinese who
had better economic and educational status were not qualified for a republic, how could
the poorer and less-educated citizens back in China form a successful republic? Thus,
until the successful revolution in 1912, Liang did not change his hope of a constitutional
monarchy in China to save this country. 70
The second effort at political reform, initiated by Sun Yat-Sen, was
revolution. Sun started this effort when he witnessed the Qing’s incapacity, evidenced by
the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, to deal with international challenges. Sun first started
Xingzhong Hui (The Association of Reviving China) in 1894, with a slogan of “expelling
69

Kang launched this association after fleeing to Canada, and then to Japan, in an effort to protect and save
the Guangxu Emperor and continue the abortive political reform, so the association became the house of
constitutional-monarchical faction, as opposed to Sun Yat-Sen’s revolutionary faction.
70
See, Gongquan Xiao, Zhongguo Zhengzhi Sixiang Shi (The History of Chinese Political Thoughts),
BookⅡ( Taipei :Lianjing Publishers, 1984), pp.782-783, 798-801. Also, Andrew Nathan , Chinese
Democracy, Chinese translation (Taipei: Wu Nan Book Company, Ltd. ,1994) pp. 89-94. English version,
(1985), chapter 3.
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Tatar, reviving China,” so this was a revolution based on ethnic identity. In 1905, Sun
organized Tongmeng Hui (the League of Associations) whose slogan expanded to
“expelling Tatar, reviving China, establishing republic, equalizing land.” The political
outline stated in its declaration was this: overthrowing the Manchurian government and
returning a Han regime to Chinese; establishing a national government whose people
enjoy the rights of political participation, and instituting the constitution of the Republic
of China; reforming social-economic organization, and finally setting the price of land,
attributing land to the state, and having it shared by all people. The polity had to be
changed to a democracy, whose ethos was “freedom, equality, and fraternity.” The
procedure to carry out such a political program was divided into three stages: first, the
military rule; then, the provisional constitutional rule; and finally, the constitutional
rule. 71
After 1905, the revolutionary faction versus the constitutionalmonarchical faction were engaged in a series of debates that lasted for more than two
years; Sun Yat-Sen’s followers fighted against Liang Qichao. The central concern was:
how could China become a wealthy and powerful nation, in the face of the western
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Please see, Tingyi Guo, Jindai Zhongguo Shigang (The Outline of Modern Chinese History), (Hong
Kong: Chinese University Press, 1980),pp. 374-380.
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challenges? 72 The debates centered on four areas. First, on revolution: Liang argued that
revolution would lead to domestic disorder, which would invite international powers’
interference and thus cause the partition of China, so China must improve the current
government and perform constitution building. The revolutionary faction argued that
revolution was an internal affair, not xenophobia; the international situation would not
permit the partition of China, and even if it did cause interference, there was nothing to
be afraid of, for this would just stimulate national indignation. There was no way to
improve the current government, so the only way was to overthrow it. Second, on
excluding Manchus: Liang argued that the political and legal equality between Manchus
and Hans had been achieved, and we should engage ourselves in ethnic integration to
become a nation capable of resisting foreign nations. For Liang, insistence on excluding
Manchus was equivalent to “revanchism” and violence. Liang also expressed his concern
that the Han people were not yet capable of building a nation. The revolutionary faction
argued that excluding Manchus was to exclude the bad Manchurian government, and
after Manchus stepped down, domestic ethnic groups would naturally integrate;
excluding Manchus was the pre-condition of political revolution, and, once again, it’s
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See, Michael Gasster, “The Reform and Revolution in China’s Political Modernization Movement,”
in Chinese abridged translation by Weiying Gu, in Nengshi Lin, and Pingsheng Hu (eds.), A Selected
Compilation of Papers on Chinese Modern History (Taipei: Huashi Publishers, 1984), p.58.
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futile to pin hopes on Manchus to institute a constitution.
Third, on people’s rights: Liang presented his views that Chinese
citizens were not qualified for a republic, not even for a constitutional monarchy, and
managing to force its performance would only lead this nation to perish; ten years of
enlightened autocracy would be appropriate. The revolutionary faction presented
Rousseau’s ideas of natural rights, arguing that people were inherently qualified for a
republic and their capability would finally surpass that of the government; the spirit of
freedom and equality were commonly shared by all human beings, and Chinese were not
an exception. Fourth, on state ownership of land: Liang argued that Chinese economic
and social organizations were better than those of the West; land annexation had not been
very serious; if state ownership of land was performed during the period when a
revolutionary army rose, the wandering rascals would grab the opportunity to rob all
property of the rich people and cause overall national disorder, and if it was performed
after the revolution, the ill effects also abounded. Liang said the priority should be
resolving the issue of capital first, and then the issue of land, and rewarding the capital
should override the protection of laborers; otherwise China would be filled with foreign
capital and the Chinese would become slaves forever. The revolutionary faction argued
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that revolution was for the welfare of poor people; when land was owned by the few, like
in America, capital would also be owned by them, thus the gap between the rich and the
poor would be huge. Therefore, the revolutionary faction argued, “to solve social
problems, it was necessary to first resolve the issue of land,” and state ownership of land
would prevent the land from falling into the hands of the few. When land was owned by
the state, they said, capital would also be owned by the state; thus the state would become
a great capitalist to produce for the benefit of all people.73 In about six months, the
revolutionary faction gained the upper hand over Liang, and after the building of the
Republic of China in 1912, Liang totally changed his position and became one of the
most faithful figures of the republic. 74
(2) The Cultural Ideals
The Chinese intellectual stratum is a group of people that carry the
cultural ideals of Confucianism, which sees the collective welfare of mankind as the
responsibility of each individual. Thus, an individual, well-schooled in Confucianism,
tends to see his purpose of life as improving the lives of all human beings. 75 How will he
be able to achieve that? Here comes the Confucian belief of human nature as basically
73
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The above four areas of debates were from Tingyi Guo, Jindai Zhongguo Shigang ( The Outline of
Modern Chinese History) (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1980), pp. 381-382.
See, Gongquan Xia, op cit., p. 802; pp. 822-823.
In Chinese term, it is called Tianxia Shengmin, means: all people under Heaven.
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good. If an individual is sincerely and diligently engaged in cultivating his innate good
nature, the benevolent love born of Heaven, he will then be able to take good care of his
family, and next, be able to govern the country well, and finally, be capable of pacifying
the world. Either being a teacher (a cultural leader) or being a ruler (a political leader)
can fulfill the above goals. A teacher can assist others to cultivate their inner benevolent
love and spread it to the whole human community, and a ruler can base his political
practice on the same power of love and help people follow his example. The fundamental
belief is that all men are born equal, with the same benevolent love in their heart. 76
People can love each other as they love their families. This is how a country can be
governed well and the world can be pacified--through the power of love and mutual
assistance.
Chinese intellectuals in late Qing period (1839-1911) all carried such
cultural ideals. In the face of western challenges, they aspired to save this country; they
wanted to learn from the west, but at the same time they cherished their cultural ideals so
much that they could not help presenting all kinds of prescriptions that would preserve
Chinese cultural ideals as the core, and absorb Western advantages as they perceived
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See the classical Confucian scriptures; Lunyu (The Analects of Confucius) ; Mengzi (The Book of
Mencius) ; Daxue (The Great Learning); Zhongyong (The Golden Mean); Datong (The Great Harmony).
All could be found in (Taipei: Shangwu Publishers).
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differently. Thus, the intellectual-political elite in the Self-strengthening Movement
(1860-1893) only saw the material aspect of the West as worth learning: they thought that
as long as they could be strong enough to repel the Western invasion, they would be fine.
They never thought of changing the Confucian political institutions as an alternative.
After the thorough, humiliating defeat in 1895, political reform was deemed necessary
and urgent. Thus came Kang Youwei in 1898. But still, in Kang’s ideas, the monarchy
should be preserved, and Confucianism as the guiding principles (the national religion) of
the political society should be maintained; what was needed was introducing
constitutionalism, the western educational system, western military training, mining, and
railroad building. After fleeing to Japan, Kang clearly opposed Sun Yat-Sen’s revolution
because, for Kang, the survival of a nation lay in its history, customs, and culture. 77
Liang Qichao changed his positions very often, but overall, he was
“an enlightened patriot” close to British liberals. 78 Liang saw Confucius as the
representative of Chinese civilization, and as the pivot upon which Chinese integration of
oneness over the past two thousand years relied, and therefore, Confucian teachings
should be the central principles of social education in the days ahead. 79 But at the same
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time, he emphasized the importance of independent thinking and reminded his readers
not to become slaves of the ancient saint, Confucius. Sun Yat-Sen also carried such
Confucian cultural ideals. Sun’s ideas were best represented by his Three Principles of
the People, which was an integration of Confucian doctrine and Western thoughts. In the
first Principle, Nationalism, he extolled Confucian political philosophy: governing the
country and pacifying the world based on self moral cultivation and taking care of the
family, seeing it as the best in the world which had not been discussed by any foreign
thinker. Then he asked the Chinese not to learn from the imperialism of the world powers,
but to revive the old Chinese virtue of peace-loving and helping the weak, so that when
China became strong, it could help the weak nations, extinguish world imperialism, and
pacify the world. He said that this was the responsibility of China, and each individual
Chinese should assume such responsibility and lead the world to “Great Harmony”--the
ultimate ideal of Confucian politics. 80
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CHAPTER THREE:

THE POLITICS IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

(1912-1949)

The building of the Republic of China (on Jan. 1st, 1912) did bring
about a modern parliamentary democracy that lasted for only two years (1912-1913).
During that period, with freedom of speech and association, Chinese were bent on
democracy, and both the reformist and the revolutionary factions in late Qing China were
now, continuing their competition, engaged in party politics in the parliament. 81
Unfortunately, Yuan Shikai, the president at that time, totally destroyed this newly
budding democracy by dissolving the parliament in 1914 and trying to restore the
imperial monarchy from 1915 to 1916. The attempt foundered and Yuan died shamefully.
That is to say, the republic won over autocracy in Chinese minds. This means the Chinese
had turned to the road of modern civilization. Although politics in the subsequent years
(1916-1928) were dominated by warlord politics that carried no concerns for democracy,

81

See Yufa Zhang, Zhongguo Xiandai Shi (The Modern History of China) (Taipei: Donghua Bookstore,
1982), pp. 85-93.
68

the spirit of republicanism did not die. Here came the third type of prescription: the
cultural reform. A new generation of prominent intellectuals, gathering in Beijing
University, launched an intellectual movement (1915-1923) that thoroughly questioned
the value of old ethics, customs, and knowledge. The essence of this movement was
democracy and science. It carried the spirit of the western Enlightenment Movement, and
advocated individualism and liberalism. Its goal was to educate Chinese youth to become
independent individuals free from any intellectual, religious, or political authority. When
Chinese youth all modeled themselves in the new thoughts, they would change Chinese
society: its culture, its social institutions and customs, and its politics. In other words, the
movement aimed at building a new civilization for China through the power of education.
Thus, Confucian ethics and institutions, the domestic warlord politics, the invasion of
China by foreign powers, were all barriers for China to pursue progress and independence.
Students educated in such thoughts were strongly patriotic and idealistic. On the one hand,
they were independent individuals with liberalism as their value; on the other hand, they
were ready to shoulder the whole nation and devote all they had for the good of it. 82
In the South, Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary efforts were inherited, after
his death in 1925, by Chiang Kai-shek, who launched the Northern Expedition in 1926
82
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and united the nation in 1928. Chiang built the nationalist government in Nanjing, and in
the next several years Chiang was embroiled in civil wars both with the Nationalist
Party’s military factions (1929-1931) and with the Communist Party’s army. To annihilate
the communist army, Chiang launched five military operations, 83 which drove the
communist forces out of their base in Jiangxi province, and forced them to flee to the
north of Shanxi province to rebuild their base there. Chiang wished to continue his efforts
to completely extinguish the residual communist army, but he was kidnapped in 1936 by
Zhang Xueliang, head of the northeastern army, who did this to force Chiang to stop the
civil war and begin to resist Japanese invasion. Chiang had to change his course, stopping
the military operation against the communists and accepting their proposal of the
“National United Front of Resistance against Japan.” Then, with the Japanese increasing
military aggression, the War of Resistance started on July 7th, 1937. Thus began the
eight-year long national struggle. In 1945, China won the war and Chiang became the
national hero of that time, but civil war soon followed. The civil war ended with
communist victory all over the country in 1949, and Chiang fled to Taiwan.
Politics in the Early Years of the Republic of China (1912-1916)
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The success of revolution in October, 1911, was a chain reaction that
caused many provinces to announce independence. Most of them were located in the
South, and thus the situation was the South (the revolutionary forces) versus the North
(the Qing Court). The Qing Court called Yuan Shikai, who used to be the head of the
Northern Army and was removed from office due to factional politics, to come back to
fight the revolutionaries with an offer of the premiership, and Yuan accepted. 84 Yuan’s
appearance brought hopes to the Qing Court, the revolutionary army, and the
international powers. The Qing Court expected him to stop the revolutionary army; the
revolutionary army expected him to dethrone the Qing Court, since he was a Han; the
international powers, seeing Qing as a dead-end regime, expected him to be reconciled
with the revolutionary army so that Chinese societal order could be restored and
foreigners’ life and property could be protected. Yuan seemed to satisfy all three sides: he
sent an army to capture Hankou, a stronghold of the revolutionary army; at the same time,
he sent people to promote reconciliation with the revolutionaries; and he communicated
his determination to restore domestic order to the foreign powers. 85
The South was quick to elect Sun Yat-sen as the provisional President,
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on Dec. 29th, 1911, in Nanjing. Yuan was pretty unhappy about this because he wanted to
be the head of the new China. But Sun had been clear in the reconciliation talks, saying
that if Yuan approved of the republic and dethroned the Qing Court, he would resign and
let Yuan assume the presidency. And so it happened; the provisional Senate elected Yuan
as the second provisional President. Sun originally wanted Yuan to assume office in
Nanjing so as to get him under control by the South. Yuan made an excuse 86 to avoid this
and assumed office in Beijing, so the provisional Senate finally had to move to Beijing,
and thus the South and the North achieved national unification in April, 1912.
Though the revolutionaries did not obtain the presidency, a group of
them in the provisional Senate, led by Song Jiaoren, thought that they could still obtain
real power if they could win the parliamentary elections to influence the parliament and
organize a party cabinet. Thus, Song actively absorbed the old bureaucrats and the
radicals, expanding the Tongmeng Hui to become the Guomindang (the Nationalist
Party) 87 , and Liang Qichao organized the Jinbudang (the Progressive Party) to compete
with it. Thus China had party politics in the parliament in the early years (1912-1913) of
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the Republic. 88
Before Yuan Shikai revealed his later intention to turn the nation back
to the imperial monarchy, Liang Qichao thought Yuan to be someone that he could
cooperate with. So the Jinbudang’s position was to support the government’s policy, and
in contrast, the Guomindang stood in opposition to the government. The two parties
competed in the following areas: the parliamentary elections and several significant bills;
the composition of the cabinet and its relationship with the parliament; and the attitude
toward the formation of the constitution. 89
Song Jiaoren advocated a parliamentary system, and Yuan Shikai
wanted a presidential system. Song’s leadership did win the parliamentary elections and
gain majority seats in both Senate and House in early 1913. The implications of such
results were threatening to Yuan. Now the Guomindang could not only organize a party
cabinet, but it could also compete for the presidency because the president was supposed
to be elected by both Senate and House. After the elections, Song saw himself in a
position of the future premier and so actively promoted his political views, which
proposed a parliamentary system and emphasized that the election of the president should
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come after the formulation of the constitution, so that the presidential power would be
constrained by the constitution. Yuan determined to assassinate Song, and so it happened
in March, 1913. 90
After the incident, Sun Yat-sen swore that Yuan must be removed
because of the assassination of the founding father. He gained little support from his
fellow party members, however. 91 But several other highly controversial bills further
made Yuan’s regime unbearable. Among them was the Big Loan. Because of Song’s
assassination, Yuan and the Guomindang were in a state of increasing conflict, and he
needed a big sum of money to prepare for it. Thus in April, 1913, after a contract was
signed, he was able to gain a big loan from a bank group of five nations (including
Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and Russia), with Chinese salt revenues and the
Customs surplus as security. The bank groups’ people were permitted to be associate and
assistant managers in the Audit Office, and its branches, of the Salt Sale. This loan further
worsened the relationship between Yuan and the Guomindang, because after the
assassination, Yuan’s plot to militarily handle the Guomindang had become clear, and the
loan would facilitate the matters. 92
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In May 1913, four Guomindang’s provincial governors published an
open telegram to denounce the government’s involvement in the Song case and the Big
Loan. Yuan immediately counter-attacked by removing three of them from their positions
in June, and continually sent armies to the South. Thus Guomindang started the Second
Revolution in July, 1913, in Jiangxi province. Unfortunately, within two months, the
Second Revolution failed. The reasons for that were pretty clear. First, most military
forces supported Yuan. Secondly, the nation had just restored order, people were tired of
war, foreign powers would not like China to continue its chaos, and the Jinbudang led by
Liang Qichao supported Yuan, expecting him to build a strong government. Thirdly, there
had been division in the revolutionary camp about whether to use force, and after the war
started, the fellow provinces did not reinforce each other to form a united power. 93
In the parliament, Yuan had been struggling for his power. Before the
Second Revolution, Yuan had organized the Association of the Research of the
Constitution to influence the formulation of the constitution in the parliament. The
anti-governmental faction advocated a parliamentary system and decentralized authority,
and the pro-governmental faction favored a presidential system and centralism. After the
failure of the Second Revolution, the Jinbudang and the Guomindang agreed to elect the
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president first, and then formulate the constitution. On Oct. 6th, 1913, Yuan was elected
the president, and he continued to struggle for presidential power. Then, under the
cooperation of the Guomindang and the Jinbudang, the legislators soon settled the draft
of the constitution which stipulated that the polity was a unified democratic country; the
parliament was made up of two Chambers; the government was a parliamentary system;
the president would be elected by an electoral meeting organized by the legislators; and
the amendment to and interpretation of the constitution was supposed to be conducted by
a constitutional meeting organized by the legislators. 94
Yuan was very upset about such results, especially about the
stipulations that the president’s appointments and removals of administrators must be
agreed to by the parliament, and that the president had no power to dissolve the
parliament. He sent eight people to present his views but was rejected by the parliament.
Thus, on Oct. 25th, 1913, Yuan published an open telegram to denounce the draft of the
constitution as bad and the Guomindang as misleading the country. Soon governors,
chiefs of civil affairs, and military commanders from every province published their open
telegrams to advocate rescinding the draft of the constitution and discharging the
Guomindang. The legislators still advanced to pass the draft of the constitution on Oct.
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30th, and present the constitutional meeting organized by both Chambers on Nov. 3rd. 95
On Nov. 4th, Yuan Shikai gave an order to discharge the Guomindang
and cancel its legislators’ qualification by retrieving their certificates. The purposes of
this action were to remove his enemies in the parliament, and at the same time to stop the
operation of the legislature. Up to 438 legislators were disqualified, and therefore both
Chambers could not proceed due to lack of a quorum. Thus, the draft of the constitution
had to be suspended. In addition, Senate on Dec. 3rd, and House on Dec. 17th both
presented their interrogation on the issue of making up the quorum, only to get the
answer that they could not perform their power of interrogation due to lack of a quorum.
And again, governors and chiefs of civil affairs from every province published open
telegrams to ask for the dissolution of the parliament. Thus on Jan. 10th, 1914, Yuan
declared the termination of the legislators’ duty. 96
The dismissal of the Guomindang and the closing of the parliament
led to the dissipation of party activities in China. The parliament had been the locus for
the parties to compete and associate with one another, and now it was gone. The utility of
the Jinbudang for Yuan no longer existed since Guomindang was gone. The attitudes of
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the party members from all factions could be classified as three kinds. (1) Those who had
lusted for fame and power originally joined a party as a stepping-stone of the path to
success, and since the parties had dissipated, they left it soon. (2) Those who saw
themselves as decent and clean and had from the very beginning taken little interest in the
party activities, and whose membership of a party was mostly based upon the social
relationships of relatives, friends, and subordinates, now found good reasons to escape. (3)
Those who had political ideals in their mind and now found no channel to fulfill their
dreams either were biding their time, like Liang Qichao and others, or turned
underground to prepare for another military cause against Yuan, like Sun Yat-sen and the
Guomindang people. For Sun and the Guomindang people, the hard built republic had
been completely destroyed by Yuan, and the revolutionary cause had to be restarted. 97
Yuan Shikai’s ambition to mount the throne under imperial monarchy
did not emerge until late 1915. After the dismissal of the Guomindang and the closing of
the parliament, Yuan was able to expand his power as he wished, and extended his forces
deep to the South. Thus, in Feb. 28th, 1914, he gave an order to dissolve all the provincial
councils. Now no forces could check his power. In March, 1914, a magistrate presented a
proposal to change the tenure of presidency from a set term to lifetime, and Yuan gave
97
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instant response to refer it to every provincial governors and chiefs of civil affairs. Thus
started Yuan’s movement toward an imperial system. 98
The movement was disguised as bottom-up. At first, a Columbia
University professor Frank J. Goodnow published an article arguing that monarchy was
better than democracy. At that time Yuan had inspired Yang Du,

then

the counselor of the Presidential Palace, to find some associates to promote his ideas. On
Aug. 15th, 1915, six figures, led by Yang Du, started the Chouanhui (the Association of
Operation for Peace) in Beijing for this purpose. On Aug. 26th, Yang published the views
of the Association: “Constitutional Monarchy to Save the Country,” arguing that only
constitution building could save the country, and only monarchy could achieve
constitution building. Many regions sent open telegrams to approve of the views, and
several provinces successively organized branch associations. 99
In addition, the imperial faction maneuvered people to present
petitions for polity change, and Yuan gave an order, on Aug. 30th, to accept them. Thus in
September, an organization, called the United Association of National Petitions, was
formed to present petitions from every province. But Yuan wanted the show to appear to
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come from public wishes, so the United Association of National Petitions asked for
Conferences of Citizens’ Representatives to resolve the issue of polity change. Thus the
Conferences were built in every province. The fact was, the representatives in every
province were those people who had already had relationships with the central
government, the content of petitions had been written in advance by people
commissioned by Beijing, and similarly, the content of the open telegrams of support sent
by every province was written in the same way. People were silently in fear of Yuan’s
power; only Liang Qichao, disregarding personal security, voiced his disapproval openly
on Sep. 3rd, fiercely denouncing all these hypocritical shows. Ministers of Britain, Japan,
Russia, and France had twice, on Oct. 28th and Dec. 15th, presented warnings and tried to
persuade Yuan to postpone the polity change. On Dec. 11th, votes from every province
were gathered in Beijing; national representatives in total were 1,993, and exactly 1,993
votes were given in approval of both a constitutional monarchy and Yuan as the Emperor.
With such a result, Yuan still pretended to be modest and rejected it, saying that he had
taken an oath to honor the republic, and if he mounted the throne, he would be unfaithful
to the oath, which would make him violate the moral principle of faithfulness. It took a
second presentation of support on that same day for Yuan to feel comfortable and issue an
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order the next day (Dec. 12th, 1995) to accept the throne. 100
There was an episode here during the movement of polity change. In
September, 1914, Japan sent its army to Shandong province and took possession of all the
rights and interests previously enjoyed by Germany in the province. Yuan was then
engaged in the suppression of the revolutionaries, and thus tried to please Japan in the
hopes that Japan could expel the revolutionaries staying in Japan. Japan grabbed the
opportunity to present the notorious twenty-one clauses in January, 1915, asking China to
permit Japan to succeed to all previous rights and interests enjoyed by Germany in
Shandong province, which included that all harbors and islands in this region could not
be ceded or rented to other countries, and which even required the Chinese government to
engage the Japanese as political, military, and fiscal advisors, and to accept that Japan
and China administered together the policemen in important regions in China. This
caused intense anti-Japanese emotions and activities in China. But Yuan did not reject
such unreasonable requirements, because he wanted Japanese support on the domestic
issue of polity change. Japan also wanted to use its fake support to get Yuan to accept
these clauses. Thus Yuan accepted most of the clauses, and soon Japan moved to the
opposite position to be against Yuan’s polity change, because if Yuan really built a strong
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imperial country, Japan would no longer be able to obtain any interests in China. 101
As Yuan’s imperial movement proceeded, the political forces against
Yuan were creeping up. The Guomindang people were the first to perceive Yuan’s
autocratic tendency. Although they failed in the Second Revolution, they never stopped
their efforts. Sun Yat-sen reorganized the Guomindang for this purpose. The Jinbudang
people felt that they were fooled and their ideals about democracy were destroyed. So
they determined to revolt against Yuan. Since the Guomindang had reorganized itself for
this purpose, the Jinbudang should not lag behind, considering its political future in this
nation. For those from the Northern Army, being an official in a republic was far better
than being a subject to Emperor Yuan, and in the days ahead they might have a chance to
succeed Yuan as the President. For ordinary people, the days after the Second Revolution
were hard because most local officials were corrupt remainders from the Qing Court; thus
Yuan had lost the people’s support. 102 Therefore, the resistance against Yuan’s imperial
movement was nation-wide. This was totally beyond Yuan’s expectation. It meant the
spirit of republicanism was deeply ingrained in the Chinese heart; no one could destroy it
because of his personal wish.
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Immediately after the failure of the Second Revolution in September,
1914, Sun Yat-sen decided to revive the revolutionary spirit of the Tongmeng Hui, and
reorganize the Guomindang, whose approach was a parliamentary one, and change it to
the Zhonghua Gemingdang (the Chinese Revolutionary Party); it happened in September,
1913. This time, Sun required the participants to swear an oath to “be obedient to Mr.
Sun” 103 to restart the revolution, and they had to sign with their fingerprints before they
were accepted as the party members. One of the founding fathers, Huang Xing, expressed
his objection to these two things; he thought such requirements were against the spirit of
republicanism. Sun tried to explain that the party members of the previous two
revolutions had not united well because they didn’t listen to him, and had thus missed the
opportunities to succeed in several occasions. But he could only convince a part of the
Guomindang leaders. Despite this, Sun continued his efforts and finally aroused a
national revolt against Yuan. 104
Laing Qichao originally wanted to guide Yuan Shi-kai on a path to
democratic constitutionalism. After Yuan’s imperial ambition emerged and became clear,
Liang was among the few to publicly denounce Yuan’s attempts. Yuan had tried to terrify
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him or used material gains to tempt him, but Liang would not be moved. Liang stood for
constitutional monarchy in Late Qing and was against democratic revolution; now he
supported the democratic republic and opposed monarchy. Both positions contained a
similar concern that radical change would upset the political situation and bring little
benefit to the nation. Also, after the republic was built, as we discuss in chapter two,
Liang’s idealism and liberal spirit would make the imperial reversal unbearable to him.
With military revolts of both the Zhonghua Gemingdang and the
Jinbudang, the whole nation soon entered into a sweeping movement of anti-imperial
monarchy. Thus, Yuan’s attempts had no chance in the newly built republic.

84

CHAPTER FOUR: THE YEARS UNDER MAO ZEDONG (1949-1976)

Mao Zedong’s ideas were influenced by Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao,
and the intellectuals’ enlightenment movement (the May Fourth Movement, from 1915 to
1923) mentioned in chapter three. As stated in chapter three, the essence of this
movement is democracy and science. The intellectuals in this movement wanted to create
a new civilization for China by spreading liberal ideas of modern western civilization. 105
Unfortunately, after 1919, the leading intellectuals in this movement were divided into
two camps: the leftist camp, represented by Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, believing in the
Russian path following its “October Revolution” 106 in 1917; and the liberal camp,
represented by Hu Shi, believing in the western liberal path since the Renaissance. Hu
Shi used the term “Chinese Renaissance” to introduce to the western world this Chinese
intellectual movement. 107 Hu Shi’s ideas did not gain a chance to be fulfilled until
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Taiwan’s democratization in the 1980’s. 108 In contrast, Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao’s
Marxist-Leninist ideas got full opportunity to be experimented with in mainland China
through Mao Zedong’s efforts toward a communist movement in this country. In 1921,
Chen Duxiu built the Chinese Communist Party (the CCP), and Mao Zedong was one of
its earliest members. Mao did not assume true leadership of the communist party until
1935. After years of efforts, Mao successfully built the People’s Republic of China (the
PRC) in 1949, and the country became a laboratory for his utopian ideas.
Early in his life, Mao Zedong had formed most of the ideas that
would influence the practice of the communist party in China. 109 Mao had a teacher,
Yang Changji, who was a sincere Confucian scholar and guided his students to become
Confucian practitioners. Under his influence, Mao became a worshiper of Confucius and
wanted to become someone like Confucius. The most interesting part of this early
romance with Confucianism was that Mao Zedong’s understanding and practice of
Marxism-Leninism carried an imprint of Confucianism. 110 In what follows, I will present
how Mao Zedong’s approach and practice of Marxism-Leninism was tinted with
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Confucian ideas or a Confucian style of doing things.
Confucius believed that there was a linkage between earthly affairs
and Heaven. If a person led a moral life in a heavenly way (i.e., merciful love in all kinds
of human relationships), he would receive heavenly blessings and get promotion in social
mobility or prosper in his agricultural harvest or through business. On the contrary, if he
did the opposite, there would be bad results. Similarly, if a king ruled a country in a
heavenly way, he and his country would receive heavenly blessings and the whole nation
would prosper and even the whole earthly world would be in great harmony. For
Confucius, the purpose of life was to cultivate one’s spirit to become a saint, and if
possible, to help others become saints, too. The way to attain such an ideal was either to
become a moral statesman (i.e., a saintly king, or a saintly official) and lead the whole
nation in a heavenly way, or to become a spiritual Master and guide disciples to become
saintly people. 111 Therefore, Confucius believed in voluntarism: a person was able to
change his own fate and even the whole world’s fate by spiritual self-cultivation. One
could change history and one should!
(1) Ontology: Dialectics and the Philosophy of History
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Confucian ideas about ontology overlapped with Lao-tze’s ideas.
They both saw the creation of the universe as, “One begets two, two begets three, and
three begets all things.” 112 This means Heaven the Almighty (the “One”) creates Yin (the
feminine force or the negative force) and Yan (the masculine force or the positive force);
Yin and Yan are the “two”; the interplay of Yin and Yan is the “three”; all things and all
phenomena are created by the interplay of Yin and Yan (“three begets all things”). This
simple description has its scientific supporters in the quantum physics of the 20th
century. 113 The interplay of Yin and Yan creates everything and every phenomenon both in
the natural world and in the social world. For example, in the social world, the father-son
relationship is the prototype of Master-disciple (teacher-student), husband-wife
(men-women), senior-junior, monarch-subject (ruler-citizens), elite-mass
(intellectuals-ordinary, uneducated people), educated class-laboring class, and Chinese
patron-client relationships. These relationships reflect Yan-Yin relationship (or
Heaven-Earth relationship), and as described in chapter one, it is a relationship of mutual
flowing (or interplay) of love: filial affection from the son to the father (or from Yin to
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Yan), and merciful love from the father to the son (or from Yan to Yin). If Yin and Yan
love and respect each other, there will be
a harmonious relationship between the pair of roles. Thus, role playing is crucial in
Confucian ethics, with loving harmony as its essence. 114
Then come Confucian and Lao-tze’s understanding or teachings of
dialectics. The relationship between Yin and Yan was either loving harmony (like that
between lovers) or competitive rivalry (like that between enemies). 115 It all depended on
the situation. A man and a woman could fall in love with each other and get married; they
could also fight each other bitterly and get divorced. Similarly, in the ethics of role
playing, citizens were not always required to love and respect their king. If the king led
the country in a heavenly way (i.e., with merciful love and wisdom in all things), and you
revolted against him, then you would be seen as disgraced morally. On the contrary, if the
king acted like a brutal beast (i.e., dictator), then you had both the responsibility to
overthrow him and the honor to rebuild the country in a heavenly way. Revolution was
justified in such a case: the relationship between you and your motherland was not
always peaceful. In some cases, for the sake of love, you had to stand up to reproach your
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own government or even revolt against it. It all depended on the situation.
From the above explanation, Confucian philosophy of history
becomes clear. An individual has the honor and responsibility to create history by his own
spiritual cultivation and moral role playing. He may help his king to build a heaven on
earth in his country or overthrow his king so that a heaven on earth will not be ruined by
his king. His honor and responsibility is to cultivate himself spiritually and then lead and
guide others well by setting a good example. Of course the opposite could happen: a
person might be a bad guy but he happens to be smart enough to get to a high position; in
this case, the hope will be that another person will obtain the Mandate of Heaven and
deal with the situation. The proof that the Mandate of Heaven has been bestowed on
somebody is the fact that the majority of people support this person. These ideas are
basically Confucian teachings on history and politics.
Mao Zedong was a sincere believer of the above ideas before he
became a Marxist-Leninist. He was a Confucian intellectual and believed in voluntarism
which emphasized that an individual could change history by cultivating himself
spiritually; if every individual was changed by moral self-cultivation, then the whole
nation would be changed accordingly and the nation would be saved. It was Mao
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Zedong’s dream to save this country as soon as possible, and the most efficient way that
Mao learned from Confucius was to devote himself to becoming a saint and then to lead
and guide the whole nation to become a country full of saints. Moral cultivation, thus,
was the best tool to save this country. This was why Mao placed great emphasis on mass
movements in carrying out any of his projects. As long as the masses were mobilized
with great moral enthusiasm (in Mao’s understanding, it meant selfless sacrifice for the
sake of all or for the sake of socialism), Mao believed, any miracle could happen. This
explained the mass zeal in the Great Leap Forward and in the Cultural Revolution.
Everybody in the mobilized mass believed that he was engaged in something great and
beneficial to this nation, and that his personal selfless sacrifice was worth the honor.
Everybody mobilized was carrying a spirit of heroism, which was called by Mao socialist
activeness or revolutionary spirit. During the Great Leap Forward, Mao expected the
mass to exert their socialist activeness to create miracles for this country, and during the
Cultural Revolution Mao called the youth to overthrow the current party-state apparatus
to embroil the whole nation in a revolutionary high tide so that every person’s spirit
would be changed to become fully revolutionary. Revolutionary spirit or revolutionary
ethics required each individual to be a moral figure like a brave combatant to fight any
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hint of selfishness emerging in one’s mind and devote himself fully to serving the nation
(or called “serving the people”) and any goal that Chairman Mao pointed out for the
nation. Mao believed that when each and every individual was well equipped with the
revolutionary spirit, the whole nation could fight any enemy, achieve any engineering
projects and any production mission, and overcome any challenge to achieving national
wealth and power long pursued by generation after generation of national aspirants since
the Opium War (1839-1842).
But Mao failed. His dream was not fulfilled, this nation was not
saved, the goal of national wealth and power was not achieved, and people’s lives did not
improve. The reason lay in his belief in dialectics. In Confucian teachings, if one
individual wanted to succeed in ruling a country and pacifying the world, he needed to be
a king or a Master filled with love, and the essence of Yin-Yan dialectics was loving
harmony; revolution was temporary and was done for the sake of love, and he needed to
return to loving harmony once the goal of revolution was achieved. But Mao had become
a Marxist-Leninist, and he believed that revolution (or class struggle) should be constant,
and the essence of dialectics was struggle rather than loving harmony. Put it in another
way, Confucius aimed at perpetual peace and Mao believed in perpetual struggle.
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Confucius managed to achieve loving harmony in any human relationship, and Mao
looked for struggle in any human relationship or social situation. Mao always emphasized
that class struggle was constant, and peace and harmony were temporary; imbalance was
absolute and constant and balance was relative and temporary. 116 This was why Mao
always launched mass movement to combat class enemies, seeing this as the way to
achieve any goal. When the whole nation was embroiled in constant struggle and conflict,
how could he achieve the goal of national wealth and power? How could people’s lives
be improved? From a Confucian point of view, Mao’s failure had been foretold by his
belief in constant class struggle: there was no hope for such ideas to achieve anything
that would lead to the fulfillment of Mao’s dream.
(2) Epistemology: The Relationship between Knowledge and Practice
Confucian ideas on epistemology were inspirational. Knowledge was
delivered through ancient saintly king’s examples on politics: their practice of
governance, and the ethos of sacrificial rites, moral customs, and spiritual music
instituted by them. On how to achieve good governance, although the military affairs
were seen as necessary, Confucius would place the priority on sacrificial rites, spiritual

116

Mao Zedong, “On Contradiction,” in The Selective Works of Mao Zedong (Beijing: Renmin Publisher,
1967), pp. 274-312.
93

music, and moral examples, moral teachings, and moral customs. A good disciple, in
Confucius’ eyes, would model himself on the ancient saintly kings, and cultivate himself
spiritually to become someone like those kings or like Confucius. Therefore, the
knowledge that Confucius wanted his disciples to learn was about the building of one’s
moral personality and the capability to rule a country and pacify the world. The way to
obtain such knowledge was by studying the examples, institutions, and music of those
ancient kings embodied in six books of scriptures edited by Confucius, and also by
questions and answers between Confucius and his disciples.
The question of epistemology is: how does a Confucian follower (or
an individual) know or acquire knowledge? 117 The answer lies in the Confucian belief in
ontology. All beings are created by Heaven the Almighty, and all men are created equal.
Each and every individual was born with the same innate noble spirit. It was only through
developed habits that people became different. In other words, each and every individual
had the same chance to become a saint as long as he made that choice. Any individual
could obtain the same knowledge as acquired by the ancient saintly kings because all
men are created equal, and every individual has the same cognizant capability as
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acquired by those kings. Because everyone is created from the same origin (Heaven the
Almighty), even an ordinary individual has the same cognizant capability that was born
from Heaven. Such cognizant capability allows every individual, be they an ordinary
person or a saint, to obtain the same spiritual understanding and moral knowledge, and
thus to have the same opportunity to make his choice (under free will) to become a
saint. 118 It is clear that such a belief will serve as the intellectual seed for Chinese
democracy in the future.
Mao Zedong’s ideas on epistemology also had something to do with
Confucianism. He believed in Confucian teachings on the relationship between
knowledge and practice: knowledge is for the purpose of practice. Thus, knowledge
should be rooted in social practice. Social practice, for Mao, included scientific practice,
literary and artistic practice, the practice of labor, and the practice of class struggle. From
social practice, one gained knowledge, and to complete the process of knowledge, one
should use the knowledge that he obtained to return to social practice again. Without the
latter step, the process of knowledge was seen as incomplete. Thus the sequence in Mao
Zedong’s epistemology was, first, you were engaged in social practice, and then, you
obtained knowledge from that practice, and finally, you should use that knowledge to
118
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enter into social practice again. Only in this way (i.e., involving yourself in social
practice) would you gain full knowledge. 119 A person needed to do the same laboring job
as peasants and workers in order for him to understand the mind and feelings of the
proletariat. Only through that kind of social practice could one person develop sympathy
with the exploited class, and then he had to enter into social practice again to stand on the
side of the exploited class and fight the exploiting class. Only through social practice and
class struggle could he identify the right versus the wrong (good versus evil), and be able
to distinguish between “us” (the good people) and “the enemies” (the bad guys).
The intellectuals and the bourgeoisie, in Mao Zedong’s views, did not
have more knowledge than peasants and workers, because their knowledge was not
rooted in social practice— in labor. Thus Mao Zedong made the intellectuals and the
bourgeoisie have a feeling of original sin because of their lack of social practice (i.e.,
labor) as peasants and workers: their souls were inferior to the souls of the peasants and
workers (the proletariat). They needed to be re-educated by learning from the peasant
mass and the worker mass. Therefore, when the situation of class struggle became bitter,
their fate would be to be sent down to the labor camp to go through labor, which was
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actually a punishment just because of their state of being—being an intellectual and being
a member of the bourgeoisie meant carrying the original sin (defined by Mao’s ideology)
all through their life. Here one can see how Mao’s knowledge brought suffering to the
people. The intellectuals and the bourgeoisie were seen as inferior citizens, and they and
their families were treated unfairly and on some occasions brutally. In the western
countries, the intellectuals and the bourgeoisie were the most creative segment of the
society; in Mao’s China, they and their families were in constant insecurity and fear. Thus,
the most creative segment of this society was constantly suppressed. How could this
nation achieve anything that would lead to the fulfillment of its people’s dream—national
wealth and power, and the improvement of people’s lives? This government was
incapable of meeting its people’s needs.
(3) Political Ideal: the Great Harmony
Confucius described his political ideal in one of his
scriptures:
When Tao is fulfilled, the wealth of the world belongs to all people. Selected
will be the moral; elected will be the capable. Respected will be the faithfulness;
cultivated will be the harmony. Therefore, people will not just adore their parents,
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and will not just love their children. The old will enjoy their days, the men in their
prime will contribute what they can offer, and the young will be nurtured and
educated. The widows and the widowers, the orphans and the childless, the disables
and the sick, will all be taken good care of. Men will have their professions, and
women will settle down in their marriage. Goods will be shared, and services will
be devoted. Thus tricks will stop, thefts, banditry, and rebellions will disappear, and
therefore, the doors of people’s houses need not to be closed. This is called the
Great Harmony. 120
Mao Zedong believed in this Confucian political ideal and saw this as
his career goal. 121 As one can see, this Confucian ideal revealed a spirit of sharing and
fraternity, with love, mutual help, and a concern for the collective welfare. After
becoming a Marxist-Leninist, Mao’s image of such Confucian ideals turned into a
Marxian communist heaven. During the Great Leap Forward in 1958, Mao described his
political ideal of the People’s Commune:
At that time there will be many communist communes in the rural areas of our
country, and each commune will have its own agriculture and industry, will have
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universities, high schools, and elementary schools, will have hospitals, will have
scientific research institutes, will have commercial stores and service businesses,
will have traffic businesses, will have nurseries and canteens, will have clubs, and
will have police force, etc.; several villages enclose a city to further become a
bigger communist commune. 122
In another occasion, Mao’s ideas were published:
Our direction is, step by step, in much order, to organize a big commune that is
made up of industry, agriculture, commerce, culture and education, and militia, and
make the commune the basic unit of our society. 123
So Mao’s political ideal was to integrate industry, agriculture, commerce, culture and
education, and militia to become one unit, in which all kinds of human needs will be
provided for, and all types of discrimination and inequality will be extinguished, thus
building a just, equal, and pure society. 124 This ideal was Mao Zedong’s dream, even after
tens of millions of people had died because of the Great Leap Forward, he never changed
his faith in and adoration of such kind of socialism. 125 At the beginning of the Cultural
Revolution in 1966, “he once again displayed such an ideal blueprint before the whole
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nation,” 126 only adding to it “drastic class struggle.” 127
It looked like Mao was very determined in his pursuit of a
humanitarian political ideal like the Confucian one; then, why did he fail? The reasons
for Mao’s failure were clear when one compares the Confucian teachings and Mao
Zedong’s practice. Firstly, in the pursuit of the Confucian political ideal—the Great
Harmony—one needs to be patient. The most efficient way and the only way is to first
cultivate oneself spiritually to become a saint to set an example for the whole nation to
follow. It takes time and free will for people to make their choice to follow a spiritual path
and to succeed on that path. When many people are determined to follow that path, it
becomes possible for such an ideal (i.e., the Great Harmony) to be fulfilled. Mao did not
follow the above principle. He pushed it so hard and made it so urgent, wanting to
achieve a big goal in just a few years, and disregarding people’s capability and free will.
Such a lifestyle as in the People’s Commune might be tolerable for people in a period of
time, but would not last for too long, because it was against humans’ basic need of family
life and family love. In the People’s Commune, family life and family love was
suppressed, traditional village life-style of human connections was destroyed, and the
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normal desire for material wealth was suppressed. So this practice of the People’s
Commune was against people’s will, which meant it was against Mao’s mass line that he
emphasized so much: every policy needed to correspond with people’s concerns and
people’s interests. Such a mass line, if fully followed, could be to some extent similar to
the Confucian emphasis on the ancient saintly king’s politics, as long as it reflects the
principle of merciful love. When you violate people’s will, people’s concerns, and
people’s normal desires for material needs, how can you and your policy succeed?
Secondly, as stated above, a Confucian path is a path of love and
harmony, and it takes time to convince people that these are the correct ways which will
benefit all. But Mao’s way of pursuing ideals was through class struggle 128 instead of
convincing logic. Although the ends contained elements of humanitarianism, the means
were too savage, too brutal, too anti-humanitarian. When the means do not reflect the
spirit of the ends, ultimately, the ends will not be realized. When the means are totally
opposite to the spirit of the ends (i.e., humanitarianism), there is no hope for success in
any way. Mao’s disregard of human cost and lack of sympathy toward innocent lives
morally disgraced his ideal, no matter how noble it was. Many intellectuals or idealists
that once adored Mao and Mao’s path found themselves alienated in the process of
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following Mao. They just could not believe the things that were happening before their
eyes. 129
(4) Class Struggle: The Way to Attain Political Ideal 130
In the 22 years (1927-1949) of political struggle with the KMT, Mao
Zedong had seen competition of power between the CCP and the KMT as the political
reflection of class struggle in Chinese society at that time, with the KMT seen as
representing the bourgeois interests, and the CCP representing the people’s (or the worker
masses’ and the peasant masses’) interests. Since the revolt of the revolutionary forces
(the CCP) against the reactionary forces (the KMT) was seen by Mao as good versus evil,
of course in his eyes the good had to and would finally win over the evil. Even after the
KMT had been defeated in China completely, the class struggle (a struggle of
life-and-death) would continue to exist, only adopting different forms. According to Mao
in 1959, such life-and-death struggle not only existed during the previous ten years
(1949-1959), but would also continue to exist and last for at least 20 years (1959-1979),
and maybe for half of a century (1959-2009). Mao said the philosophy of the communist
party is the philosophy of struggle. In 1966, which was the beginning of the Cultural
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Revolution, Mao emphasized that one “should see everything and analyze everything
from the point of view of class struggle, and from the method of class analysis.”
Therefore, the whole history of the PRC under Mao Zedong was seen by him as within
constant class struggle, which was seen as the basis of everything and every phenomena
in society.
Each individual in that society, according to Mao Zedong’s method of
class analysis, would be given a class attribute. Those who were defined as the middle or
poor or employed peasants, the workers, or the urban poor, would be seen as good people
who were laboring masses; those who were defined as landlords, rich peasants,
reactionaries, bad guys (usually the criminals), and the rightists (bourgeoisie and its
intellectuals)—called “the black five classes”—would be seen as the people’s enemies
who had exploited the people, the laboring masses. The communist party represented the
interests of the laboring class and practiced proletarian dictatorship toward the people’s
enemies. Thus the laboring masses belonged to the class to be protected, and “the black
five classes” were subjected to dictatorship. These class attributes not only followed a
person all through his lifetime and would be passed on to whatever work unit he moved
to, but they also disgraced his families and his offspring. This led to serious social
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discrimination in which a person could be treated like social trash once he was born into a
family of “the black five classes,” and to make things worse, there was no way for a
person to change his attribute of black class.131 Thus, all through your lifetime, you had
to carry the burden of disgraceful identity wherever you went. In serious situations of
class struggle, these black-classed persons would have to go through severe physical
violence and mental insults; in less serious situations, their load of work distributed to
them was heavier than others and their payment was the lowest in an urban work unit or a
rural production team. Would this situation change? Not during Mao’s years.
Mao’s method for conducting class struggle was through mass
movement. Confucian ways of carrying out political ideals were as follows: you had a
saintly king or a spiritual Master (charisma), you had spiritual knowledge (ideology), and
you had a group of followers (spiritual practitioners or vanguards), and the mass (the
people); when the king or the Master called, the followers, well equipped with spiritual
knowledge, would come to the mission, setting examples for the people to follow, and
thus carry out a mission or a project. In pretty much the same way, Mao Zedong carried
out a project through the political movement of class struggle. There was charisma
131
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(Chairman Mao), there was ideology (the Mao Zedong Thoughts), and there were
communist practitioners or vanguards (the party cadres), and the people (the masses);
when Chairman Mao called, the party cadres, well equipped with the Mao Zedong
Thoughts, would come to the political mission, and mobilized the people (i.e., provoked
the political activeness from the people) to carry out a project. Class struggle required
people to become political activists in a political movement; if you were not active
enough, you would be seen as a laggard. Being a laggard would place you in an
unfortunate situation of political or social discrimination, or even mean becoming subject
to dictatorship; therefore, no one wanted to be seen as a laggard in a political movement.
Thus, whenever there was political movement, you would see people doing many things
in whatever they could to demonstrate their zeal and to show that they were political
activists. This is why there were 90 million people advancing to the mountains to chop
down the trees, which caused very serious damage to the Chinese natural environment.
Magic (but fake) production figures were reported to Mao during the Great Leap Forward,
and this is why the whole generation of national youth responded to Chairman Mao’s call
to come to the mission of revolution, creating national chaos. In short, everyone wanted
to become an activist, so that he would gain respect in that social aura: I am a brave guy!
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I am not a coward! This also led to personal worshipping of Chairman Mao, since it was
Chairman Mao who called them to the truth, who led them to the revolutionary Holy land,
and who guided them to become heros.
(5) The Problem of “Democracy”
Since Mao had divided people into two groups: the people and the
people’s enemies (or the proletariat and the bourgeoisie), the “democracy” defined by
Mao was equal to dictatorship. Democracy, for Mao, meant the people became the
masters of this country. But the people were an uneducated mass, and they needed to be
educated and guided by the vanguard (the party member); this led to the claim of
leadership of the communist party. Therefore, in the final analysis, who would be the
master of this country? The party! Whose will would be the basis of any policy? The
party’s! Who would shoulder the “burden” of educating the people? The party! Who
would point out the right direction for the people and help them correct their errors and
blindness? The party! Who would give the people jobs? The party! Who would be the
people’s mother or father that nurtured them to become mature? The party! Who would
be the one that held the truth and was therefore able to guide the people to communist
Heaven or the revolutionary Holy land? Still, the Party!
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But, what’s wrong with that if the communist party really represents
the interests of the people? The problem lay in our above discussions of social
discrimination, plus the so-called “people’s democratic dictatorship.” If you belonged to
“the black five classes,” you would be subject to dictatorship. If your son did not want to
be a laggard in a political movement, he would have to draw a clear line, politically and
publicly, between you and him, and in some occasions he would publicly insult you or
physically attack you to demonstrate his political activeness or revolutionary pureness.
Thus, during the Cultural Revolution, cases of children attacking their parents, students
attacking their teachers, workers attacking their leaders or managers, and husbands and
wives drawing a clear line between each other were not rare. What kind of society was
this? Also, when you participated in such behavior, you even had to feel grateful for the
grace of the party’s leadership or encouragement, because without the party, you would
not be so brave to attack your loved ones. And “healthy” love only existed between you
and Chairman Mao. Your love toward your parents or teachers or managers, if not filtered
by so-called “class feelings,” was something to be criticized and to be discarded. This
was a beastly society.
Then comes the problem of mass line. In Confucian teachings, “the

107

people” meant all individuals except the king. In Mao’s mass line, “the people” meant the
laboring masses (i.e., the peasant masses and the worker masses); it excluded the people’s
enemies (i.e., the bourgeois rightists, and national bourgeoisie and its intellectuals, or “the
black five classes”). Thus any policy would correspond with the interests of the laboring
masses (the people) rather than the interests of the black classed persons and their
families (the people’s enemies)—the number of the latter amounted to hundreds of
millions 132 during the history of Mao’s PRC.
Another problem was democratic centralism. Because Mao’s central
concern was class struggle, and most of the time he saw struggle as life-and-death
struggle, he believed that if the socialist forces did not win, the capitalist forces would
win in that society. Thus, class enemies were seen as being everywhere in all fields of
daily life; any criticism to Mao’s policy would be read by him as crazy attacks from class
enemies, or as wavering of class position and leaning to the enemies’ side. Both were not
tolerable for Mao. Thus, dictatorship toward “the people’s enemies” was seen as crucial
for the life-and-death struggle. Witch-hunts for the counter-revolutionaries or the
right-leaning opportunitists were a serious part of every political movement. In order to
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guarantee victory in each political struggle, Mao naturally centralized political power to
his hands, because even the party cadres and the central party leaders were seen as
possibly reactionaries, right-leaners or revisionists that would stand on the way of Mao’s
fulfillment of his utopian dream. Those local followers (party secretaries at the local
levels) of Mao also centralized political power to be able to carry out the mission from
Mao’s calls. Only by centralizing power could the dictatorship toward “the people’s
enemies” succeed, and only by such practice could Mao be confident that he could freely
fulfill his ambitious ideals without any barrier from “the people’s enemies.” Thus
democratic-centralism was always geared toward the central side, both in the relationship
between him and other party leaders and cadres, and in the relationship between the party
(under Mao’s will) and the people. The lack of true democratic practice was an important
reason why Mao could make such serious mistakes in pursuing his dreams. There was
only top-down command and control, and no reasonable check and balance, and no
tolerance for criticism or even mild views of disapproval. Under such kind of
“democratic dictatorship,” how could Mao succeed in any way in his pursuit of the
fulfillment of his dreams?
(6) The Problem of Mao Zedong’s System: A Summary
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Class struggle was the essence of Mao Zedong’s worldview. The
purpose of life, for Mao, was to fight against the bourgeoisie for the interests of the
proletariat, and to build and consolidate a regime of proletarian dictatorship (so that
China would be on the road of socialism). A person had to choose to stand on the
proletarian side; otherwise he would be subject to dictatorship. The problem was: who
had the right to decide which person belonged to which class? In China, in Mao Zedong’s
years, only Mao and his trusted followers had this right. Once you were classified as the
object of dictatorship, you were subject to severe physical and mental suffering, or even
death. Only in very rare cases could a person or a family change their attribute of class,
which would follow a person all through his lifetime wherever he went. People were thus
terrified to speak from their heart. So many people suffered severely in Mao’s China. And
Mao saw such suffering as nothing in comparison with the ideal world that he was going
to build. As stated before in this chapter, when the means did not reflect the spirit of the
ends, the ideals that one pursued would be corroded, and when the means was totally
against humanitarianism, nothing noble could be achieved.
(7) Prescription: A Suggestion of How to Fix Mao Zedong’s
System—the Building of Liberal Democracy
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Confucius proposed a noble ideal that carried a spirit of sharing and
fraternity for all people in the world, which was the Great Harmony. The means to
achieve such a noble ideal was through following the principle of love and respect for
each individual. “All men are created equal”—this was the firmest and the most basic
belief in Confucian teachings. Everybody was born equal and had the same capability and
opportunity to become a saint; this was a belief beyond the division of class, gender, race,
and religion. Once an individual decided for himself, under the principle of free will, to
follow the Confucian spiritual path, he would be able to become a saint as long as he
worked hard toward that goal. Nobody could make the decision for him except he himself.
This was about a person’s self fulfillment and it was a totally free choice. Once a great
number of people decided to follow the spiritual path, things became easier for the
fulfillment of “Great Harmony.” The method was to cultivate oneself spiritually and set a
good example for others to follow. When enough people acted as vanguards at many
corners of the world to lead people toward the same ideal, “Great Harmony” would be
fulfilled and each individual’s highest dream of self fulfillment would be achieved.
Here in Confucian teachings, the means did reflect the spirit of the
end: the end was “Great Harmony,” and the means was through following the principle
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of love and respect for each individual, through the recognition of each individual’s inner
nobility, and through the respect of each individual’s free will. This was, from Confucius’
point of view, how an ideal of noble spirit could be achieved. The farther one stood away
from the above principles (i.e., love and respect for each individual; the recognition of
each individual’s inner nobility; the respect of each individual’s free will), the greater the
failure of one’s self fulfillment—the fulfillment of one’s highest, noblest dream. From
such point of view, there was no chance for proletarian dictatorship to achieve anything
noble, or anything beneficial to humans. Thus, the answer is clear to the question of how
Mao Zedong’s system could be fixed. First, an individual’s inborn value (i.e., his inner
nobility) must be honored, and this implies the respect of human rights; secondly, an
individual’s free will must be respected all the time, and this implies the building of a
civil society in the spirit of the western liberalism; thus the building of a liberal
democracy would be just a question of time. Do leaders in the reform years follow these
principles? The answer will be clear in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE REFORM YEARS (1978—THE CURRENT TIME)

After 30 years of reform (1978-2008), many Chinese intellectuals
became disillusioned with China’s reform. 133 This is a system of political dictatorship
plus market economy. 134 China could have achieved a great success in the building of
democracy if its leaders (Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao) had that in mind.
But from the very beginning, Deng Xiaoping had made it clear that the reform should
insist on economic reform on the one hand, and political dictatorship (the four cardinal
principles) on the other hand. The whole purpose of reform, for Deng Xiaoping, was to
rebuild political legitimacy for the communist governance and consolidate its rule of
China—to save the party from the disastrous situation resulting from Mao Zedong’s
Cultural Revolution. 135 The four cardinal principles, proposed by Deng Xiaoping in
March 1979, were: “firstly, we must insist on the socialist road; secondly, we must insist
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on the proletarian dictatorship; thirdly, we must insist on the communist party’s
leadership; fourthly, we must insist on Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong
Thoughts.” 136 Deng saw these four principles as prerequisite to the four modernizations:
modernizations of agriculture, industry, national defense, and technology. 137 This meant,
in the pursuit of China’s economic development (i.e., the four modernizations), China
would always be a socialist country, which would be characterized by the proletarian
dictatorship, which in turn would be guaranteed by the leadership of the communist party,
and the communist party would be ideologically well equipped with Marxism-Leninism
and Mao Zedong Thoughts to be able to lead China to maintain its proletarian
dictatorship to pursue the socialist goal. 138 The most important thing in the four cardinal
principles was the communist party’s leadership; only with its leadership could China
maintain its nature of socialism. Liberal democracy was seen as a bourgeois political
institution, the building of which would bury the current institution of proletarian
dictatorship, and thus the possibility of liberal democracy should be guarded against all
the time. So Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thoughts would continue to be the
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ideological guide-lines to lead the party and the whole country.
From the four cardinal principles, one can see that it is impossible for
liberal democracy to take root in China as long as the communist party is still in power.
So one would expect to see economic development on the one hand, and communist
dictatorial rule on the other. There would be no such things as freedom of speech and
publishing, freedom of assembly and association, let alone multi-party competitive
elections for political power in the political field. 139 And because of this insistence on
political dictatorship, China’s economy became a predatory economy, 140 its social
structure became an elite-dominating social stratification which sacrificed the interests of
the peasants and workers and other people at the bottom, who has little chance for
upward social mobility, 141 and its culture became a bureaucrat-based culture that was
deeply involved with institutional corruption. 142 In what follows, I will divide my
discussion into four areas: the economy, the social structure, the politics, and the
culture. 143 All four areas were filled with serious problems that came with the institution
139
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of a one-party dictatorial rule which carried the ideas of the four cardinal principles.
(1) The Economy
The whole point of economic reform was to stimulate each
individual’s or enterprise’ production activeness to increase productivity. This was
because under the original planned economic system, the individuals or enterprises had
lost the zeal for production since they did not produce for themselves. Mao Zedong’s way
of stimulating revolutionary zeal or using moral incentive proved to be ineffective.
People had to work for themselves in order for them to be active economically. Therefore,
the People’s Communes were dismissed one after another, and each peasant family was
allowed to produce for themselves if they simultaneously accomplished the quota of
production mission distributed to them. Such a system did boost agricultural production
and brought about rural prosperity. Then the communist leaders wanted to transplant the
rural successful experience to the urban economy.
Under the original planned economic system, the state-owned
enterprises were obliged to perform the production directives issued by the administrative
bureaucrats. Institutionally, the enterprise was only an affiliate to the governmental
administrative apparatus. It was not an autonomous organization independent from the
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government. Therefore, before the reform years, instead of looking to the market for
guidance of their investment or production behavior, the state-owned enterprises looked
to their governmental administrative superiors for guidance of production mission. They
did not have the power to decide on which products to produce, how to produce them,
where the raw materials would come, and where the products should go. They did not
decide on the price and amount of the things they produced. The administrative superiors
would make all the decisions and give directives to the enterprises, and the enterprises
only listened to their superiors and accomplished the production mission. Thus, market
behavior was totally alien to the enterprises. Most of the state-owned enterprises were in
constant economic loss because, once again, they did not produce for themselves. The
reform aimed at activating their productivity with material incentive. Thus, it was
required by the central leader that the administrative superiors should loosen their control
over or interference with the enterprises, and should release the enterprises from the
heavy load of tax and profit which was originally supposed to be paid to the government.
But the reform of the state-owned enterprises was a very difficult job.
The difficulty was both internal and external. Internally, there were
two problems. The first problem was about the heavy reliance of the workers on the
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enterprise for their income and welfare; the workers had been accustomed to the iron rice
bowl that guaranteed their economic security (i.e., their wages) and social welfare,
including housing, medical care, and old-age pension. But because there were too many
redundant workers in an enterprise, which had become a huge burden for the enterprise,
many of the workers, for the sake of reform, had to leave their long protected
employment and welfare. Huge population under unemployment thus became a serious
social problem both for the cities and the nation as a whole. The second problem was
about the short-sighted economic behavior of the state-owned enterprises. The
state-owned enterprises were short-sighted in their investment behavior; most of them
pursued either unnecessary expansion of infrastructure or careless investment on goods
popular in the market at a certain time. This led to redundant construction and
over-production, and thus led to waste of the investment money. But the state-owned
enterprises would never change such short-sighted investment behavior, because they did
not spend their own money--it was money from national finances, or national banks.
Even if they owed debts to the banks, they would not bother to pay the debts since the
state would not let them go bankrupt because they were both the ideological and the
fiscal pillar of the socialist state. Their significance for the economy was also because the
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employees of the state-owned enterprises and the state apparatus were the main body of
urban residents; the state had to constantly raise their wages and level of welfare so that
these residents would make a big urban consumption market to attract the investment of
foreign capital. Social stability was also easier to maintain when the urban residents
received higher payment and higher welfare than the rural areas because the urban unrest
would be harder than the rural unrest to deal with. 144 Therefore, the state-owned
enterprises, with their significant role in the economy and social stability, could always
gain a loan from the national bank (under the directives from the state) even if they were
in constant or even serious economic loss. That’s why the state-owned enterprises would
not change their short-sighted economic behavior. So, internally the above two problems
made the reform of state-owned enterprises a most tough job.
Externally, there was one problem and it had to do with
government-enterprise relationship. There had been too much administrative interference
from the enterprise’ “mothers-in-law” (i.e., administrative superiors). Both the central
departments and the local governmental agencies could exert their power to interfere in
the internal affairs of state-owned enterprises. They could interfere in the personnel
arrangement or production projects. They could also impose on the enterprises
144
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unreasonable fees, fines, and share of payments by many excuses (e.g., the enterprises
might be required to pay some money in a public event). The reform gave a green light to
central departments and local governmental agencies to create their own “second fiscal
channel.” Thus all kinds of “mother-in-law” bureaucrats (i.e., the superiors of the
enterprises) focused on the enterprises for money. 145 And this was only about asking for
money. If the enterprise wanted to initiate or perform a project, sometimes it would need
hundreds of stamps for permission. 146 So the system was very ineffective. That was why
the state-owned enterprises had been in constant economic loss and was very hard to
cure. 147 The root of the problem lay in the government-enterprise relationship. If the
government did not change its behavior of constant interference in the affairs of the
enterprises, there would be no hope for the state-owned enterprises to improve
themselves and become profit-making enterprises. The government had to change its
practice of paternalism, which had to do with its nature of dictatorial rule.
(2) The Social Structure
China’s social structure, on the distribution of wealth, was a pyramid.
In an article written in 2000, He Qinglian said,
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I developed two criteria. . . to evaluate the income level and professional
acknowledgement. . . I estimated that the upper-class-level constitutes four percent
of China’s population; the middle class counts for 11 percent; and the lower class
including marginalized groups counts for about 85 percent. 148
In 2004, her analysis stated “that the middle class in China including the upper middle
class totals about 15-16 percent of the population,” 149 and the social structure was still a
pyramid one 150 where a small part of the people occupied a huge amount of national
wealth, and about 80 percent of the population lived at the bottom. China’s economy is a
predatory economy dominated by a coalition of political, economic, and a small part of
intellectual elite. The reform does not bring everybody to wealth as the party promised;
rather, it winks at corruption and lets a powerful elite group “rob money” from most of
the people in that society. 151
How did this happen? As He Qinglian points out, “the reality of the
reform was in fact to gradually change the state of possession of social resources through
the adjustment of interests.” And she continues,
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The change of the state of possession of resources in China’s reform took the
road of the privatization of the power of political elite starting with the
marketization of the power. 152
In other words, as long as a bureaucrat had power to allot economic resources, he would
use the power to engage in rent-seeking activities, illegally giving out policy favors,
prerogatives, or special permission to the economic elite and obtaining material gains in
return, thus making China a rent-seeking society. A coalition of political, economic, and a
part of the intellectual elite (to justify such activities with academic theories) had formed
in China’s society that had a very powerful ability to dominate and monopolize the
allocation of public resources in their favor. And because this elite group had overly
monopolized social resources, not only the growth of the middle class in China was
impeded, but also the interests of other social strata . 153 This was why about 80 percent of
the people lived at the bottom, and a small part of the people (about 5 percent 154 ) enjoyed
a high standard of living.
One noteworthy thing is that most of the economic elite either
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originally were the party bureaucrats or had bureaucratic backgrounds, 155 or were closely
intertwined with the party so that they could get rich. 156 Don’t forget this is a rent-seeking
society: the political elite are the ones who can make you rich or poor. Therefore,
businessmen will not be the class promoting democracy in China as many people expect.
Another noteworthy thing, pointed out by He Qinglian, is as follows:
Chinese middle class is the beneficiary of economic reform and the current
political order. The main body of the middle class is still the Chinese Communist
Party staff and government agencies. They are not only the defenders of the current
political system, but also the beneficiaries of the system. 157
He Qinglian also points out, the middle class people, like other Chinese people, do not
have any channel to voice their opinions; without any institutional protection of their
rights and interests, they can not even fight for themselves; therefore, the expectation that
a rising middle-class will accelerate democratization in China is just a “new myth.” 158
She further points out,
The white-collar and high-tech elites who work in foreign enterprises regard
‘staying away from politics’ as their core value.” They are only interested in
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becoming rich and having fun and do not want to endanger the very source of their
income. 159
The bureaucrat-based social structure in China also has a serious
problem. According to Cheng Xiaonong, being a “state cadre” enjoys high social status
and “special socioeconomic identity.” “Before the reform,” “there had formed” “a stable
socioeconomic structure” “in the urban society,” Cheng continues,
The socioeconomic status of each individual member of this society was
determined and controlled by the party and the government, and was protected by a
whole set of socioeconomic institutions. Whether one could live in the city, get
promotion, get housing was determined by the party and the government.
according to one’s political performance, work years, and educational level. 160
According to Cheng, the “promotion of socioeconomic status was not necessarily the
result of fair competition, but was often possibly just the reward by the party for one’s
political loyalty.” Cheng continues,
Since the socioeconomic status of social member had to be endorsed by the
government, this ensured that the government had control over the social member’s
159
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behavior. As long as he would not offend the government, his status would be
protected. 161
Also, according to Cheng, “the government often guaranteed that each social member”
“would get promotion” “once he achieved a certain educational level or work years.”
Therefore, according to Cheng, “the social mobility” “was usually one way”: only
moving upward and very rarely moving downward. Thus, the bureaucrat-based “social
structure” “gradually became an inverted pyramid structure.” Cheng continues,
For example, there were more and more public agencies and work units, each
becoming bigger and bigger; in the enterprises, the proportion of managerial
persons became too large and there were not sufficient front line workers; among
the workers, the proportion of high-ranked workers was too large, and there were
not enough non-technical workers who would do the heavy-labor jobs. 162
Cheng said that most urban residents had been accustomed to such stiff social structure,
and up until the time being (1996), the government never wanted to change the
social-political institutions to change such a stiff structure. 163
This bureaucrat-based social structure caused serious problems. The
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bureaucratic system became too huge and there were too many bureaucrats who relied
upon the government’s fiscal capability to feed them. Not only was the fiscal burden
heavy, but the government’s efficiency was low. For example, to run a business, you
might need to go through many governmental agencies for permission; if you did not
have a special relationship with some insider officials, you might need to wait for a long
time while your perfect business timing slipped away. Another big problem was that the
peasants’ economic burden was unreasonably high even just to pay all kinds of taxes to
feed the rural bureaucrats, let alone the unreasonable extra fees, fines, and share of
payments under different excuses. The behavior of many rural base-level regimes became
more and more like underworld gangsters; some of them even hired bully-boys to enforce
the unlawful tax and payment “laws” to the peasants . 164 Again, all these problems had to
do with the communist party’s dictatorial rule which created the bureaucrat-based social
structure.
(3) The Politics
Development and stability (i.e., social-economic-political stability)
have been two pillars of China’s reform, but without the sincere pursuit of human rights,
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freedom, and western style democracy, these two pillars may not be sustainable.
One-party dictatorial rule has been the institutional origin of most of the problems
emerging in the process of China’s reform in the past 30 years (1978-2008). Why was the
coalition of political, economic, and a part of intellectual elite able to occupy
unreasonably huge amounts of national wealth? Because the monopoly of political power
by the communist party bureaucrats made them able to use their power of allocation of
social resources, to be engaged in rent-seeking activities with the economic elite who
were adept in collusion with the party bureaucrats. The elite coalition did this at the
sacrifice of the interests of most people (about 83% of the people 165 ) who were
disadvantaged or marginalized in the society. 166 If there had been sound democratic
institutions, the disadvantaged or marginalized would have a channel to appeal for or
represent their interests in the process of policy-making; the media might have performed
the function of supervision of the policy-making process. If that had been the case, there
would not have been the policies of so called “housing reform,” “medical reform,”
“educational reform,” and “reform on social protection” that seriously undermined the
interests of people at the bottom. By the same token, there might not have been the
165
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suppression of Falun Gong in 1999, the cracking down on Tibet in 2008, or the
completely predatory requisition of the peasants’ land in the rural area or the
gangster-like tearing down of people’s houses in the urban area. In recent years, there
have been many events of mass protest or confrontation due to unjust land requisition or
forced house demolition. 167 And obviously, if there had been multi-party competition,
there would have been more reasonable and flexible policies toward Taiwan. Democracy
may not be the answer to all problems, but it could help policy deliberation, and without
it, a wrong policy could go so far and deep as the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap
Forward during Mao’s years. Chinese leaders of the reform years still have not learned
the lessons.
The injustice in China’s reform leads to further social instability. The
feud between the people on the one hand, and the local government and housing estate
merchants on the other hand in the case of land requisition or house demolition has led to
mass protests as stated above. There are also crimes committed against the rich people by
the poor and hopeless people who become criminals to either vent their feelings of
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imbalance about the gap of wealth distribution or plunder wealth from the rich. 168
Chinese local governments’ way of dealing with mass protest had been unwisely using
public violence to suppress the mass; in many cases, the behavior of local governments
was close to or the same as the Mafia or gangsters. 169 How could a political regime keep
its legitimacy when behaving like that? This behavior led to “structural tension” 170
between the disadvantaged and the government, and was thus not good for the future of
the regime. In short, China’s lack of democracy led to a power monopoly, which in turn
led to power abuse in almost all fields of daily life. Although revolution may not happen
because of the regime’s social control, the regime is neither in security nor exempt from
social unrest within the next decade.
(4) The Culture
The guideline for the reform was Deng Xiaoping Theory that was
generalized as “one center, two basic points.” The “one center” meant economic
development: the central job of the party and the state would shift from Mao Zedong’s
class struggle to the reform government’s economic development. The party would
specifically focus on modernizations in four areas: agriculture, industry, national defense,
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and technology. The “two basic points” are: on the one hand, to insist on the four cardinal
principles (as explained in the beginning of this chapter), and on the other hand, to insist
on reform and openness. 171 Deng Xiaoping emphasizes that both basic points were
crucial for China’s socialism. Therefore, Deng’s attempt is to develop an economy
without changing the one-party dictatorial rule. This Deng Xiaoping Theory has been
upheld until the present time, and will continue to be followed, according to Deng, for a
total of a hundred years (1978-2078). 172 Jiang Zemin added the “Three Represents” to the
Deng Xiaoping Theory: the communist party represents the interests of the broadest
range of the people, it represents the most advanced productivity, and it represents the
direction of the development of the most advanced civilization. Jiang Zemin’s purpose
was to justify the existing coalition of the political elite and the economic elite, and to
include the capitalists in the party. This “Three Represents” may not be as positive as
some people think, seeing it as a sign that the Chinese communist party has turned its
direction from socialism to capitalism. It aims at a justification of the predatory coalition
of the elite in China. 173
Hu Jingtao adds to the Deng Xiaoping Theory, too. He advocates
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“human-based development,” “scientific development (or sustainable development), and
“the harmonious society.” “Human-based development” was only a slogan or lip service
since so many people were in difficult situation because of the predatory nature of the
development. “Scientific development” or “sustainable development” placed emphasis on
the issue of environmental protection, but this also had little use since the environmental
situation in China have become worse and worse. 174 The slogan of “constructing a
harmonious society” is beautiful, but in dealing with mass protest events, Hu himself still
believed in state violence. The use of state violence to suppress the so called “unstable
factors in its budding state” was the real practice to keep citizens silent and made them
comply with the state policy or state position. What kind of “harmonious society” is this?
Besides the ideology, Hu Jintao also tried to come close to
Confucianism, which had always been misused historically to justify the ruler’s
supremacy and to require the subjects to be loyal to the emperor and the Court
unconditionally. In other words, Hu borrowed from Confucianism in order to reject the
western democracy. Therefore, once again, Confucianism becomes the tool of dictatorial
governance for the ruler—a constant tragedy that happened repeatly in Chinese history.
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CHAPTER SIX: THE INTERVIEW CASES IN SHANGHAI (1)

In what follows, I will present the interview cases in Shanghai. There
are 18 cases that I am going to present, including three government officials, six
enterprise people, four media professionals, and five intellectuals. The interviews were
conducted from late April to the middle of June, 2004. I use these interview cases to
obtain data that will reveal a long-term trend in the development or evolution of Chinese
democracy. This long-term trend started with the Opium War (1839-1842) when Chinese
civilization first encountered the modern, western civilization, and was forced to start its
long process of modernization. China today is still in that process. Shanghai is one of the
most modernized cities in China. How did these interviewees see the positive factors and
the negative factors that drove or impeded the development and change of the city that
they lived in? What were their evaluations of the roles of self and state in Shanghai’s
development and change? What were their expectations of the future, including their own
future and the city’s future?
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(1) The Government Officials
Interviewee No. 1 was a party cadre; his age was slightly over 50. He
first explained the characteristics of the Chinese political system, saying that the party
and the state were not separate. Even if currently China was in the reform years, it was
still the party that had the final say in everything. The government was the accessory of
the party. Now in China there were discussions on the separation of the government from
the party, saying that the party should change its role from the role of management to the
role of service, and let the government assume the responsibility of governance;
originally the government’s role was absent. Chinese traditional government was
different from the government in the western political science. Then he said that the
above description was context; anything that he was going to say was all within this
context. 175
Then, he discussed the currently-hot topic of institutional change
regarding the separation of the party-government. He explained that the main body of the
government was still the party members, so even if the party and the government were
separate, [the political system after] such governmental transformation was different from
the west: it was one-party rule. Then he turned to another hot topic: the legitimacy of the
175
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[communist] party’s rule. There were legal legitimacy and political legitimacy. Regarding
legal legitimacy, the birth of Chinese Communist Party was different from the situation in
the west. China had the party first, and then came the state. In the west, they had the state
first, and then came the party. The legal legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party was
sure because it had passed, in the procedure, the negotiation of the Council of Political
Negotiation and the agreement of the Congress of People’s Representatives. This meant it
had gained the support from the people. Further, the Congress of People’s
Representatives instituted the constitution that admitted the legal status of the Chinese
Communist Party’s rule. So legally, there was no problem. Regarding political legitimacy,
the Chinese Communist Party represented the people and was supported by the people.
“Now we say ‘Three Represents’”: the party represented an even bigger part of the
people. The party kept a close relationship with the people and was pragmatic, and this
further resolved the issue of political legitimacy. [If] a party wanted to rule successfully,
it needed to win the heart of the people. 176
The interviewee then gave a short theory of the difference between
Chinese and western political culture. He said that Chinese civilization was a “big river”
civilization, and western civilization was an “oceanic” civilization. “Big river”
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civilization meant agricultural society, which depended on water for living. In that case, it
needed a chief [as the authority] to allocate water areas, and rules [as the authority] would
not work. The civilization depended on the leader’s will to make the allocation. In the
“oceanic” civilization, each individual rented a boat to plunder things for allocation; thus
rules and institutions were crucial. So the difference between China and the west was
determined by such cultural background. He continued,
We have a joke. . . if you enter into China’s inland areas and ask the peasants
about what they need, the answer will be a good leader. And in the United States
and the Western Europe, it is institutions that are crucial, [and] it will be fine if a
leader is a fool. But in China, the leader cannot be a fool. 177
He further continued,
No matter how the government will change, it’s impossible to change to be like
the western style [because] the cultural tradition is functioning, the popular base,
the people’s cultural psychology. 178
His expectation of the future was that even after 20 years of change, such traditional
culture would still play a determinative role, and he said that even if Shanghai was
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characterized by its power to contain different kinds of culture, in essence, it was still
Chinese traditional culture that would dominate: People would follow individual persons,
not institutions. People’s knowledge about government was via specific persons
[officials]. His emphasis implied that Chinese people would not know the government by
a set of rules or institutions. 179
Another important point he made was about his self role in driving
the city’s development and change. He said that he was 52 years old, and his life goals
were to be diligent and sincere, acting as a bolt in the machine of the party. He said that
Maslow talked about an individual’s value fulfillment, “people in our generation do not
have such [desire], as long as our family is in harmony, our income is stable, we will be
satisfied. We are more realistic.” 180 The younger generation thought differently. His child
said that he would never did a job like his father’s job as a party cadre, which did not
carry significant social status; he wanted to be a big boss and be able to travel around the
world. The interviewee said that there was a generation gap involved: the value direction
was different. For him, the greatest joy was to serve the people, but for his son, if he had
the same attitude as the interviewee, it would influence his personal development within
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the peer group, and would make him discordant with the current society. Here the
interviewee expressed an important point. People in his generation held a value of self
sacrifice for the benefit of the collectivity (the work unit or the nation as a whole). Now
the social values had changed to more self-centric, focusing more on earning money and
becoming rich rather than on collective interests. But still, his way of leading the younger
party members was that they should learn from his occupational attitude (i.e., self
sacrifice for the collective interests), and in other aspects they could just follow each
one’s own character as long as they would not violate morality and law. Speaking of
spirit civilization 181 and how to develop a young party member, once again he
emphasized the difference between the western way and the Chinese way. The western
way, in his views, was by institutions, laws, credit, and punishment, and the Chinese way
was by education. “Confucius opposed most punishment without education first,” he said.
So he emphasized education. To awaken the people’s moral consciousness (common
ideas or ideals, common morality, and common sprit aspiration) was the content of spirit
civilization. He saw this as the political mission of the party.
On how the party worked (i.e., the political process), he explained
181

Spirit civilization is a term used by the CCP to distinguish non-material values from material
civilization which means economic development or earning money. The CCP emphasized that both
material civilization and spirit civilization were important. For example, corruption is a serious problem in
the category of spirit civilization.
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that, first the party made the decision, and then mobilized the people. The crucial part
was the party members; they should play a leading, vanguard role in the mobilization. 182
What if the people did not like the policy made by the party? He said that the policy ideas
should come from the people, and then shift to public policy or norms to manage public
affairs. In other words, his words implied that the party should always know what people
thought and what their concerns were, and the policy should always reflect the interests
and concerns of the people—this is mass line advocated by Mao Zedong. He continued to
explain this point of mass line, though he did not mention the term. How would the party
know what people thought or what their concerns were? The way to attain such purpose
was through the connection between upper-level and lower-level party members. The
lower-level party members should express their viewpoints to the highest party leader.
And the highest leader of the party should spend a long period of time with the people, to
investigate and research people’s wishes, and this had been institutionalized within the
party. If people’s wishes were normal and reasonable, those wishes will be
182

This meant that the party members should set an example for the people to follow in any policy. They
should be the first ones to uphold and carry out the policy which had been made by the party. If the policy
required the people to sacrifice their self interests, then the party members, as the vanguard of people,
should go first to sacrifice their interests for the people to follow. This had become a traditional way of
doing things for the CCP—using political mobilization to call the people to a mission, whether it was
economic development, one-child policy, suppression of Falun Gong, or house tearing and resettlement.
This way of carrying out policies had been created by Mao and had been inherited by the reform
party-government. That’s why being able to be accepted to become a party member was sometimes seen as
an honor. The party cadres were to serve the people, not to serve their own interests or any concerns about
self.
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institutionalized; if their wishes were not reasonable, the party would persuade them into
giving up those wishes. Here lay a problem that the interviewee did not raise: Who
decides which wishes are reasonable and which are unreasonable? Of course it is the
party that decides! If the party “persuades” you into giving up your concerns and interests,
you will have no choice but to listen to the party and comply with the policy that has been
made by the party. So this is the problem of mass line: In the final analysis, it is not mass
line; rather, it is the party line—the party decides everything, rather than the people.

Then he gave an example of house demolition and resettlement of
people. Why did the party want you to follow and move? It was because, the party would
tried its best to persuade you, that such movement would raise everybody’s living quality.
Why should you move? It’s for your own long-term interests, and for your children and
grandchildren and later generations’ interests which you might not be able to see during
your life. So the party would reason with you, and then required every household
involved to sign the contract. Using a “reasonable” way of counting the loss-- counting
heads or counting bricks, depending on the situation-- the party-government would
compensate you for the loss in the resettlement with a distribution of space of your new
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residence. If 60% or 70% of the households expressed their view that the distribution was
unreasonable, then the institution would be seen as unreasonable and the party and
government would reconsider the whole thing. If some part of the households expressed
their views which were unreasonable, then the government would have to do it
anyway. 183
Finally, he referred to the principles of the communist party’s
discipline for all party members. (1) The individual should obey the organization (i.e., the
party). (2) The lower level cadres should obey the upper level cadres. (3) The whole party
[members] should obey the central [party], for example, if things involved overall
considerations. (4) The minority should obey the majority, for example, if things involved
different views. At last, he said, the party played a determinative role in everything. 184
Interviewee No. 2 was a government official who was responsible for
propaganda. He first gave a general talk on the factors that drove the development and
change of this city. He said that development and modernization was about progress, so
there were three aspects in modernization. (1) The material aspect: this had to do with
technological innovation; (2) the sociological aspect: this referred to values and concepts,
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and it had to do with concept innovation; (3) the human factor: this had to do with talent
innovation. All three came down to humans and centered on humans. The interviewee
was very positive, self-confident and optimistic about himself, about Shanghai, and about
this country. He said that the requirement of the development of human civilizations was
progress, and the requirement of the society was that it wanted progress. Therefore, no
one should be anti-human beings or anti-society, and this meant that everybody should
pursue progress. If human history diverted from progress, it would need to return to the
normal track. He gave an example on Hitler, saying that Hitler was anti-human
civilization, so he had to fail and human history needed to turn its track back to
progress. 185 And the appearance of Hitler was because everybody cultivated the situation
for him to appear; without the policy of Appeasement and other factors, he would not be
able to appear. In general, a country should not impose its own values upon other
countries. Development should not be just caring for one’s own area, one’s own nation, or
one’s own country. There should be harmony, communication and cooperation. The
subject of this era was peace and progress. 186
185

Here I suspected that even if his example was on Hitler, the real example he wanted to mention was
Mao Zedong. I guessed what he wanted to express was that Mao’s Cultural Revolution was anti-human or
anti-society, so Mao finally had to fail, and Chinese history had to turn its rail back to the normal track,
which was reform. But because he was a government official, it was inconvenient for him to raise Mao
Zedong as a negative example. So he chose Hitler as a substitute.
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From talks of interviewee No. 2. Here he meant the US should not impose its democratic values on
China. There should be harmony, communication, and cooperation between countries that had different
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The interviewee then related his above talk to the state role in driving
the development and change of Shanghai. He said that since the human civilization and
the society wanted progress, and development and modernization were people’s desire,
the government should follow such a normal track and pursue progress. The government
had the most resources in its hands, so it was the most important organization in a society.
The government’s role was to guide, to coordinate, and to organize the development. If
the development went too fast, the government should slow it down; if it went too slowly,
the government should make it faster. He mentioned that the government’s role in
planning should not be discarded; it should make plans and guide a whole area to
advance to the positive side. The government should serve the people to meet their
demands, and it should be responsible not to be anti-society or anti-humans; otherwise it
would be discarded by the people. 187
Based upon the above ideas, the interviewee then talked about his self
role. He put his self role in the bigger picture of the area development. He said that he
had witnessed the development of this area: this area had played a leading role for [the
development of] Shanghai, and Shanghai had played a leading role for [the development

values, for example, between China and the US.
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of] other places. And in this process, his self value was raised, his material life became
better, his knowledge became more advanced, and his capability improved. So his
understanding of self role was placed under the whole framework of collective
development: when the collective development ran high, his self value ran high; because
there had been such an aura of progress in the society and in the reform years, he as an
individual could then gain an opportunity for the advancement of his self value. So he
was very positive. The future, he said, would be positive and bright. 188 That was his
expectations of the future.
Interviewee No. 3 was also a government official whose job was to
coordinate information and communication between the city and the central party. He
analyzed three factors that drove or impeded the development and change of Shanghai.
(1)Normative: the government in Shanghai was very normative, always following the
rules. In the area of social order, the Shanghai government did a good job. Therefore, it
was very secure in Shanghai. But because it was too normative, it lacked dash. (2)Crystal
of wisdom: Shanghai was a city full of domestic immigrants, and just as the interbreeding
children were smarter by 9 percent than other children, so the level of people’s quality as
a whole in this city was raised by the intermingling of different elements. (3)The drive of
188
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innovation: the drive of innovation in the government of this city was very strong. It was
a pattern of “small government, big society.” The government here was to offer service,
not to directly participate in the socio-economy. In contrast, in the inland areas, often the
party secretary was the president of the board in a company, and the socio-economy
depended on the government to pull it up. Here in Shanghai the government’s role was
like a judge, not a sportsman. The office that he worked in was to propagandize the image
of the development of this area. The western society might not understand this area, and
the office would hold news conferences periodically to help other provinces and the
western media to understand more about this area. The interviewee said that he enjoyed
his current job because he could contact different people and at the same time he could
serve people. 189
I asked him about his child to get a clue of his expectations of the
future. About the child, the interviewee said that he would not set a goal for him to attain,
but rather, he would create an environment for him to pursue his own life. However, he
would teach his child on three things. First, be loving: think of others and respect others.
Secondly, cultivate a consciousness of competition. The society would not center on you,
[so] you must raise your capability to fairly compete with others. Thirdly, behave yourself.
189
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More people placed emphasis on freedom, but he would stress the importance of norms.
You must inherit the norms of the previous generation, and the Chinese traditional virtues
like respecting the old people, loving the young, and no picking up of things other people
lost on the road. The interviewee was confident in himself, in the development of this
area, and in the development of Shanghai. There was a kind of work zeal and positive
aura around his working place (i.e., the government team). The drive, he said, came from
a goal stimulation in the government that by 2010 they would build Shanghai to become
an outward, modern, and multi-functional city—the prospect was very beautiful and
everybody had been working toward such a beautiful common goal. The drive also came
from his personal wish to make great progress and improve his own quality and
capability. 190
To sum up, government officials in this sample were all very positive
and optimistic about themselves and the future of Shanghai. They saw their self value in
the framework of the collective development of Shanghai. They all emphasized the
importance of the quality of government officials, including knowledge and capability to
do things and to communicate with others. They all emphasized the importance of the
state role in driving the city’s development and change. None of them talked much about
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the negative factors that impeded the development and change of Shanghai. Their
expectations of the future and the younger generations were positive; they enjoyed their
jobs very much, and they saw their jobs as serving the people and serving the collective
interests of Shanghai’s development and positive change.
(2) The Enterprise People
Interviewee No. 4 worked at a foreign company that provided the
parts of cars to car companies. He was in a position of high-level management . The
company started its business in China very early (1993-1994), and developed very fast.
Shanghai was a very easy environment, he said, for investment on the hardware and
software facilities. Now the company’s major opponents had entered into Shanghai, so
the situation for the competition was very fierce. The company planned to keep its
original leading position with its advantage on research and development (R&D). This
was not about traditional parts whose profit was not high; it was about high technology.
It’s a German company that defined itself as a high-tech company. The R&D was
focusing on electronic technology to meet three big trends: safety, environmental
protection, and fuel saving. It had three strategies in the competition. First, it would focus
on new fields to provide value for the customers and thus earning profit for itself.
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Secondly, it would pay much attention to the Asian-Pacific, Chinese market. Thirdly, it
planned to enter into non-vehicle fields globally like that of the motorcycle, and medical
field. 191 The interviewee said that Chinese market size was big because of its large
population. Chinese purchasing power grew very fast. As long as in one year there
emerged several new cities whose GDP per capita was more than 3,000 or 4,000 US
dollars, there would be a promising market for high growth rate. So it was promising in
the next three to five years; after five years, it was hard to say. The future was promising,
but he said usually a company would not see as far as 10 years or 20 years (as stated in
my interview questionnaire); it usually saw the next five years. For the parts of the cars in
the European or American market, if there was a 1 % growth, it would be very good
already. So the company paid great attention to the Asian-pacific, Chinese market. 192
About the self role, the interviewee showed a high degree of
self-confidence. He said that in the next five years, the most promising area was in
Shanghai; his job would be here, and he did not want to leave here. He had got an
Australian permanent resident qualification which was due in 2003, and he gave it up. He
had had some advantages in his career: he worked in MNC (multi-national corporation),
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he had an EMBA degree, and he had overseas work experience. So he told his boss that
he did not want to leave here. The place and timing for him was just perfect. Especially
people at such level [like him], having five to ten years of senior management
qualification were now the hottest in the employment market. People having
qualifications like him received telephone calls from talent-hunting companies every few
days. 193
About the government’s role, the interviewee had a high evaluation
of the Shanghai government, saying that the Shanghai government’s character was
efficiency and transparency. Their work was pro-business, and “we have a deep feeling
on this,” “the [Shanghai] government supports us very much.” “It very much meets our
needs.” Especially to the top 500 companies, the Shanghai government had many
favoring policies and support, and it was transparent. Because this was a foreign company,
I raised the question of Chinese nationalism. He said, the company had a policy of
promotion of indigenous talents, it did many things for China, and its development in
China and training of indigenous talents had long-term
benefit for the Chinese national car industry. Therefore, nationalism would not be a
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problem. 194
Interviewee No. 5 was also working at an American top MNC and
was also in a high management position. He looked about 40 years old or less. He first
gave a general talk on the factors that drove the development and change of Shanghai. In
general, Deng Xiaoping’s Southern-tour talks [in 1992] played a role of liberation from
the conservative forces within the government: thus the general aura of turning to
pragmatism. Specifically, (1) Shanghai originally had a strong industrial foundation. (2)
The Shanghai people had a very deep complex of aristocratic decline. It used to be the
Far Eastern “little Paris,” and was the earliest area of westernization [in China]. It had a
strong character of intermingling different elements, and it accepted new things very fast.
So when China decided the nation wanted reform and openness, it absorbed new things
very fast—the fastest in the country. (3) Shanghai had gained support from the [central]
government, especially in the recent 10 years. After 1989, Jiang Zemin was in power and
had a policy leaning toward Shanghai. It had very high level radiation [effect]: its
development was able to bring along the adjacent inland regions. Also, its city
administration, infrastructure, and cadres were all of high quality. (4) Shanghai had a
plural structure of industries. (5) Shanghai had contained talents from all regions. (6) The
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foreign investment in Shanghai had brought consumption, trained talents, and brought in
advanced ideas and management models. 195
The state role was very important as stated above at point (3). About
the self role, the interviewee thought that an individual’s power [to drive a city or a
society] was very small. Since he was not able to control the whole society and he could
only control himself, the only thing he could do was to do his job well. He wanted to act
as an instrument of communication to share with his friends and acquaintances new ideas,
new concepts, and new ways of management, because not everybody had had the
opportunity like him to enter into a big foreign company. In the future he also hoped that
after he learned [new] knowledge, he would jump into national industries to help the
development of Chinese national industries. He also worried that once China joined WTO,
when the tariff went down, many Chinese national industries would fall. But he was
optimistic about this. The time was short. Within five to ten years, the national industries
must catch up to avoid being ousted in the competition. I asked him about the role that
Chinese nationalism played in driving the economy, which was totally different from the
American capitalists’ individualism. He said that this was also an area where the
difference between China and the US lay. He said that because the US did not have
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history, 196 and did not have a hundred years of national humiliation like China did since
the Opium War, it would not have strong nationalism to play an important role in driving
the national development. He said that China’s government officials had very strong
ambition and aspiration to drive national development. I think he touched an important
point that China’s development was to a great extent due to its officials’ will to pursue
national wealth and power. This was the same as my assumption and my previous
knowledge of Chinese nationalism. Finally he talked about himself. Though he wanted to
enter into the national industries, the national industries could not afford to pay the salary
that he was paid in the foreign company. 197
Interviewee No. 6 was a young lady; she worked at a foreign
pharmacist company. Her job was about communication and public relations. She first
gave a general talk on the factors that drove the development and change of Shanghai. (1)
Shanghai, for a hundred years, was the commercial port. The western culture first came to
Shanghai, so the Shanghai people had the earliest contact with the western culture and
industrialization. (2) Many of the old generation who received the western education
were still alive; they were not unfamiliar with western culture and customs. After 1978,
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the reform began, and the city people got along with people from outside of the country
very fast. People from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and overseas Chinese had connections of
friendship, family relationships, investment, and cooperation [with the Shanghai people].
Globally, the trade began, and here in Shanghai, the labor was cheap, the level of
knowledge and culture was high, the transaction was efficient, and business norms,
courtesy, fax, and e-mail were all present. In the early 1990’s, foreign trade, export of
processing products, capital from Hong Kong and Taiwan all came to Shanghai, and the
city people’s self-confidence rose. Capital from America and Europe also came, adopting
the form of a joint venture. At first the Chinese side opened slowly, occupying 51% of
capital share. Both sides were testing the way of cooperation. Again, the Shanghai people
accepted the business culture very fast. And the work manner influenced the manner of
life. Originally the western way of dealing with jobs and the modern business manner
was absent in the Chinese pattern. (3) The culture influenced Shanghai’s government
officials, and the officials thus had richer and broader views, experiences, and
understanding. They were more capable of dealing with things. (4)Also, the Shanghai
people were far away from the central government, so they were more practical, not
counting too much on ideology. 198
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About the self role, the interviewee mentioned the similarity of
cultures: the world was becoming an integral whole. Shanghai or other big cities had
more opportunities to experience the fusion of foreign things with indigenous things. She
emphasized that it was a fusion, not a total copy. So the government’s talk on nationalism
and spirit civilization made sense. In her case, the more she contacted foreigners, the
more she loved her own country. Foreigners did have their advantages, and if there was a
process of progress [for the Chinese], she was willing to play a role in helping her
countrymen [to become modern]. This would take a long time of education on modern
philosophy and modern culture. This would require a fusion of Chinese and western
knowledge of philosophy and history. 199 In other words, the interviewee believed that the
global culture had become an integral culture, and Chinese philosophy and history would
be able to make contributions to the fusion of the western culture and the Chinese culture.
The interviewee’s expectations of the future were positive. She said
that the enterprise’ future depended on the government’s policy. If the policy became
more open, joining WTO, then the next five to ten years would be good; it would still be
an “economic culture,” which was good for their enterprise. The problem lay in the areas
of intellectual property right, public hygiene, and the medical system. The policy of
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public hygiene could not be controlled by the ministry of foreign trade. I asked her about
the political process. (1) “How would the enterprise influences the government’s policy?”
The interviewee answered, “It’s hard.” (2) “Is there any lobby group?” She said only
the children of high level cadres or the retired old cadres could use personal relationships
to affect policy-making in some grey areas. (3) “How about the media’s role?” She said
that it was said that the media would act as the third side and play the role of supervision
of the government and its policies, but the media were controlled by the government and
belonged to the government. The media in America could criticize their government
about the policy toward Iraq; here in China such thing was just impossible. (4) “Is there
any informal channel to try to influence the government’s policy?” She said that in
America the government and the academic circle could hold a forum to discuss issues on
public hygiene; the European government was less active than the American government;
and here in China their company depended more on themselves and very little on the
government. I asked, “So the company could only passively wait for the policy and
comply with it?” She said, “Yes.” Finally I asked her, “If you had a child, how would you
guide him or her?” She answered, “Education. Not the school education, but he or she
must understand Chinese philosophy and history, and the world philosophy and history.
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Some people were sent overseas for study, but it was pathetic that they know very little
about their own country’s philosophy and history.” 200 So her expectations of the future
were a fusion of Chinese culture and the western, modern culture to become a global
culture, and she wanted to play the role of bridge through education—this was a
long-term view and it would be a long-term process.
Interviewee No. 7 was a Taiwanese businessman. He was the boss of
a small company and was less than 40 years old. He first gave a general talk on the
positive or negative factors that drove or impeded the development and change of
Shanghai. He first talked about the positive side. (1) Shanghai had strong power of
consumption. (2) It had strong acceptability of foreign, new things, and it was very fast in
absorbing new things. (3) It had geographical advantage: it was located in the center of
coastal provinces, where there were no earthquakes; it was a plane, and it had a big
deep-water harbor that was easy to enter and exit. Then he talked about the negative side.
(1) The employees lacked activeness in work. They were self-protective, and did not take
initiative to serve the customers. (2) It was hard to get money you needed from the bank.
The institutions were complete, but the way of thinking lagged behind. 201
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About the government’s role, the interviewee highly praised the
Shanghai government. The Shanghai government had high efficiency in enforcing the
laws. Living in Shanghai was very secure. And the government’s administrative
efficiency was very high. They were really doing their job well. People in Shanghai only
wanted stability. Living here was very comfortable. So he said that we should give them
time, and should not demand things too much.

In 200 years, 202 they could make

progress to such an extent; it was great already. Five years later, when the software
construction and the construction of the humanistic environment were completed, it
would become better. They were using 15 years to catch up with what should be
completed within 50 years. He gave the crisis of SARS as an example. Within one week,
the spreading of SARS was under control; this really showed their administrative
efficiency. 203
About the self role, the interviewee was very positive. He emphasized
initiative, service, and relationship. It was not necessary to be greedy, just step by step,
[and he would succeed.] Next year (2005) his business would extend from domestic trade
to foreign trade. He said he had the Taiwanese spirit of business, but did not look down
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upon the mainland Chinese people as some Taiwanese did. He would train the mainland
employees, and once they had learned, everything could just follow the institutions of the
company, and he would become relaxed and could just travel everywhere. It would take
three to five years for this process to be done. After three to five years, he would have
created his world. 204
Interviewee No. 8 was a Taiwanese businesswoman, who opened a
teashop and sold tea in Shanghai. She came here because her husband wanted to come
here to sell tea, and she liked to drink tea, so, she followed her husband; originally she
was not a businesswoman. She first talked about her self role: how she ran a successful
business. “Doing business in Shanghai is fine.” “You have to deal with officials of the
Customs, tax affairs, agency of industry and commerce, public security, fire-fighting, and
hygiene.” Not only did one need to deal with upper-level officials, but one also needed to
deal with base level officials like public security people [i.e., the policemen]. There was a
Taiwanese saying: “The little official was intractable.” As long as one did not violate the
law or did bad things, it was very free [doing business in Shanghai]. Public security in
Shanghai was the best in this country. But although the economy ran so high, the level of
people’s knowledge did not catch up. In restaurants you saw poor dining etiquette; in
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traditional markets you saw people spit casually; in the bus station, nobody lined up.
Running business here, first, one needed to avoid other people’s attention; secondly, one
needed to know where one might encounter what, so that one would not fall
somewhere. 205
Taiwanese businessmen who came here had a high rate of failure.
Only three out of ten could make it even, earning little, or earning a lot. The reasons for
failure included ex-marital relationships, playing too much, and alcoholic addiction.
Those who succeeded worked very hard, like 24 hours a day. Then she analyzed the
reasons for business success. One had to work hard. The interviewee said that she worked
355 days a year, only taking ten days off during the lunar New Year holidays. She was
here to make money, not to play. Besides, if one came here to run a high-tech production,
one should keep some part of the technology and should not share it all. Dealing with
people was another important point. It took a clear mind to deal with other Taiwanese
businessmen, the people around you, and the mainland Chinese. You must know how to
reject something that you did not want, like alcohol; avoid being a “yes-man” in every
situation. She also said sometimes when she had a good feeling about people, she would
give a lower price, and thus she won a good reputation in the business circle. People
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would introduce other customers to her, and that was an important reason for her success
in business. The interviewee then gave several other examples to show that people’s level
of knowledge had not caught up. So even if she had been here for five to six years, she
had not accommodated her life well with the life style here. Because her business was
successful, she was self-confident and positive about the future. She said she would close
the business here after five to eight years, and then returned to Taiwan. She did not have
traditional cultural ideas of leaving her business to her children. 206
The interviewee said that Taiwanese businessmen came here to
educate the mainland people. Somebody told her that she was good at teaching the
employees, because they were very polite in answering the phone. She told her
employees that telephone etiquette was the first thing to learn, because it was crucial in
doing business. Young ladies should not sit with their legs wide open. Here lay the
difference in education between mainland [China] and Taiwan. Taiwan’s education
included etiquette lessons. The interviewee also made some comments about the
Shanghai people. People from Shanghai liked to show off. They wore valuable things
[pearls, rings, necklace, etc.] on their body, but would not let you go to their house lest it
reveal the fact that they were not that rich. Now the economy had risen, the Shanghai
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people could buy a house with 400,000 yuan, and spent 800,000 yuan in house decoration
and adornments. They installed air-conditioners not for use, but more for showing off. 207
About the government’s role, the interviewee mentioned several
points. She said foreign capital kept coming in, and even if some Taiwanese enterprises
did not want to come here, they had to. Beijing and Shanghai were two cities that foreign
enterprises had to come to. So here lay the government’s role: they made use of foreign
businessmen to build their own cities and inland areas. Another role that government
played was macro adjustment and control of the economy. Still another role was
promoting the rise of the consciousness of environmental protection in government.
Finally she made some comments on the future of Shanghai and China. Shanghai’s
modernized appearance was propped up by the government; the city was not mature
enough. Again, it was because of the people’s level of knowledge or cultural upbringing.
China might be good in some professional field, like launching the navigation satellite.
But that was not something to boast of; when people would not spit casually, that was
really an achievement. So unless China developed the talents of its people and sent a
good number of students overseas to learn, things would not change. But for a country
with a population of 1.3 billion, how many new talents and students would China need to
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improve itself? 208
Interviewee No. 9 was a partner of a small company which had only
nine employees. The capital was only 500,000 yuan. 209 He and his partner each share half
of the capital (i.e., 250,000 yuan). Their business was about logistics (i.e., material
circulation) management. Their jobs included warehousing, transporting and distributing
goods. He came to Shanghai because Shanghai was a big modern city, the relevant
industries were well developed, and it was the center of the Yangtze River Delta, so there
would be more business here. He said that he wanted to enter into a foreign company, but
he was limited by his English proficiency. In 2001, he stayed in a logistics company
named Menlo for one year. Now (2004) his company had signed a contract with a
customer company. The contract was for one year, and it had only been nine months so
far. The contract stipulated that the customer could break off business relations without
giving notice. Though this was unfair to them, they had to tolerate it, because in the
future there were still chances that they would have business relations with this company.
He said that it was hard to open the markets of foreign enterprises or big enterprises,
which meant it was hard to expand their business. Their company was too small; big
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customers did not have trust in their services. 210
About the expectations of the future, the interviewee mentioned three
points. (1) He hoped that this company could grow to become big so that his marriage,
housing, and children would be supported. (2) The other partner was now in a foreign
enterprise which had closed the logistics department. (When the foreign investors merged
the enterprise, what they saw was sea transport and air transport, not land transport; that’s
why they closed the logistics department.) So he hoped that his partner would come to
their own company and he himself could leave, because if he stayed, his salary was
15,000 yuan, 211 which was a high cost for their company. He hoped that he could go out
and find a job in logistics; then it would be convenient for him to introduce some
business to their own small company. He said that the reason was that he had an
academic degree and his partner did not have one, and therefore it would be better if he
went out. (3) He expected that someday they could open the markets of foreign
enterprises or big enterprises. He would not give up, and would keep trying. 212
I asked him a question about “spirit civilization” which was
propagandized by the communist party. He said that it was just responsibility, faithfulness.
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The company must be responsible to the customer, and the employee must be responsible
to the company. I asked him about the spirit strength to sustain his pursuit, and he said
that it’s quite simple: they just wanted to survive. Seven or eight years ago, those who
entered into this field were all doing well because the profit rate was 40%. And he just
entered this field when he came to Shanghai last year (2003); now the profit rate was
20%. About the state role, he said that it was just about applying for the license and
paying taxes. That’s it. The government disregarded them. They did not deal with the
government much, and there was no party organization in their company. “Now the party
organization was very slack. My girlfriend is a party member. I sometimes see her not
join the party meetings or activities.” And in Shanghai the government did not impose
unreasonable fees or payment shares like in other places. 213
About his self role (or occupational drive/-motivation), he said that
he felt that this field was proper for him. In general, the goods transport services had very
low quality. For example, if the customer needed two trucks for their goods, the truck
company would send two trucks. But after they left the customer, they would put all the
goods in just one truck to save their cost, and thus the goods would be damaged; or they
might be dishonest and stored the goods in their warehouse and told the customer that
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their trucks were broken and needed to be fixed, thus impeding the arrival of goods in
time. Some of them even scolded the customer; this was a buyer’s market: [when] you
scolded the customer, of course he would not come to your business. The main concern
for the interviewee was to survive and develop. The biggest source of pressure was to
enter the markets of foreign enterprises or big enterprises. 214
The way to do business was about commission and human
relationships. The interviewee did not buy trucks. He was a middleman. The truck
company did not need to find business. He would find it for them. He was able to do so
because he stayed in Menlo, the logistics company, for one year and was in the position
of director in some area, and therefore he knew some people. So it was crucial to
cultivate human relationships. The method he utilized was an old Chinese one: giving the
potential customers dinner treats. The first treat was just to make friends, and there would
be little discussion of business; usually the potential customers were introduced by
someone he knew, so the first treat would include several persons. The second treat was
only two persons: the potential customer and him. This time both could open their hearts
and get into direct discussion, including the commission. If you gave me one million
yuan of business, I would give you 2% of commission. If you requested 10%, that was
214
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also fine—then I would need 15% of profit, so in total there had to be 25% of profit. The
interviewee said that there were many competitors; other people (the competitors) also
knew how to use human relationships and commission to elicit business, so if it were not
for the relationships [between me and the potential customers], why was I able to get the
business? 215
The interviewee also mentioned the relationships between him and
the employees. Sometimes he would give some lectures to them, and share business
experiences. The Shanghai government had regulations about employees’ rights, so he
would buy medical insurance and financed other welfare needs for them. He said that if
you treated people sincerely, in most cases people would treated you the same way. This
was a private enterprise, so the employees worked hard. Finally he mentioned the
newly-passed law of traffic safety had an influence on them. In the past, if the regulation
said that a truck could carry five tons of goods, it was fine to carry ten tons, thus earning
money. Now when the newly-passed law said that a truck was allowed to carry five tons,
then you could carry only five tons. This had increased the cost. 216
To sum up, in this sample, the business people all had a positive view
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of the state role in driving the development and change of Shanghai. The mainland
Chinese who worked in the MNCs (multi-national corporations) did not see Chinese
nationalism as a negative factor for the business. They even wanted to act as a bridge to
help their countrymen learn modern culture: modern ideas, modern concepts, and modern
business manner. Working in the MNCs had not only given them higher salaries, but had
also made them pioneers of the global culture. They expected the Chinese national
industries to catch up with the modern way of management, especially within five to ten
years when Chinese industries needed to compete with the global MNCs after joining the
WTO. Taiwanese business people noticed that currently (2004) the mainland Chinese
were lagging behind on the way of thinking or the way of doing things. One of them
wanted to allow them more time to make progress and not to demand things too much.
The other (the businesswoman) saw that it was hard for them to catch up unless there
were lots of trained talents and overseas students (who had learned from the west) to lead
this country and educate the people. The last case was a partner of a small company, and
therefore, the biggest concern for him was to survive, to open the markets of the foreign
or big enterprises. As a small, private enterprise, they did not deal with the government
much. All interviewees in the business circle in this sample were self-confident, diligent,

166

and positive about their own future.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE INTERVIEW CASES IN SHANGHAI (2)

(3) The Media Professionals
Interviewee No. 10 and No. 11 were interviewed together, and
interviewee No. 10 went first. During the interviews, each of them sometimes interrupted
in the other person’s talks to make some comments on the same issue. They were both
young, unmarried, and just entering into media business, working for newspapers.
Interviewee No. 10 was a female. She first gave a general talk on the driving force that
was carrying Shanghai forward. She said that it was tension: the Opium War as the
contact point between modernization and pre-modernization. Originally country and
country, continent and continent were separate and had distance [from each other].
Europe and America needed overseas trade market, needed connection, so there was
tension. Such tension would burst when it reached a certain degree. Thus the geographic
plates that were originally not relevant to each other had inter-continental contact because
of economic-political development. China was forced to know the existence of another
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world. Once it started, it became an irresistible power. 217
About the self role (or occupational drive/- motivation), she said that
becoming a news person was quite natural. By chance her university entrance exam
brought her to the department of news, and her major in the university thus determined
the job that she was in now. When she finished her master degree, it was time for a job.
The media was fitting for her. The reason for her choice of Shanghai was a combination
of Shanghai’s attraction, her ideas for a job, and family factors. She explained such a
choice. There were two aspects for such a choice. On the bigger aspect, the media’s
market would become larger in the later time; now in Shanghai, the media was regulated
very tightly because of politics—it had huge limitations presently. On the individual
aspect, personal capability and professional capability would have more chance for
development. 218
I asked her a question: “Somebody asked that why Guangzhou and
Beijing were able to have newspapers that could lead the whole country, why was
Shanghai not able to do so.” She said that from the perspective of [political] forces,
Guangzhou and Beijing had cracks. There was competition between political forces. In
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Beijing, it was the central government competing with the local government (i.e., the city
government of Beijing); in Guangzhou, it was the provincial party committee competing
with the city party committee. Another factor was that Guangzhou was at the front of the
trend of reform and openness, so it was filled with business consciousness. Still another
factor had to do with the Shanghai people’s character: they were more practical, more
compliant, not like the Beijing people who liked to talk about politics. Guangzhou had a
brave, pioneering spirit; Shanghai was milder. That’s why the South Weekend 219 pleased
neither the government nor the market. A year ago, it was the society’s public channel to
supervise the government, but not anymore. Interviewee No. 11 interrupted here, saying
that it had to do with the retirement of Premier Zhu Rongji—the South Weekend devoted
20 pages to express their respect to the Premier. Interviewee No. 10 continued to say that
it involved intra-party factional struggle. 220
She said that this newspaper did not sell well in Shanghai; the
Shanghai people did not have enough humanistic concerns with the disadvantaged. The
South Weekend had a famous slogan: “Let the powerless become powerful; let the
pessimistic advance.” Journalists of the South newspaper system were from the Beijing
219
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University, so they were cultivated in a city that was filled with political concerns. The
Shanghai people were concerned more about earning money and living their lives; the
Beijing people were concerned more about how to make the nation powerful. The South
newspapers also did not sell well in Guangzhou. 221
Interviewee No. 10 then returned to the topic of self role. She said
that Hangzhou (the city that she lived in during her university and graduate work) was
too quiet, too boring, and Shanghai was the only city around that had city air. You would
be free here, and you could be exposed to different information, and meet more
prominent people, and richer people. But Shanghai was too far away from nature; there
was no place to play around. It was more tolerant, and had more uncertainty. Hangzhou
was very certain; you could predict the next 10 years of it. Beijing and Guangzhou was
too far away, and Hangzhou was too boring, so she chose to go to Shanghai. In general,
Shanghai was very good, but she had anxieties: her level of personal development in her
career and English proficiency, her love relationship, and whether she was living a life
that she wanted. I asked, “What is that (the life that she wanted)?” She said, “a job that I
love much, a man who loves me, health, money, being able to take good care of my
family, and more experiences.” I continued to ask, “What are the barriers for you to
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achieve that goal?” She said, “On career, my characters, my English proficiency,
competition, and talents—I am not very intelligent. On love relationship, good men are
rare. The female group now has a lot of changes. A woman has to take care of the family,
and has to be good in her profession: she has to be both tender and capable. I want to
meet an interesting and faithful man.” 222
The interviewee continued to express her anxieties. She worried that
the social development in Shanghai would be in a mess. Shanghai was westernized but
not open, pursuing fashion but not tolerant, especially the middle-aged men—they were
very stingy.

This was a society where those in power did not have enough wisdom.

What if the buildings collapsed? There were not many trees and grassland, the air was
becoming worse, and the culture was also in a mess. There were no traditional things, like
folklore or hand-made products. Traditions were crucial for the cultivation of a person’s
personality. The government did not know what traditions were, and where the good
points of traditions lay. The government might understand modernization, but they lacked
an understanding of traditions. 223
About the government’s role, the interviewee said that whether the
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government team could fulfill the job of modernization would depend on a mechanism of
conscience that could bring about some people to use norms to manage the city. The
government was the steering person of the boat; it needed a professional, modernized
team. The individual’s ideals were dependent upon the grand environment, which
depended on the government. Things as small as jobs, the media’s development, space for
free market competition, and as big as the living environment, all depended on the
government. 224
About the expectations of the future, she said: health, positive
development, norms, and nature. Shanghai’s development was at the sacrifice of nature;
in the 1980’s, Shanghai was very beautiful; now all the beauty was gone. She thought that
excellent planners and designers should be included in the government’s urban planning
department. And she expected that the city would become more plural, tolerant, and
warmer in human relationships. 225
Interviewee No. 11 first made general comments about Shanghai. He
had complex feelings about Shanghai, and did not very much see himself as a Shanghai
person. But he said wherever he stayed, he did not develop a special sense of identity. He
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stayed in Beijing for half of a year, and saw many strange, crazy guys who were poor but
culturally active—it was culturally plural and rich. Shanghai, in this respect, was
culturally monotone. In Beijing, if you wanted to do something in a cultural circle, you
had to belong to this circle. When there was a circle, there was trouble. In Shanghai, there
were [cultural] circles, too. But an individual did not have to rely on a certain [cultural]
circle. You could have your own world. The big difference between Beijing and Shanghai
was that Beijing was culturally active, and Shanghai was culturally monotone. He studied
philosophy in Germany for six years, and he felt that in Shanghai people’s way of dealing
with people and things, their way of life, their speech and behavioral manners were
similar to those in Europe. When he stayed in Beijing, he had cultural shock: he was not
very much adaptable to the Beijing way of speaking and communication. His way was
when he talked with friends, the talks went slowly and were about ideas; he had a habit of
serious discussion. But most of the Beijing people talked about interesting things and
nobody was serious; it was hard to direct the talks to such a serious track—conversations
would not have to do with your profession. In contrast, in Shanghai, the way of life, food,
drinks, and buildings were similar to coffee shops, internet bars, and street districts in
Europe. So he had little psychological distance and felt comfortable in Shanghai. 226
226
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About the self role, he said that he studied phenomenology,
Heidegger, etc. Media was not his major, and in his high school days, he thought that he
would spend his life in the university. Then gradually he learned that profession and life
aspirations could be separate. Originally he saw them as one thing. His pursuit of
knowledge started very early. During high school days, he read Russell’s The History of
Philosophies, studied analytical philosophy and Nietzsche, and later cultural
anthropology. He summed up his studies in three parts: the theoretical physics,
philosophy, and literature. So it was a process of self-education. Then he entered into the
department of German in the university, and then studied overseas in Germany. He said
that German philosophy was detailed and deep, and Chinese philosophy did not ever
match its quantity and quality. He got lots of joy from his studies, and he began his study
of Chinese philosophy in Germany. Later on, he became doubtful about whether he
should stay in the academy. If he wanted to study Heidegger to the doctoral degree, it
would take seven to eight more years. Both time and economy did not allow him to do so.
So he began to think seriously about the path of his life. 227
At this time, by coincidence, he had a chance to enter into the media.
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For him, the income in the media was fine, but how would the job in the media related to
his life aspiration? During this period, he was studying neo-Confucianism in which the
value of life lay in two things: internally becoming a saint and externally directing
politics to the goal of the Great Harmony. He thought that working in the media might be
relatable to the external goal of neo-Confucianism; thus he attained a solution for how to
relate profession and life aspiration. He said that he was not placing great faith and hope
in the media’s work. Some people thought that the media could rebuild China, and direct
Chinese political change; he himself was not that optimistic. Yes, the media had great
power, but it was not controllable by the individual. The only thing that he could hope
was that people who worked in media were mostly good people, but even so things
directed by good people might not necessarily be good. The media had its own regularity,
and was not controllable by the individual. Then he gave two recent events as examples
on how the media operated which was clearly against justice. One of them was that the
general manager of the newspaper The South City was wrongly and unjustly condemned
to be corruptive; in truth, he insisted on a just and correct report of an event which
exposed the government’s injustice and wrongdoings. In other words, the general
manager was put into jail because of his insistence on news conscience. Therefore, the
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media was in a situation of absurdity. It was not controllable by an individual or a group
of people who insisted on conscience. 228
The interviewee continued to say that this did not mean that one was
unable to do anything, as long as you played your role well and did a good job in your
position, doing your best and leaving the result to heaven. You should not give up your
ideals, but you should not have too high expectations and made the mistake of political
childishness. The difference between life aspiration and profession was that the former
was where your life enthusiasm lay and the latter was how you got your income and
leisure. Maybe someday the media’s work could be related to the external goal of the
Great Harmony. He had just entered into the media, so he still needed to observe and
learn the complex situations. He had not set a goal, and did not hold high faith, just step
by step; when there were opportunities, he would not give up, and if there were not, he
would not be in despair. 229
About the state’s role, I asked him that how the state role related to
his profession and life aspiration. He explained that the government was very important.
In appearance, the media seemed to be affected by the market; in reality, the
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government’s administrative order could destroy a media outlet. For example, due to
factional struggle, if the minister of the ministry of propaganda was changed, or if the
general manager of a media was changed, the whole personnel that followed the previous
person would change accordingly. Then a media outlet could die or change its nature. The
reason was that the newspaper was defined [by the communist party] as the voice of the
government, of the party. Such a position seemed to be neglected in ordinary times, but
when there was a change of high-level personnel, everything changed. 230
Since the media was positioned as the voice of the party and the
government, I asked that what those things were that were not permitted to report.
Interviewee No. 10 interrupted at this moment; she said that there was a propaganda
pamphlet that specified the propaganda taboo: religion and ethnic affairs were surely not
to be touched upon, and recently the forced demolition of the houses by the [housing
estate] merchants could not be reported; that the launch station of a cell phone would
influence people’s health could not be reported. Then she gave an extreme example: in
the News Morning Post, you could not find the word “pig,” because it had to do with the
Muslim faith. So, the meat of “pig” (i.e., pork), “pig” head would have to disappear, and
Mr. “Pig” would have to be changed to Mr. “Cow.” She said that smart and politically
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sensitive leaders were very cautious on these places. Interviewee No. 11 continued to say
that in China the way of doing things was not straightforward; you needed to beat about
the bush or circumvent something. This was the most challenging thing to the
intellectuals. In ancient times [in China] there were also such things as hiding between
the lines. So he mentioned his life aspiration here, since it had to do with the capability to
see into the nature or core of things, to penetrate between the lines. He said that young
people easily made the mistake of political childishness.231
About his expectations of the future, he said that he would not expect
too highly, just hoping that people working with him would be easy to communicate with,
and the job would be stable. He would stay in the media. Finally I asked him to add
something more. And he added a point that in Germany, in Europe, or in America, the
real places that intellectuals were able to exert their influences were, first, in the think
tank or acting as policy advisors of the political elite, and second, in the media, and the
media was the most direct public channel that one could make use of. Like Habermas
said, “public space.” This was more influential than teaching in the university. In the
current Chinese environment of the media, it was very difficult for the intellectuals to
make use of the media to exert their influences. He said that he was gambling. The media
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had a process of development. In the west, the people who occupied the media were those
who had doctorates or those who were professionals. And in contrast, here in China those
who worked in the media lacked seriousness, capability, understanding, and high levels
of knowledge. 232
He then said that his wish was to retire at the age of 45, and devoted
himself to writing books. I asked that if he had a model author in mind. He said, first,
Mou Zongsan (a neo-Confucianist in Hong Kong), and second, writing novels. I asked if
the novels were to carry “Tao”? He said that they would be about history, like the
reminiscences of the Roman Emperors. About carrying “Tao,” he mentioned that he
wanted to re-explore the ethos of the neo-Confucianist intellectuals (about what issues
they were thinking about, and what state of being they were in) in the late Ming dynasty
and South Song dynasty, the two turning points of Chinese intellectual history. He finally
said again that because of the outside (i.e., political) factors, intellectuals’ power could
not be manifested in the media. Now the voice in the media was monotone. The media
should be clear that all kinds of voices should be manifested. 233
Interviewee No. 12 (also in a newspaper) was a typical idealist
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journalist who had always stuck to news conscience and cared about the disadvantaged
and the true benefit of the country, and saw the media as a public channel to supervise
government; that was what interviewee No. 10 (the female one) told me in advance. After
I explained my interview questions, he first told me that he would remind me [to be
cautious in writing] if during the talks we touched upon the sensitive things since in my
questionnaire I had referred to the government’s role. He, as others, first gave a general
talk on the factors that drove or impeded the development and change of Shanghai. He
said that in appearance the general answer, for a modern man, seemed to be the power of
the market, the power of economy. But as far as Shanghai was concerned, if we traced
back to the 1980’s, the early 1990’s to the middle of 1990’s, in fact, the change still had
much to do with the state’s ideology, the political change. Shanghai was a core city of the
planned economy after China’s liberation (i.e., after 1949); it did not enter into
development in the reform years until the middle of the 1990’s. In the process of
transition, political factors had to be considered besides the market factor. Chinese
modernization had been going on for 150 years, but for the recent 50 years, up until now
(2004), the market and the state were still the two most influential factors that existed.
This also had its historical reasons. Shanghai, compared with other cities, did not have
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much sense of history. It was a city that did not appear until the days of [western]
colonization. So it was a young city. In the 1920’s and 1930’s, it further formed its own
Shanghai culture, 234 occupying its own [glorious] position in finance and shipping. It was
a young city and had had a prosperous past like that. So in the mindset of the Shanghai
people, there was a deep-rooted sense of the good old dream of prosperity, and this had
led, in their mind, to an illusion of what this city should have been like. Therefore, though
this city was young, the influence of the potential psychology, culture, and the city
dwellers’ characters could not be underestimated. Shanghai’s history, from the views of a
cross section, also reflected the reversals and zigzags of Chinese history of
modernization. 235
About the self role, the interviewee said that he represented a kind of
people who, in the recent 20 years in China, were born in the rural area, and entered into
the city through the university entrance exam and settled in the city. He called such a
group of people “two sections people,” with the upper half of the body stretching in the
air of the city and the lower half section of the body buried under the [rural] soil. I asked
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him when were such a group of people born. He said around the end of 1960’s to the end
of 1970’s; those who were born in the 1980’s had a good environment of urbanization, so
it was easy to enter the city, and it’s hard for the generation earlier than his to enter into
the city because of the strict household register system and the tough university entrance
exam; so his generation lay between those two generations described above. He
continued his talk on the “two sections people.” Their blood affinity and relative affinity
were all in the village, but their society, human relationships, and career were all in the
city. Another name for this group of people was, “the generation that cannot return to
their home countryside,” which meant that there was no turning back, and there was not a
piece of grass or tree familiar to them in the city. They were the domestic immigrants,
and there was a sense of alienation for them in the city. Except using the same writing
characters [with the city people], there was [sheer] blankness in other areas. 236
Under such circumstances, these people were strongly goal-oriented,
working harder, and assuming a color of material utilitarianism; but this was the reality.
The pressure from material drive was the greatest. This group of people had been under
heavy material pressure since their early days: from the family life to the school days, to
the job and to the present time (2004). For the tuition, their families and they themselves
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had to think of many ways to raise money. And buying a house and living in the city, the
living cost was very high. The only way to resolve all these issues was to work very hard
in their career. That’s why they devoted themselves much more than others. So the major
driving force for their personal development (i.e., the self role) was the huge material
pressure. 237
In another aspect, when he opened the door of the media, it really had
great temptation for him. This was a career that changed fast, had huge space for the
market, and carried many social ideals. He advanced from knowing nothing about it to
loving it to being unable to stop. So this was the second driving force for his self
development (or professional motivation). If there were some barriers that impeded his
self development or self fulfillment in the career, it would be the fact that the media that
he was in was still under the control of politics. He said that in current China the media
was not a profession of high profit; neither was it the best way for climbing up the
bureaucratic ladder. If your heart was burdened with ideals, conflict and confusion would
be immense. Another impeding factor for self fulfillment was that Chinese society had
lost faith and values; now the society centered on money. This was a strong, invisible
magnetic field that surrounded every individual, making the individual have to consider it
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when making decisions--these problems might be for the purpose of survival. The
interviewee then said, under the appearance of prosperity, there hid something which
caused worries. And this had to come to the government’s role. 238
About the government, last week he talked with an American. The
American said that since the building of the PRC, the Chinese had been in constant
revolutions, had been constantly engaged in reform by [political] movement. The
interviewee asked the American, “In your views, has China now settled down?” The
American answered, “No. Now it is still under movement: movement for capitalism.”
The interviewee (No. 12) said he himself was confused, and he thought that the American
must also have felt confused. The red China in foreigners’ eyes now was seen as
capitalistic. The interviewee was himself within it (i.e., within China’s development), and
was confused about how the government would reconcile the [socialist] institutions built
by the government with the institutions of market operation and with the cultural values
and notions, how the government would explain something contradictory or how to
maintain a positive operation. He said that as far as the Shanghai government was
concerned, these questions were suspended; they could not be discussed. The method the
government adopted was like that of Singapore: big government, small society. Some
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officials believed that as long as the economy went up, and the government and the
people had money, these questions would all become pseudo-questions. The interviewee
said that the media and the intellectual circle of course would not be willing to admit that
these were pseudo-questions. And when the ordinary people saw that such methods
which the government adopted gave them material benefit, they supported it. 239
Now the problem most raised was Shanghai’s strong government.
The power of this government was everywhere: it was in big public policies, it entered
into the field of market, and it also entered into the field of private thought. He said that
as far as an ideal society was concerned, this was not a perfect method. Now in media
and the intellectual circle, many people were making efforts, through laws, to restrict the
government’s power, and this had formed a covert game relationship between the
government on the one hand, and the media and intellectuals on the other hand. I asked
him to explain. He said that publicly the current media outlets were all led by the party,
but after leaving the government’s conference, privately everybody was talking about
how to supervise, restrict, criticize, and regulate the operation of the government. But for
the time being, the hardships of such a process had made most of the people feel tired
both physically and mentally. “Just see how many events have happened between the
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media and the government in recent two or three years.” Despite all the above situations,
he still felt “this is the best age, and this is the worst age.” These were the best words to
summarize his feelings, he said. 240
The interviewee still thought that currently China was in a time full of
potential. At least now the factors such as big war, big natural disaster, and domestic
chaos did not exist. Although some covert pressures did lurk in the market and in the
government institutions, at least opportunities were greater than the pressure. The
question was: “Are we able to arrange a fast operating machine (i.e., the government
institutions) on a track to make it transform from rule of person to rule of law, from
closure to openness, and from irrationality to rationality. Are we able to get rid of, since
the recent time, bleeding and bleeding, suddenly turning left and suddenly turning right,
opening and then closing, closing and then opening, and walk out of such state of
constant turn-around and uncertainty, and go to a hopeful direction that we can devote all
our efforts to; otherwise history may once again turn around.”241
The interviewee then stopped for sometime as if the interview had
ended. Then he said, “I will add something more on Shanghai.” “Do not isolate it as a
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Shanghai; Shanghai is China’s Shanghai. Behind the surprising prosperity, don’t forget
that what kind of soil , factors had been left until today, don’t forget that if it were not for
the opening of the rules, if it were not for the market power of the whole Yangtze River
Delta, it would have been impossible for Shanghai to have its prosperity today.” He
continued, “Shanghai is just Shanghai; it cannot represent the whole China. There still
exists imbalance in the whole China. The economic imbalance and the imbalance
between people’s ideas are huge. It will be very biased if one takes Shanghai as equal to
the current China. More radical views will be that, such imbalance will lead to the
situation that the strong become stronger and the weak become weaker, or the weak and
the strong confront each other because of the loss of balance.” He said that now the state
emphasized those underdeveloped areas such as the west and the north-east, but it was
useless just the government called. Only when the rules of the game, the concepts of
sustainable development and scientific development now much discussed, were
institutionally arranged, from ideas to actions, could the problems be resolved. At present,
there were over-heated investments in Shanghai, which had made Shanghai, in many
respects, to become a mirage in China’s east coast. “Is this a universal sample to
represent the whole China? I doubt it.” 242
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Here the interviewee expressed his worry that I might take Shanghai
as a universal sample to represent the whole China, when serious imbalance was
everywhere in China. I did not mean to use Shanghai to represent the whole China, which
would be a big mistake. My thinking was as follows. Shanghai was at the front of China’s
modernization. I tried to place it in the long-term trend of China’s modernization since
the Opium War (1839-1842). The ideas of the elite in Shanghai could not represent the
disadvantaged (who were just struggling for survival), but they could reveal how the elite
saw Shanghai’s development and change--its culture, its driving forces, its impeding
factors, and its positive and negative aspects--in the broader picture of modern Chinese
history since the Opium War. Their evaluations of the self role and the state role (in
driving/impeding the city’s development and change) could tell us the relative weight that
they placed for the state (the influence or control that the state had on personal life and on
the city’s development) and the self (the degree of self fulfillment). And such information
may guide us to the understanding of the individual’s self efficacy in the control of his
own life, and in the contribution that he felt he could make to improve the society that he
was in. Such self efficacy, in relation to the state role, allows us to evaluate the possibility
of China’s democratization in the next 20 years (2004—2024). The information that
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revealed in the Shanghai sample was about the long-term trend of China’s
democratization, not about the current situation (especially not the prosperous or
seemingly glorious appearance) in the whole China in the year of 2004.
Interviewee No. 13 also worked in a newspaper, and was less than 25
years old. He first gave an analysis on the positive or negative factors that drove or
impeded the development and change of Shanghai. “Looking outside from this cafeteria,
you can feel what factors they are that are driving the development and change of this city.
It is a force of growth—I travel globally very often—such kind of vigor is rare in any
other place in the world.” If he would choose among the US, Japan, Russia, Europe,
Africa, Asia, and Southeast Asia, Shanghai would be the one that was the most powerful
in its force of growth. Its growth was displayed in the increasing quantity, not in the
existing quantity. The force of growth became a very big characteristic. There were
several factors for this. (1) Because there was a gap, there was leaping forward. There
was a Chinese saying which said, “The knowledge of shamefulness makes one brave.”
After the reform and openness, people have chances to make comparison. With
comparison came the knowledge of the gap. With the knowledge of the gap came the
knowledge of shamefulness. With the knowledge of shamefulness came bravery. Thus
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came the force of growth. The feeling of shamefulness was: such a great country, with its
5,000 years of history, now lagged behind other countries to such an extent! The world
had developed to such an extent! (2) There was self-confidence hard to find in any other
places; it was a determination and belief that we could make this city become one of the
top cities in the world. (3)Currently this city had a kind of very huge containing power. It
reflected in the fact that in many respects it was at the top of the world. It broadly
adopted the strengths of other nations and places. Combining these three factors, the
interviewee found that this city displayed an unusual force of life rarely seen in the world.
It had been 160 years since the Opium War, and this was the first time in this place that
there existed such force of life like the growing power of the bamboo after the spring rain.
It could not be suppressed; it could not be resisted! 243
About the self role, in the final analysis, it had much to do with the
above three factors. (1) You had opened your mind and views, so you knew the
international requirements, the international talents, and the international rules of the
game. You saw the gap, and you would work hard to improve yourself. (2) You had
self-confidence. During this range of age (from the university days to now, or from age
18 to 25), you were able to attain the international requirements, the level of the
243

Talks from interviewee No. 13
192

international talents, and the international rules of the game. (3) You were brave to adopt
all others’ strengths. Therefore, both the individual [development] at the micro level, and
the city development at the macro level, the interviewee said, were all about these three
factors. 244
His self role, the interviewee said, was a media worker. Entering into
the media was more a coincidence, not a choice. Recently, in just a few years, the growth
of the media and this newspaper was very huge like a hurricane, and with it he found his
self role, a career merging with this newspaper, a career relying upon this newspaper to
carry it forward. The enthusiasm for the career also had much to do with the above three
factors. (1) Currently in Shanghai the media was in a state of underdevelopment, on the
attitudes, on the contents, and on gathering and editing news materials. (2) He had self
confidence in the prospect of market, in the aspect of audience, and in the quantity of
growth. (3) He would imagine his newspaper as a Chinese New York Times or Shanghai’s
New York Times, or Chinese USA Today or Shanghai’s USA Today. The column, the
model of operation, the model of industry operation, and the innovative ideas, all these
strengths could be contained broadly so that his newspaper could adopt all others’
strengths! Therefore, the interviewee continued; the career, the individual (the self), and
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the city development were compatible with one another to create a powerful, ever-lasting
driving force for growing upward. 245
About the barriers that impeded Shanghai’s development and change,
he said that the individual, the city’s development, the current generation (i.e., his
generation), and the career all had the same big weakness. The current generation meant
those who were born in the middle of 1970’s when the Gang of Four was crushed. They
had had very good fortune [in personal development], but their characteristic was
impetuosity. This was a big weakness and it was reflected in the city’s development, in
how the individual deal with things and people: they only permitted or hoped that they
could constantly make progress with a certain speed, and it’s very hard for them to
tolerate developmental stagnation or backwardness. I asked that this sounded like a
driving force, why he saw it as a barrier. He said that the coin had two sides. On the one
side, it drove development; on the other side, it caused impetuosity. You could see that in
the city development: the urban planning, the developmental speed, the over-heated
construction or redundant construction. For the city, it used three to five years to move
and resettle a huge population that originally took 50 years to complete; it involved
rearrangement of the city’s construction and industry concentration. The mentality of the
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city was that this was a good opportunity that was never seen before, so everybody
wanted to add a piece of timber upon the fire [to make it even more glorious.] Nobody
ever had time to stop to care about the relationship between human and nature, the
distribution of the industries, the proper growth on GDP (now growing too fast), and the
balance between development and stability.246
This was also reflected in the individual. When the current young
men graduated and joined the people, they had super-high expectations about their
profession. They could not tolerate something like that the previous two years they had a
fine development and the third year their development became stagnant. Usually it was
normal that one might have progress and regress. But the city, the work units, and the
individual could not tolerate regress. I asked that since they could not tolerate regress,
what would happen when there was stagnation. He said when there was regress, nobody
was well prepared psychologically. Shanghai could not always have two-digit growth rate
of GDP; someday some industries would reach their saturation point; it’s impossible for
Shanghai to grow so fast year after year. It was reflected in career (the newspapers) also.
Once they had success, the profit requirement every year would be higher. This year you
completed the quota, next year the quota would be raised. They just could not tolerate
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slowness, or regular progress. Thus there occurred a kind of overdraft. 247
It was even more so for the individual. Many young people had grand
plan for themselves when they graduated. Once they encountered some barrier, they
would have sense of frustration and could not adjust themselves well. Therefore, on the
one side this was the driving force of development, on the other side there were more and
more mental problems because of the huge work pressure. European cities were mature,
the mentality of the individual, the city, and the enterprises were stable, and relaxing. To
make it clearer, the generation of these young men’s parents did not possibly have
planning on their career; they were just chosen [to a career]. In the interviewee’s
generation, it was the first time the individuals could have choices, and they thought that
they could have choices on everything—this had become an inborn ideology. They did
not have such idea of being distributed [on the career]; there existed huge sense of
activeness, and no sense of passiveness. Once they encountered contrary situation in the
reality, there would be huge amount of psychological imbalance. Some research found
universally that 70% to 80% of young people were unsatisfied with their current job, but
they had no choice but to accept it. There was a gap between the psychological
expectations and the reality. The career did not match their ideas, and they could not calm
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down about that. Their concerns about wealth, social status, and power were much
greater than their concerns about the contents of life, health, and the quality of life. The
coin had two sides. The cities, individuals, and enterprises that concerned more about the
contents of life, health, and quality of life could not possibly have great force of life; this
was the situation of European cities, individuals, and enterprises. Under such
circumstances in China, the media were impetuous and not calm; they were creating an
environment for the force of life: wealth, social status, and power. Every year the hottest
topics for the media were the publication of the Forbes rich people, the silk fabric, the
products for high-level consumption, and the famous cars, and this further aroused young
people’s emotions. 248
About the government’s role, the interviewee said that the
government more hoped to see that Shanghai would for a long time keep such pulse that
was never seen in the past 150 years, and for this purpose, they tried all they could to
maintain such force of growth. This was also right. When a city was just in its
adolescence, it did need the government to support and protect its vigor to maintain its
life of growth; this was not the time for coordination. In the future, when the city’s
development reached the saturation point, maybe the government would adopt an overall
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perspective and care about the equilibrium such as the distribution of the industries, the
public facilities, and whether the development should be based on GDP or humanistic
concerns. Now the government’s role was a protector, an advocate, and a guide of such
force of growth. 249
About the expectations of the future, the interviewee first continued
his comments on the current generation (i.e., the young people). Compared with last
generation, both the advantage and the disadvantage of the current generation were that
there were no historical burdens for them. Therefore, young people now inherently lacked
many concepts, those moral norms or coercive things that imposed upon their parents’
generation. They did not have such concepts as sent-down to the mountain or to the
countryside, work unit distribution of one’s career, and the “big-pot meal.” That’s why
young people felt confused about the state policy to protect old workers—they took it for
granted that economy should be distributed according to the labor devoted. They took it
for granted for lacking all the above concepts. In correspondence with that mentality,
since they lacked historical burden, they thought that they should have rights for choice,
and should be able to control their own development. And [as stated above], once they
encounter specific reality, they would have sense of frustration and resistance—they had
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much lower capability than last generation who had went through unimaginable
hardships and was able to shoulder much more pressure. 250
About the future, the interviewee said that he was concerned about
how the impetuous generation could have a calm mentality to make a reasonable
arrangement for the future of the career. He never doubted the city’s future or prospect.
But when the city no longer had big numbers of growth rate, both the city and the
individual should be well prepared. For the city, what would it have to maintain the
power of competition? What was its core competitive power: what would come to
people’s mind when they spoke of this city?

For New York, it was financial center; for

London, it was a conservative, serious city; for Tokyo, its price of goods was the highest;
for Hong Kong, it was the most open society; and for Shanghai, what was it? The
interviewee said, if it was the great containing power—being able to include and
intermingle many differences, then Shanghai was successful. He told me that my concern
[in the interview] was about the driving force (reasons, factors) for Shanghai’s
development and change, and his concern was about what kind of problems would
happen in the process of [Shanghai’s] development, that was to say: what were those
things that the city, the individual, and the enterprises should pay attention to? Of course
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his expectations for the future was that the city, the individual’s capability, the profession,
would become better and better day after day, but these needed not to be discussed; these
[promising prospects] had become common sense. What needed to be discussed was:
balance among the city, the enterprise, and the individual. Every adolescent city should
answered the question about the bottleneck [of development], not the speed [of
development]. 251
I asked him about what the city, the enterprise, and the individual
should do for the bottleneck. He said that for the individual, the key question was to
control the rhythm of the individual’s development, and this had to do with the city. For
the individual’s development, he should clearly recognize his own core competitive
power, and transform his core competitive power in different time. For example, when
you were young, you had the impulse, physical strength, and the spirit of disregard of
everything; you could do your job well as a journalist. But people younger than you had
the same advantages: impulse, physical strength, and the spirit of disregard of everything,
and they could achieve what you could achieve with less time than you. Then your
mentality would be different. You would want to be someone irreplaceable. So you might
examine yourself, “Why am I a good journalist?” The answer could be: (1) the ability for
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communication; (2) insights and analysis; (3) writing skill. Then you might extend these
three qualities to different fields: (1) the ability for communication could make you
competent on the job of public relationship, so you could be a good PR (i.e., public
relationship person); (2) the ability of insights and analysis could make you competent as
an analyzing person or an occupational manager; (3) the ability of writing skill could
make you competent as a writer or a novelist or as an owner of a studio of writing books.
Thus, you might transform your core competitive power and not to be replaced by people
younger than you as journalists. Similarly, the city and the enterprise could transform
their core competitive power and become irreplaceable.252
In the case of the city, Shanghai’s buildings or other advantages were
not the nature or nucleus of its real core competitive power. It was easy to find a piece of
land in the big cities of Japan or South Korea to build buildings or produce similar
advantages that Shanghai currently had, then Shanghai would be easy to be replaced.
Then, where would Shanghai’s real core competitive power lie? If it was economy, then
Shanghai would be the eastern New York; if it was cultural buildings, then it would be the
eastern Paris. Therefore, it could be Shanghai’s indigenous characteristic that it had great
containing power: being able to include and intermingle many differences and never
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rejecting any foreign culture. Whenever it needed to absorb others’ strengths, it would do
so. Such characteristic was reflected everywhere. Its style of building was like the
European style, its subway system was like that of German, its mechanic-electronic
integration was like that of Japan, and its urban planning and design was like that of
Britain and America. So Shanghai was never stingy in contact and communication with
other cultures, and thus producing its own qualities. Shanghai’s culture, containing power,
and qualities could be further traced back to 1930’s when it was the biggest city of the
Far East, at that time Tokyo was just very small, Hong Kong was just a small fish
beachland, and Seoul was just a colony. So what made Shanghai ever-lasting was not its
tall buildings, coastline or productions, but its city’s core culture: what made Shanghai
Shanghai was its Shanghai culture, its containing power; it was world-class,
international-class metropolis, and the way of construction and development was to make
it a global, world-class great city.253
To sum up, the media professionals in this sample felt strongly about
the characteristics of the strong government in Shanghai; it was “big government, small
society.” The power of the government was everywhere, from the big public policy to the
market, and even to people’s private thinking. There were many things that were seen as
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taboo that were not allowed to be reported, so the media professionals saw the state as a
force of restriction or an impeding factor for the true benefit of both the city’s
development and the development of the nation as a whole. An individual who had ideals
in his heart had to go through hardships in their attempt to restrain the power of the
government. This was because the media belonged to the government and was defined as
the voice of the government’s policies and positions. An individual either reminded
himself not to expect highly about the media’s function to bring progress to China, or had
to be cautious not to offend the government. Too many unjust events had happened to the
media professionals who held the news conscience. But even so, for someone who had
ideals in his heart still saw this age as having hopes and positive prospects that still
surpassed the negative possibilities. “This is the best age, and this is the worst age.” If the
media could enjoy freedom of speech, then it was the best place for an intellectual to
exert his influence and ideals. Although now the media still have many restrictions, the
media professionals did not give up their hopes and ideals. The last interviewee talked a
lot on the weaknesses of his generation, paying much attention to the problems that
emerged in the process of Shanghai’s development. His hope was that young people of
his generation could calm down and pay more attention to a reasonable plan for the future
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when the growth rate slowed down and when the problems of imbalance in many areas
needed to be resolved. Finally he gave examples to show that how an individual, the
Shanghai city, and the enterprise could redefine its own core competitive power so that
they would not be replaced in the competition. In general, the media professionals saw
the government’s role as negative, and were making efforts to change the situation,
though there were lots of difficulties.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THE INTERVIEW CASES IN SHANGHAI (3)

(4) The Intellectuals
Chinese intellectuals are a special group of people. They will never
isolate a city as a city, and will always see a city from the point of view of national
development. In other words, their concerns are about this country, about what the correct
way is to make this country wealthy and powerful, and to improve the people’s life. In
their eyes, city development is only an example, a case, of national development. Such a
mentality is the tradition of Chinese intellectuals: they are always concerned about the
true benefit of this country and its people.
Interviewee No. 14 was a professor of a university. He first gave a
general talk on the positive or negative factors that drove or impeded Shanghai’s
development. He said that 50 years ago, Shanghai was the cultural center and economic
center of the whole country. And before 1949, it was also a “shadow” political center of
the country: although the [central] government was in Nanjing, the prominent political
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figures had residence in Shanghai; decision-making [of important policies] was done in
Shanghai in the weekend, and Nanjing was only for practice. After 1949, Shanghai lost
its status of cultural center of the nation; now only Beijing was the cultural center.
Originally both Beijing and Shanghai were the cultural center. But Shanghai always kept
its status of economic center. It was the area that produced the most profits, so it was the
[important] fiscal point for the state. Before the Cultural Revolution, Shanghai was able
to pay 600 billion yuan. Even such a big figure like Mao Zedong who dominated the
overall situation could not let Shanghai be in chaos. So since the liberation (i.e., 1949),
Shanghai was the area that had the most planned economy, having the most socialism.
For the Cultural Revolution, you must have food, money, and fiscal income, so that the
revolution could be carried out. Many people did not understand this point that Shanghai
had the most planned economy, the most socialism. 254
After the reform, the situation changed, but changed very little. It was
in 1993 that Shanghai started to change a lot. There was the distribution of resources
between the central government and the local areas, and Shanghai thus had more
resources to develop itself. It became the area that developed the fastest. Deng Xiaoping
said it was a big mistake that he did not let Shanghai become an economic special zone to
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develop. This was just the political language. In fact, in the beginning, Deng dared not
take a risk on Shanghai lest it become chaotic and the state would lose huge fiscal income.
Now Shanghai enjoyed very great extent of openness; [whether] it was an economic
special zone was just not important. So the driving force of Shanghai’s development and
change was what Deng said, “Development is of paramount importance.” That’s the
driving force. 255
China had not developed for too long. From the highest leader to the
ordinary people all knew the importance of development. If we did not develop and
stayed backward, we would be beaten [again.] The modern history of China was a history
of being beaten for more than a hundred years. That’s why the policy of reform and
openness gained so much support from the people. Some people said Mao’s age was
better, but such voice was weak; everybody wanted development. That’s one side. The
other side was corruption, moral decline, and the society became not secure. But
everybody thought that it was wrong to quit development just because there were these
problems. The driving force was that everybody wanted development. In the past, the
biggest challenge for the communist party was how to resolve the problem of food for so
many people. Mao Zedong’s old way did not work. Now the new way (i.e., the policy of
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reform and openness) had resolved this problem in just a few years. Why was it that in
the past it was a big problem and now it was no longer a problem? Because in the past the
way was wrong: in those days everything needed a ration ticket, and now that was gone.
The trend of Shanghai’s development was still going on, and Shanghai would continue to
develop. 20 years ago, Taipei’s development was much better than Shanghai; now Taipei
lagged far behind Shanghai. 256
About the self role, the interviewee said that he was more special; he
saw scholarship as life, and were not concerned too much about its utility. He worked on
history: rebuilding the original historical facts, and not caring whether or not it would
have some utility for real life. Scholarship had its own inner logic, so he pursued
scholarship for its own sake, just like pursuing art for the sake of art; he pursued purely
academic knowledge. I asked that if he felt satisfactory about his goal. He said that he
was satisfactory. He used to be an engineer, majoring in science and engineering. Later he
transferred to liberal arts and found that it suited his interest. The university did not
interfere in their research objects and methods. He had stayed in the university for more
than 20 years. He said that surely they wasted 10 years of time in the Cultural Revolution,
but it also depended on one’s determination. If one was determined to pursue knowledge,
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one could always find books to read; otherwise his major was science and engineering,
how could he turned to liberal arts? It’s all about self-education. He said that his
academic focus was on Chinese historical geography, more specifically, political
geography and cultural geography; it was about the administrative planning. It was when
he was a graduate student that he found that he could do this. In his generation, those who
were good in science were all good in liberal arts, but those who were not good in liberal
arts were also not good in mathematics, physics, and chemistry. So it was easier to
transfer from science and engineering to liberal arts, but it was difficult to transfer from
liberal arts to science and engineering. 257
About the government’s role, I asked him if there were some areas or
views that were sensitive and could not be discussed. He said that it was much better now.
He could publicly express his ideas of administrative planning that advocated dividing
China into 50 provinces. Especially his university had free academic aura: giving lectures
in class was free, and students were free too; the school did not interfere. Then I asked
him about his expectations for the students. He said that academically they should play a
role of a milestone. Dissertation should be something that others could not circumvent;
people had to refer to it; at most people could supplement it on the basis it had built.
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Scholarship should not follow what others had achieved; your ideas should be innovative.
About his child, he said that he did not have any specific expectation for his child. He
wanted his child to be independent and autonomous—it’s more like the western way of
education. 258
His expectations for Shanghai were the balance of the hardware and
the software. Here the software meant human’s quality. In the daytime or at night,
Shanghai had little difference from Tokyo; it attained the standard of an international
metropolis. But people’s quality lagged behind. People would not line up when waiting
for the bus. Some young men had cars, and when they found somewhere in the car was
dirty, they mobbed it clean and then just threw the mobbing paper away through the car
window. Such behavior made him feel bad. He said [if] the educated persons behaved
like that, needless to say, the uneducated persons would be worse. He said that to improve
the people’s quality needed one or two generations of incessant efforts. I asked him about
the academic circle of history. He said that in the recent 10 or 20 years, the circle of
history was basically healthy. Now China had become wealthy and powerful, so there
were chances for scholars to do some research that looked irrelevant to the national
economy and people’s welfare. But still, there were some people repeated the topics that
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others had done, doing some mainstream scholarship that could bring them fame. 259
Interviewee No. 15 and No. 16 joined the interviews together. No. 15
was a professor, and No. 16 was a graduate student who was going to advance to the
Ph.D. in about 3 months. They interrupted the other person’s talks several times.
Interviewee No. 15 first gave a general talk on the positive or negative factors that drove
or impeded Shanghai’s development and change. He said that Chinese modernization was
a stimulation-response model. It was pushed by external factor; it was not originating in
the internal factor. That was to say: it would not go on the path since the Opium War if it
just followed its internal development. The external factor was the western powers’
invasion of China. Then the intellectuals gradually waked up to the crises, and the
intellectuals’ efforts further awakened the industrial-commercial circle. In this process,
the government played the roles of an organizer, an obstructionist, a protector, and a
destroyer. 260
The interviewee (No. 15, the professor) said that Chinese
modernization went a long curve on its road. From the Opium War to the 1911 revolution,
it was the correct road. Then learning from the Soviet Union, China diverted itself from
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the mainstream of world development, and went to the least promising road in the Cold
War—the Soviet Union’s road was a road leading to the dead-end. Then he said Deng
Xiaoping’s role in history was to move the country back to the track of modernization, so
he thought Deng Xiaoping, despite his unforgivable errors on the June Fourth incident [in
1989], was still greater than Mao Zedong. Almost at the same time, the KMT in Taiwan
walked on the mainstream road (i.e., democratization). 261
The interviewee said that Shanghai was the most typical case in view
of more than 400 years of colonization history in the world. France, Portugal, and Spain
did not leave healthy heritage for the colonized country. But England left the institution
of civil service and legal institutions; when the [British] suzerain was gone, the local
land’s transition of modernization all went more smoothly. So Shanghai’s strengths today
were mostly because England had left its legacy during its half-colonization age. The
quality of Shanghai’s people and cadres, the legal institutions, and the civil service,
legal-rational bureaucratic system, in spite of going through distortion in Mao Zedong’s
age, still played its role [on Shanghai’s modernization]. Shanghai’s transition to
modernization, compared with other cities, [was still the best]. In addition to the policy
favor [from the central government], the Shanghai cadres’ and people’s innate rationality,
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the aura of city life, British rational attitude, not tending to violent resolution, not
win-lose game, compromise, and win-win approach all came from the England’s legacy.
The interviewee (No. 15) said that he did not completely oppose colonial history.
Colonization surely had its negative side, and this had been much discussed in the
mainland’s textbooks, but it had left [positive legacy] to the underdeveloped areas. He
said that in China the term “colonial” had carried negative connotation, but originally
“colonial” was a neutral term; it should be neutralized.262
Then the interviewee (No. 15, the professor) mentioned Beijing. He
did not like Beijing; Beijing was always bureaucrat-dominating, and the citizens, and the
society, contained very little proportion of modernization. Beijing’s bureaucrats had very
strong tendency towards ideology, and its citizens had narrow-minded nationalism;
Shanghai also had this aspect, but this city had different historical heritage. What else
could Beijing have except bureaucrats? When Beijing’s intellectuals came to Shanghai,
they felt that Shanghai was still the best in dealing with western affairs. 263
Then interviewee No. 16 (the student) spoke. He was born in a
village in 1978 (the year the reform began), and felt very deeply about the huge change
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that the reform brought to people. The reform had very great influence on ordinary
people’s life in both the material aspect and the aspect of spirit and notions. There were
many factors involved: the government permitted people to do things that were originally
inhibited; the people spontaneously sought survival and wealth. [The most important
factor was] the power of market. Many things formerly unimaginable now became
organized. Then he gave three examples. (1) In Shandong province, the products like
oranges now were transported by the big truck. Formerly the peasants never thought of
such ways; now things became organized. (2) In the place he came from, there was no
need for the government to promote one-child policy, because the economic pressure had
caused people to automatically bear one child and then stop. It’s difficult already for a
family to support one child on education. (3) His father told him that he would work
harder on the agricultural work so that he and his wife could buy insurance. In the past,
people’s notion was raising a son to take care of them when they became old; now they
had the notion of insurance! So all these examples demonstrated the power of the market:
its influence on people’s life in the rural area.264
Then he turned his talk to Shanghai. The life of the citizens in
Shanghai was different from the life in the inland area (that he came from), and this was
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because of modernization. What he felt deeply was legal-rational bureaucratic system:
systematic way of doing things, and following the regulations when doing things. In the
inland area, it was still the old manner: human warmth and human relationship. But, the
interviewee (No. 16) said, in the process of [Shanghai’s] modernization, the officials who
carried ideology and who were conservative were not different from the cadres in their
place. Here in Shanghai, the party discipline and the party mission were stricter and
tighter than those in their place. He said that doing things by following the regulations
agreed with modernization, but this system of the party’s work conflicted with
modernization 265 —this was an interesting contradiction that he pointed out.
Interviewee No. 15 (the professor) spoke at this moment to further
explain such a contradiction. He said the historical tradition of Shanghai was better than
other cities. Dealing with the western affairs was smoother in this city. On the other hand,
for 50 years, Shanghai had been following the extreme leftist line. After 1949, whenever
there was leftist political movement, Shanghai was the starting place. So Shanghai was a
very strange place: on the one hand, it was the most modernized place; on the other hand,
for 50 years, the communist party had made the most efforts in this city, so there was
leftist legacy. Why? Because Mao Zedong thought that Shanghai was the headquarters of
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the capitalists, the cadres Mao sent here was ideologically leftist. Therefore, Shanghai’s
cadres all had two colors: they were both westernized cadres and leftist party cadres—the
former agreed with modernization, and the latter was against modernization and was
irrational. For generations, the Shanghai cadres all carried two colors. I asked, “Don’t
they conflict with each other?” The interviewee said, “merging, and harmonious.” He
also said, from developmental point of view, the party part, which came from the party’s
ideological control of the cadres, was weakening, and the westernized part was
strengthening. He further said, such contradiction had to do with Deng Xiaoping’s
thinking on reform: economically, open, open, and more open—economically turning
right; politically, tight, tight, and tighter—politically turning left. These two opposite
factors, for more than 30 years, were always in internal tension. The coastal cities all had
such phenomenon, like Shenzhen, and Guangzhou. 266
The interviewee (the professor) continued to say that somebody even
thought that the leftist ideology was used to protect the economic rightness. In other
words, the leftist ideology was just for putting on a face for Beijing to see, and in essence
there was less and less identity with it. Some seemingly leftist cadres spoke very different
words in other occasions. So the ideology was weaker and weaker day by day. The
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interviewee then said to me, “Give mainland more time! Give mainland more time!” 267
By this he meant that the mainland would become democratic with time, but if Taiwan
went the independence route, the war would be unavoidable and it would destroy all the
progressive elements that were currently happening in the mainland China; all mainland
needed was time—it would become a democracy like the mainstream road of world
development, like what happened in Taiwan in the 1980s.
About the self role, the interviewee (No. 15, the professor) said that
an intellectual like him, the role of life was made by the experiences of the previous 30
years, and the most important among them was the Cultural Revolution, which had
molded his characters: on the positive side, he had a sense of responsibility towards the
nation, the world, and the fate of human beings; on the negative side, it was easy for him
to be politicized. For the reform and openness, his most urgent wish was that Chinese
nation could successfully pass the challenges of modernization. This included two things:
economically, the privatization of property rights, and politically, constitutionalization
and democratization. I asked, “The reform is now called the initial stage of socialism; if
the property rights become privatized, could it still be called as socialism?” He said, “So
this [theory] does not make sense; every step was against [socialism].” That’s why Deng
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Xiaoping advocated “No debate.” 268
The interviewee (No. 15) continued to say that since the Cultural
Revolution, he began to be concerned about the country, so he majored in the history of
the western political thoughts to seek for the prospects of China’s democratization. Then
interviewee No. 16 (the student) spoke about his self role. He said he was still young and
had not joined the society yet; the big issue [like democratization] also concerned him,
but the urgent self pursuit was the personal economic problem, which was big pressure
on his shoulder. He was concerned more about completing the Ph. D. degree and found a
teaching job in the university so that he could be filial toward his parents. In order for
him to be able to complete his academic pursuit, his sister stopped to go to school in the
third year of junior high school. So the whole family had made great sacrifice for him. He
said that as a student of liberal arts, surely he was concerned about public issues, but
personal issue concerned him more. He wanted to repay the love that his families had for
him. 269
Interviewee No. 15 spoke. He said that his career was a teacher, not a
statesman. He used his profession to serve the process of [Chinese] democratization.
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There were two ways to achieve this. First, leading students; secondly, writing articles
and books. In the process, he went through several times of ups and downs. When he
contacted the side of modernization, he became confident; when he was suppressed by
the ideology, he had to go through troubles. About the relationship between his self
pursuit and the government’s role, he said that he insisted on independence: not
confrontation, not cooperation [with the government]. This would surely bring troubles to
him, and he could undertake all these troubles. The government sometimes suppressed
him, and sometimes also wanted to hear his views through some channels. He said there
were two sides of the reform: politically, the reform of political institutions lagged behind;
economically, the reform brought about some social progress and some social space, and
this was mostly due to the economic reform. I asked, “So you are satisfied with your life
pursuit?” He said, “Yes and No.” “Yes, if I had a second time of life, I would still make
the same choice. Of course there were times that I made mistakes when I was young. [But]
the profession [will stay the same].” “No, because the age that we live in is an ambiguous
age. There is no freedom of speech; we should have been able to talk freely. I always
have a feeling of dancing with shackles on.” I asked, “Then, should you push the edge?”
He said, “Yes, I have been pushing the edge.” 270
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About the expectations of the future, the interviewee (No. 15) said
that China would have two kinds of prospects. The first one was more optimistic. If the
situation outside [it meant Taiwan’s independence] did not worsen, the irrational [events]
inside did not happen, the economic reform would clear up the dated institutions. The
second one was more pessimistic. It was hard to guarantee that there would not be
irrational conflict. It would happen in the social-political field: there was contradiction
between the government and the intellectuals for modern constitutionalism and modern
democracy; there was only economic reform and no political reform; there was the
polarized socioeconomic division. The disadvantaged group might grab Mao Zedong as
their symbol to conflict with the direction of economic reform. There could be small scale
of conflicts or great scale of confrontations. This was a hidden danger. 271
Interviewee No. 16 (the student) spoke. He said, the trend would
become well. The inland area did not have open knowledge. The rural economy was
backward, and some peasants felt that Mao Zedong’s age was better: there would not be
such socioeconomic division in Mao Zedong’s years. In his views, the market institution
was in general successful. The lack of reform in political institutions was something to be
worried about. But the great direction should be carefully optimistic; it should be going
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upward. 272 Then interviewee No. 15 (the professor) spoke. Once again he said, “Give
mainland more time.” Now the ideology is weakening. If mainland could have some
more time, [it would democratize.] He said, all his life witnessed that China moved
backward for 70 or 80 years, and then backed to the original starting point, and then
restart again. Then he said, another hidden danger was Taiwan’s independence. If there
was war, not only Taiwan’s 23 million people, but also mainland’s South-eastern coastal
area, the most advanced areas in mainland, would once again be damaged. Then the
mainland would once again regress for many years. So the next 20 years could destroy
the process of Chinese modernization. In his mind, in 20 years, the inhibition on speech
and the control of newspapers would open; if not, there would be chaos. One-party rule
would be more difficult to change; this was purely Leninist party, not like the KMT
which was partially Leninist party, so it was more conservative. There should be a
sequence: first, the opening of the inhibition on speech, then the opening of the control of
newspapers, and finally, the opening of the party system. If all three were open at the
same time, the society might not be able to bear it. 273 Interview No. 16 (the student) said
that at most we could only deal with two things at the same time, and we should do that.
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As to specifically how to operate such things, now mainland and overseas Chinese did
not have enough thinking on this: how to conduct the first step; how to operate.274
Interviewee No. 17 was a professor in a university. He first gave a
general talk on the factors that drove the development and change of Shanghai. He said
that it had to do with Shanghai’s history and its current state. Compared with other big
cities, Shanghai was more orderly, and this was an obvious characteristic. It was closer to
the western type of society. There were two factors for this. The first one is about the
history. Shanghai was opened since the middle of the nineteenth century, so the western
cultural, economic, and political influence spread into this city very early, and thus
Shanghai was able to get into a fusion of cultures. It was at the front of the trend [of
modernization.] Also, Shanghai had a tradition of Concession (i.e., the leased territory).
The Concession area was totally different from non-Concession area. The western way of
city management, the operational aspect and experiences [were influential.] In addition,
not only the outer appearance such as the western buildings, but also the cultural aura had
its influence. The style of Shanghai’s dialect carried English homophony, and the western
culture had influence on the citizens. So these experiences had made very good historical
preparations for Shanghai. Although decades had passed, such influence did not disappear.
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The above factor was on the relationship with the west. 275
Another factor was that Shanghai had been a city of immigrants. The
immigrants came from all areas in China. There were overseas students, and university
graduates from outside areas. In Shanghai’s company, there was a high proportion of
people from other parts of the country. So there were activeness, educational background,
creativity, and individual’s goal pursuit. Under such cultural background, Shanghai’s
officials had broader views, acute thinking, and sensitivity to new things. Their
decision-making reflected the characters of the new age, and thus was different from the
fixed pattern of the inland areas. 276
About the self role, the interviewee said that his job was academic
work and teaching; he identified with such a role. His interest and characters made it
fitting for him to play such a role. In the academic research, he had a feeling of
achievement; this area enabled him to exert his strengths. He said that not only in natural
science, but also in liberal arts, there was no ideological interference, and he himself
would not let his research be interfered by the ideology. Since the latter part of the 1990’s,
the ideological interference became less active; even criticizing Marx was no problem.
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[It’s important] to have freedom in research so that the academic work could be deepened.
So he could say what he wanted to say, and could have critical response and critical
transcendence to the western questions. His professional field was philosophy, including
Chinese philosophy and the western philosophy. He thought that philosophy was about
the pursuit of wisdom, so there should be no boundary to distinguish between Chinese
philosophy and the western philosophy. His goal was not just on history of philosophy;
he wanted to be a philosopher. He said that in every age there should be constructed
views on the old questions. So he wanted to, as stated above, have critical response and
critical transcendence to the western questions. 277
Another positive factor for his life pursuit was about income,
especially after the latter part of the 1990’s. He said that without economic freedom, there
could not be freedom of thought. His income was so good that buying a car or a house
was easy for him. There were negative factors for his life pursuit, too. There were
different kinds of administrative work and many conferences that would occupy his time
and energy. He disregarded 80% of them, but still, some of them could not be rejected,
for the sake of human relationships; he had to accept some work that he was unwilling to
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do. 278
About the government’s role, he mentioned two points. First, there
was too much management. This was not about ideology, but the government offered
research fund, putting it in a plan, so it was still a planned management. It could be
hundreds of thousands or millions yuan in a plan, and the plan needed to organize
scholars to be engaged in collective research. Although as an individual, he could
disregarded it altogether, sometimes it was the school that mobilized scholars to compete
for it, and as a member of the school, it’s not good that you did not cooperate. Secondly,
there was insufficient communication between the people and the government. When one
saw the problems of the city’s real life, like the city traffic problem and the pollution
problem, one did not know how to communicate with the decision-makers. There was no
channel, no way to do that. 279
About the expectations for the students, he thought that philosophical
training was a resource to the students’ job in the future. About his influence on the
society, he said that publishing articles was the major way; he was also concerned about
real problems, not just on studies. 280 But most of his time was on his professional
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academic field. About the expectations of the future, he focused on the issue of
democracy. He said that no doubt there should be development on democratization. But
he doubted that whether Taiwan’s democracy was fitting for the mainland. He said that
Chinese modern history had lots of lessons. Now in Chinese village elections, there were
underworld factor and money politics. If China totally let go of the control, what result
would it be? Nobody had the answer. In addition, confrontation like Bush versus Gore [in
America], or Chen Shuibian versus Lian Zhan [in Taiwan] was not good; in China, during
the Cultural Revolution, there were factional confrontations which evolved into wars.
Nobody had the answer [whether or not this would be the result of China’s democracy.]
This was a question of [different] historical environment. In the America, however
disorderly it might seem to be, it could always be in orderly state; in China, when the
Qing dynasty collapsed, and Yuan Shikai died, the result was warlords fighting one
another, and finally it needed a man like Mao Zedong to take care of the situation. So
China at that time had paid a great cost [for its pursuit of democracy and lack of a strong,
powerful central government to maintain the order]. So could China let go of the control
completely? He doubted it. This could become a disaster for the international society
because China was not North Korea, it had a population of 1.3 billion. Once it plunged
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into chaos, nobody [in the international society] could bear it. If China tried it, and once
again it became a situation of the warlords fighting one another, [what would this be like?]
281

He raised Iraq as an example: everyday there were explosions. Once
China let go of the control, the situation would be hundreds of times of that in Iraq. Some
said that it had been 21st century already. [But in] the 21st century, brutal and barbarous
behavior was still happening. So he said China should adopt the approach of gradual
improvement. Then he criticized the [overseas] democratic movement people. He said
that they were pursuing their interests [, not for the benefit of China.] They were mean;
they were nothing. The American government valued them, but they lacked
understanding of Chinese reality. These people were engaged in power struggle,
competing for who the true representative of the [democratic] movement was. They
pursued their individual interests, and disregarded of the national interests. They
demanded that the America should apply economic sanctions against China. Economic
sanctions meant that millions of people would face unemployment! They supported
Tibetan independence and Taiwan’s independence. If these people were in power [in
China], China’s prospects would be really poor. He said, “We can’t let history repeat
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itself.” He argued that before the 1911 revolution, if the Qing government adopted [Kang
Youwei’s] reform line, it would be more fitting for the current situation, and the cost
would be lower. 282
Then he said Eastern Europe and Russia had their long cultural
traditions; they were not like China after 1911 revolution and the whole country plunged
into warlord conflicts. The Cultural Revolution was also grand democracy; you let go of
the control completely, and then you had chaos! Just a little interest competition, and the
power struggle would be intense. Then he gave two examples. In Taiwan, the green camp
versus the blue camp, and overseas, the power struggle within the democratic movement,
all these were under the flag of democracy and happened in the background of China. By
this the interviewee was arguing that China’s cultural background was very different, so it
could not have democracy as Eastern Europe and Russia, and his examples of both
Taiwan’s democracy and the overseas Chinese democratic movement conveyed the
message that democracy in China would become intense factional struggle for power, or
even brought about the situation of warlords fighting one another, so it was not fitting for
China’s current situation. 283

282
283

Ibid.
Ibid.
228

The interviewee continued his argument, saying that the current level
of democracy in China was absolutely and clearly not enough; it lacked channel of
communication [between the people and the government.] But an immediate letting go of
control like Europe and America or Taiwan would absolutely cause big problems. He
mentioned social harmony, equality, and freedom, saying that the general goal for China
should be healthy democracy and freedom, but the way should be discreet improvement,
instead of bombastic talks that disregarded the reality. He said, in the final analysis, when
the economy developed, democracy had to come. If China now changed to become a
democracy, it would bring about counter-effect: [the reform] would move backward. 284
He continued to say that now was the most relaxed time in China
since 1949. Then he said that the Voice of America had its bias: It said that China saw
Taiwan as a renegade province; it did not understand that this was the outcome of civil
wars between the KMT and the CCP. If China had had sufficient sea and air forces,
Taiwan would have been unified. This was the outcome of the Cold War; it had nothing to
do with the anti-fascist war in the world. The western countries did not follow the fact [,
seeing China like a fascist power on the Taiwan issue.] The fact was not that simple. 285
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Then he turned to the current situation about Chinese intellectuals.
He divided Chinese intellectuals into two groups: the leftists versus the rightists. The
rightists were singing the bombastic words, very much idealistic. For them, China had
better move the American presidential system to China now! Everybody hoped that this
would be fulfilled, but considering China’s reality, was this feasible? What should be its
possible outcome? Yes, the goal was democracy, but the key question was about the path
and the way. Some said that Chinese society was dictatorial historically, but Liang Qichao
said that historically it was also serious that the society was like a dish of sand. If there
was not a relatively powerful central government to consolidate the society, there would
not just be Taiwan’s independence; there would be serious factional politics: the society
would be separated as several factions and each of the factions would be a
military-business-political coalition; this was totally possible! Then he gave Afghanistan
and Iraq as examples. China was a big country, and the peasants had low-level of
education and lacked class consciousness—they lacked a strong self identity as a group.
So it was very easy that they were used by any political force as long as there were
attractive slogans that touched their heart. By this he meant that the factional politics or
civil conflicts might happen to divide this nation into several parts like what happened in
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Afghanistan or Iraq. 286
Finally I asked a question about his expectations for the intellectuals.
Again, his talk centered on democracy. He said, that intellectuals had different views was
a good thing; it’s really bad to have only one voice. But the focus of the intellectuals
should be placed on cultural construction which included academic work, science, and
liberal arts. Intellectuals should not be engaged in bombastic talks and beautiful words to
arouse the people. One should conducted solid learning, not just borrowed some ideas
from Heyek or Rawls, and talked about positive freedom and negative freedom; one
should have solid learning, not just shallow learning. And they should take into serious
consideration the Chinese real situation. Hu Shi said, “More research of real problems,
less talk of Isms.” Philosophy, politics, economy all had specific problems. So the
intellectuals should conduct solid research, and should not misguide the society. They
should be responsible to express their ideas, both on Chinese current situation and on
theories. 287
Interviewee No. 18 was also a professor of a university who taught
history. He first gave a general talk on the factors that drove Shanghai and China. First he
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emphasized external factor. He said that without the stimulation of foreign powers, China
would not have marched on the path of modern market economy. Although, like Weber
said, commodity economy, trade, market, and consumption had been present in the old
time, many characteristics of western market economy were still absent in Chinese
[traditional] society. He expressed the central concern of his scholarship as follows:
China had thousands of years of glory, its agricultural efficiency, compared with
[historical] Europe, was not low, and the development of its small peasant agriculture was
very delicate, why did it fall in the recent hundred years? The answer he found was the
relationship between power and money; that is, the absence of separation between power
and money, or between the government and the enterprises, which characterized the
western market economy. Traditional Chinese society was characterized by a political
institution which concentrated power in the central government; the central government
had total control of the whole economy. Such an institution inhibited the growth of
modern market economy, and thus China lagged behind the western powers in the recent
history. The Opium War, especially the second Opium War stimulated Chinese elite
stratum. Thus China started its process of modernization.288
Then he also emphasized the internal factor. He said he did not
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approve of the ideas which saw traditional China as a feudal society in which the natural,
agricultural economy inhibited Chinese [economic] development. He said that there were
two errors in such ideas: (1) [Traditional] Chinese commodity economy always occupied
a not-low proportion in the economy and had been very active. (2) Agricultural economy
was not the natural enemy of capital economy. He explained why Chinese commodity
economy was active: it was because Chinese had special tax system which required the
people to pay the tax by money, and therefore agricultural products and services had to be
exchanged with money. This was different from the situation in Europe. Then he
emphasized that Chinese economic rationality and economic capability were not a
problem [for economic development;] the problem lay in the political institution. In the
recent 500 years (i.e., since the Ming and Qing dynasties), Chinese commodity economy
had developed very well. Silver kept coming into China. In 1843, Shanghai was opened,
and this was the fundamental turn for Shanghai; with its geographical advantage,
Shanghai was engaged in trade. Thus, it was a natural historical process that Shanghai
turned from a port city to an industrial-commercial city, and then to a financial city. So he
emphasized again that Chinese economic rationality and economic capability was not a
problem; the problem was that China had a political institution of highly-centralized
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concentration of power, which controlled the power of economic revenue: it totally
controlled the economy. The institution could never resolve the power-money
relationship, [or] power-money combination: using power to gain money and using
money to gain power. Such an institution that power and money could not be separate led
to the situation that the government and the enterprises could not be separate. He said that
such an institution was against modernization. Some people thought that it was culture,
but he thought that it was political institution that inhibited China’s development. 289
Shanghai’s development, in general, started with the opening of it in
1843. It was a window for the international economy and world cultures to enter into
China. The Concession areas were free from the governance of Chinese government;
therefore, they had become laboratories for [the western] institutions and cultures. So
Shanghai became both the economic and cultural center of the whole country. After 1949,
it was still the domestic economic center, complying with the planned economy; but in
the world, it had lagged behind. It was not seriously damaged during the Cultural
Revolution because it was the base for the Gang of Four. In the reform years, Shanghai
was late for change. For a long time, it operated according to the original political
institution, daring not to do things that went beyond the socialist line. After Deng
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Xiaoping’s Southern tour in 1992, it began to change and changed very fast. This was a
fundamental turn from the planned economy to the market economy. Once it shifted to
the market economy, the market economy had its own logic. 290
Then he emphasized the importance of government policy and
institutions: when they changed, everything changed. Foreign capital and foreign bank
came in, and Shanghai revived its vitality like in the 1930’s. Then he said Shenzhen did
not have the technological and cultural advantages that Shanghai enjoyed. There were
universities, research institutes, engineering technological workers in Shanghai. Also, the
Shanghai people had brain power for running business. Therefore, such historical legacies
made Shanghai different from other cities; the Shanghai people were very practical, very
pragmatic. So both internal factor (the technological and cultural advantages that it had)
and external factor (foreign capital, and talents from all parts of this country) played a
key role in Shanghai’s development. 291
About the self role, the interviewee said that he was an intellectual:
all his life was dealing with books. That’s his career. He happened to be distributed, under
the planned economy, to a field that he was interested in: he liked to study history, and he
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liked to be a teacher. Then he said the greatest change after reform was that there was no
more political movement. Deng Xiaoping was very great on this. The recent 20 or 30
years were the best time in [the PRC’s] history. He no longer had too much fear. The
degree of freedom on research and publishing was greater. Intellectuals should be free
and independent intellectuals.

He said he also had the traditional spirit of intellectuals:

being concerned about the fate of this nation, and the history, and he had a sense of social
responsibility. So he distinguished himself from more westernized intellectuals; he was
more critical of the development of this nation, and he thought that this was true
patriotism. Intellectuals could not cure [the society’s] disease, but could diagnose the
illness. He said that the government should welcome the diagnosis. Now it was better; the
government might not listen or might not be happy, but it’s no problem to speak it out. He
said that only because one had deep love of the country would one criticize it; if one felt
that one did not care, there was no love in one’s heart. So he still had the traditional
intellectual’s spirit. 292
Then he said that the intellectual’s role and the government’s role
should be clearly defined. The intellectual could not replace the government, whose role
was about feasibility and operationalization. The government might not listen, but the
292

Ibid.
236

intellectuals had their role and function: to comment. This was especially true for the
profession of liberal arts. Economics and technology might have operationality, but the
function of liberal arts was to comment. The government should not interfere in or
suppress the scholar’s speech; the responsibility of the government was to listen and
choose: if the contents of the speech were usable, the government could use them; if not,
the government could neglect them. If both roles were clearly defined, there would be no
confrontation or conflict between the government and the intellectuals. The interviewee
said that in class he would say whatever he wanted to say, but in newspapers and journals
he would refrain. He said it was the most important thing for the intellectuals to speak
honestly. So his role was to comment. Then he said no matter what, all intellectuals must
be concerned about the society. 293
About the expectations of the future, I asked him three things: the
expectations for the intellectuals, the expectations for his children and students, and the
expectations for China. He expected that the intellectuals could be open-minded to
contain and accept the [rich] resources of all kinds of thoughts and cultures in the world,
and then coming back to indigenous characteristics. In other words, he advocated
indigenous scholarship, but this would need the rich stimulation from all kinds of
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thoughts and cultures in the world. He said that Chinese modernization was a very special
case in the world; the current modernization theory could not fully explain it. [The
experience of] Chinese modernization was never seen before in the world history, and
there must be a lot of scholarship to conduct. It would make contribution to sociology,
political science, and economics. He said that Taiwan’s experience of success might not
be applicable to the mainland because the mainland was a big country, and there was
serious imbalance in the development. It would not be difficult for Shanghai and the
coastal regions to develop, but it would be hard for the whole country to develop.
Another point was that development had to be continuous; in the past China’s
development had been seriously damaged, now the reconstruction should not break the
previous basis, it should adopt an approach of gradual change, and it should not use a
revolutionary way. The revolutionary way might just change a group of people, and did
not change the institutions, and such change could not achieve anything. 294
Then he pointed out that the current academic circle had too much
utilitarianism, but this was oriented by the government. The government used a system of
evaluation and assessment to define the levels of scholarship; this had led to
utilitarianism. Scholarship needed deep thinking, but the system of evaluation and
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assessment just regulated the quantity of words and articles published in the core journal.
In order to pursue the quantity to complete the mission, scholars might give up deep
thinking, and then good works became less. The reason for the existence of such a system
was that there were too many technical officials or leaders, and these leaders used the
way of managing technology to manage liberal arts. He said that there were different
characters between technology and liberal arts. When scholars pursued quantity, the
quality lowered down. 295
About the expectations for his children, he said that he was open on
that: let the children go their own way. This was because he found that, in today’s society,
if you regulated the children too much, it might cause antipathy. He raised one point: the
training of psychological quality was absent in the education. Young men today were
very weak; they could not bear frustration. This was because they had good conditions of
life, not like the interviewee’s generation. In the old days of their generation, conditions
of life were worse, so the individuals needed to struggle, thus they became strong. His
attitude towards his children was American way: after the children worked, they should
be independent economically and lived their own life. The interviewee had the same
attitude towards his students: He would teach everything he knew without any reservation,
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but they should go their own way. Each student had his own individual personality,
characters, and quality. He respected each one’s characters, and especially considered
their differences. They should have their own opinions, daring to question what they were
taught. They should ask “why” in everything. He expected the students to work hard in
the three years (for Ph. D.) Learning history would surely benefit them, for it was a
special way of thinking. 296
About the expectations for China’s future, the interviewee said that
viewing from the aspect of optimism, the road of gradual change had good prospects:
continuous change, no turning back. Rush would surely not work. But if it had reached
the critical point of change, there should be no hesitation. So [on democracy] rush would
not work, it took [mature] conditions. On the other hand, viewing from the aspect of
difficulty, there were hidden dangers. The interviewee mentioned two things. (1)
Especially for such a big country as China, there were still many poor people. Peasants
were 50%, or 60% of the population, and underdeveloped areas were still large. The
complete modernization [of China] was an exceptional case in the world history. He said
that we should see the existing contradictions and problems; the western countries spoke
well of us, but we should keep our mind clear and awake. The division in the income
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level was a source of vitality, but high differentiation and polarized division in the income
level would lead to social instability. And if you wanted to solve this problem, you had to
slow down the speed of development—this had become a special situation in China’s
development. The problem of social welfare, and the social welfare in the large rural
areas, needed economic strength to solve it. 297
(2) This was also a big problem; it’s about the restriction of
[government’s] power. The people were poor, so they were unhappy about the corruption.
Illegitimate and illegal incomes were serious. The government needed to expand the
legitimacy of the regime by the restriction of power. “How did we do that? It needed
exploration. This problem needed to be taken seriously. It still had to do with the big size
of population. But it still needed to be done; there should be no fear of it.” [Should it be]
direct election or universal election of the leaders? For China, the way should be step by
step. It needed [mature] conditions. 298
The interviewee then mentioned Taiwan. He said that he had two
points on that. (1) Taiwan had democracy, but it was not orderly. (2) Having democracy
was better than not having it, but one should not idealize it. The western philosophy said,
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you could not have the best government; you could only expect the government was not
the worst. He then turned back to China. For China, there were both hopes and hidden
dangers. He did not hope that the situation became chaotic, but you needed to do it so that
there would not be chaos. He said that in the past China had many lessons on this. For the
huge gap in the income level and government corruption, there should not be slowness;
for democracy, there should not be rush. If the situation needed to be resolved and you
did nothing, it would lead to problems after sometime of accumulation, but rush would
also cause problems. Finally he mentioned his worry on Taiwan’s independence. He said
nobody wanted to go into war. Whoever on the position of leader could not bear the
responsibility of letting Taiwan go the independence route. So he worried about war, and
this was one of the hidden dangers. He concluded the interview by saying that history
was unpredictable; there were many rational and irrational factors, so history was
unpredictable. 299
To sum up, in this sample, Chinese intellectuals all carried a spirit of
social responsibility, and all were concerned about the fate of the nation. That was why
they were honest in pointing out the problems or hidden dangers of the nation. Their self
role was to do their best to teach students, spread ideas, and make comments for the
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government’s references. They all stressed the importance of independent scholarship; the
government should not interfere in or suppress the thoughts and comments of the
intellectuals. They see reform as much better time for the intellectuals than Mao Zedong’s
years. But for the liberal intellectual, self pursuit was still like “dancing with shackles
on.” They used their profession to pursue their ideals. They all see democracy as the
future of this nation, but had very different opinions on the way to achieve it. Because
China is a big country, the change should be step by step. Liberal-minded intellectual
used the profession to serve the prospects of Chinese democratization.
Non-liberal –minded intellectual had serious criticism on the rightist’s attitude and the
overseas democratic movement. In general, they upheld intellectual independence,
supported democratic prospects, and worried about the tendency of Taiwan’s
independence, especially its outcome: war.
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CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION

Will China become a multiparty democracy? My hypothesis in this
dissertation is this: the greater the extent that Chinese elite thinking on development and
change reconciles the tension between Chinese nationalism and collectivist, family-like
ethics on the one hand, and the western democratic ideals based on each self-seeking
individual’s subjectivity on the other hand, the greater the chance that China’s political
development will lead to a multiparty democracy. As stated in chapter one, since the
Opium War, the Chinese (intellectual and political) elite have been driven by an
aspiration to save this nation, so they educated and mobilized Chinese people to awaken
them to the crises that China was facing, and to rise up to save China. Nationalism thus
dominated the Chinese mind and heart and became the most powerful driving force of the
society’s development and change. Up until now, generation after generation of Chinese
elite have been thinking and practicing different prescriptions (or paths) to save this
country. National wealth and power has become the shared, collective goal for the whole
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nation to pursue.
The problem is this: how can the Chinese fulfill the common goal of
national wealth and power? Different elites at different times gave different answers, and
there were three approaches sequentially. The nature of the approaches was related to the
elite recognition of the advantages that the western powers had. Because of a series of
military defeats, at first the Chinese elite thought that the western advantages were just in
technology, so the Chinese began the Self-strengthening Movement (1860-1893). The
goal of this movement was to improve Chinese military technology and build a strong
naval force. After 30 years of efforts, it seemed that China had successfully built a strong,
modern naval force. But the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) totally destroyed the naval
force and the self-confidence of the Court. The Self-strengthening Movement that took 30
years of efforts thus collapsed. The technological approach proved insufficient. 300
Then came the second approach: the institutional approach. Kang
Youwei and his student Liang Qichao proposed a constitutional monarchy whereas Sun
Yat-sen advocated revolution to overthrow the Qing Court and build a republic. Both
Kang and Sun were shocked and disappointed by China’s defeat in the war with Japan
because Japan had previously been viewed as China’s younger brother who learned many
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things from the elder brother, China. Now even “little Japan,” learning from the west,
could defeat China. This was a big shock, realizing how weak China had become. So
both Kang and Sun recognized that the western powers’ advantages were not just on
military technology. The true advantages were in the political institutions. Kang wanted
to be engaged in a Confucian Reformation, retaining the imperial monarchical system but
adding constitutionalism to the imperial monarchy. Sun, modeling on the American
system, wanted to build a republic. Kang and Sun thus competed with each other for
which way China should go. Kang’s efforts ended up with a failure in the Hundred Days
Reform (1898), and he and Liang Qichao fled overseas to continue their movement
promoting a constitutional monarchy for China. Sun Yat-sen’s efforts finally succeeded in
1911, and thus China built the first republic in Asia. Nevertheless, the Northern warlord
Yuan Shikai tried to terminate the republic and revert to the imperial monarchy in which
he assumed the throne as Chinese emperor. Such efforts caused huge opposition
nationally, and Yuan failed and died. After Yuan’s death, the whole nation plunged into
warlord politics and wars. Therefore, both Kang’s and Sun’s institutional approach failed
and proved insufficient. 301
Then came the third approach: the cultural approach. A group of
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prominent intellectuals, gathering in the Beijing University and led by Hu Shi and Chen
Duxiu, launched a new cultural movement. They thought that the reason why Sun
Yat-sen’s efforts to build a republic could not succeed was that the Chinese people’s
thoughts were not awakened, and the success of building a republic should be based on
the change of people’s ideas, especially the ideas of the youth. Hu and Chen believed in
the power of education, so they pinned their hopes on Chinese young people. The essence
of the new cultural movement was democracy and science. They spread the ideas of
liberalism and individualism, and relentlessly attacked Confucianism for its social ethics
and customs, on the issues of women’s rights, and as an obstacle to the growth of an
individual’s independent personality constrained by the long-established family system.
In short, they wanted to build for China a new civilization based on democracy and
science, and urged the Chinese to discard Confucianism; their central concerns were
modern civilization and its humanitarianism. 302 Hu Shi raised a slogan of “complete
westernization,” later changing it to “sufficient merging into the world culture.” 303
Unfortunately, since the May Fourth incident (May 4th, 1919), the
new cultural movement was diverted to assume a political color, and the leading
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intellectuals of this enlightenment movement divided into two groups: the leftist camp
and the liberal camp. The leftist camp, represented by Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao,
advocated that China follow the Russian path, learning from the proletarian revolution
then happening in Russia. The liberal camp, represented by Hu Shi, continued to
advocate the western or the American path. The leftist ideas led to Mao Zedong’s China
and later to the reform China, and the liberal camp brought its ideas to Taiwan after 1949,
contributing to Taiwan’s democratization in the 1980’s. 304 Mao’s way proved to be a
failure to bring national wealth and power to China. 305 Nevertheless, Deng Xiaoping’s
reform still retained Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thoughts as ideological
guidelines. And Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao have had no interest in bringing the country
to the path of democratization. 306
Returning to my hypothesis, Hu Shi was a very good example of a
patriotic intellectual driven by nationalism. His career was to save China by education.
He advocated liberalism and individualism, and at the same time, he guided his readers,
students, and friends to build a life purpose that defined self value as being a useful
person to the society. He believed that if people were good, the society and the nation
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would be good. He encouraged Chinese young men who aspired to save this country to
train themselves to become a useful talent first, and then they would be able to contribute
their talents to the society and the nation. So in Hu Shi’s thinking, we find that he could
successfully reconcile the tension between Chinese nationalism and collectivist,
family-like ethics (i.e., social concerns) on the one hand, and western democratic ideals
based on each self-seeking individual’s subjectivity (i.e., self fulfillment) on the other
hand. He had the spirit of Chinese traditional intellectuals’ characters of being concerned
about the society, the fate of the nation, and the fate of human beings. This was the
collectivist, family-like ethics that saw the society as a family, and as the central concerns
of one’s life purpose. And because of modern Chinese history of being invaded, such
collectivist, family-like ethics in one’s mind and heart naturally turned to nationalism: an
urgent concern of how to save China in a social Darwinist international world.
Hu Shi’s thinking or his prescription was: train yourself first, and
then someday you would be able to make a contribution toward the situation of China.
Therefore, self-seeking subjectivity or self fulfillment was defined as benefiting others’
life, benefiting the society, and benefiting the country. But even so, the essence of Hu
Shi’s thinking was still liberalism and individual’s independent personality. Collectivist
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concerns did not have to conflict with liberalism and individualism. Thus the tension
between collectivist, family-like ethics and each individual’s self-seeking subjectivity
disappeared! The tension between nationalism and democratic ideals was reconciled
successfully as well. This is the best example supporting my hypothesis.
In what follows, I will divide my interviewees in Shanghai into four
groups of elite, and focus my discussion on how each interviewee reconciles the tension
between nationalism and democratic ideals, or between collectivist, family-like ethics
(i.e., social concerns) and self-seeking subjectivity (or self fulfillment). As I said in
chapter 7, the ideas of elite in Shanghai could not represent the disadvantaged (who were
just struggling for survival), but they could reveal how the elite saw Shanghai’s
development and change in the broader picture of modern Chinese history since the
Opium War. Their evaluations of the self role and the state role (in driving or impeding
the city’s development and change) could tell us the relative weight that they placed for
the state (the influence or control that the state had on personal life and on the city’s
development) and the self (the degree of self fulfillment). And such information may
guide us to the understanding of the individual’s self efficacy in the control of his own
life, and in the contribution that he felt he could make to improve the society that he was
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in. Such self efficacy, in relation to the state role, allows us to evaluate the possibility of
China’s democratization in the next 20 years (2004-2024).
(1) The Government Officials
Interviewee No. 1 was a party cadre. He said it very clearly: people in
his generation (he was 52 years old in 2004) did not have such ideas of self value
fulfillment, his pursuit of life goal was to be diligent and sincere, acting as a bolt of the
party (the party being a machine). His generation had a value of self sacrifice for the
benefit of collectivity. Collective interests were much more important than self interests
and concerns. So in this case, the interviewee did not have democratic ideals, and did not
play the role of individualist self-seeking subjectivity. His self fulfillment was to serve
the people by serving the party; his concern was not about “self,” but about the benefit of
the whole nation or the collectivity. There were no individual’s interests; there were only
the people’s interests, which should be defined by the party. This was the typical
mentality of a sincere party cadre. But he mentioned the generation gap. His son would
never do a job like his; his son wanted to be a big boss. There were different value
directions between the two generations. Young men today had stronger “self.” 307
Interviewee No. 2 was a government official whose job was about
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propaganda. He placed his self role under the whole framework of collective
development. He said that the society and the people wanted development and
modernization, so the government should meet their needs, that is: development and
modernization. In the process of collective development, his self value was raised, his
material life became better, his knowledge became more advanced, and his capability
improved. So his self fulfillment was dependent on collective development. He was very
positive, self-confident, and saw the future as positive and bright. In this case, the
interviewee’s self role totally merged into collective development. Since collective
development did not include democracy as a goal, the interviewee did not have
democratic ideals as his value. For him, the self-seeking individual’s subjectivity (i.e., his
self fulfillment) was to serve the process of collective development.308
Interviewee No. 3 was also a government official whose job was
about propaganda. He also enjoyed his current job very much. His self role or self
fulfillment also depended on collective development. He was also very positive and
self-confident. There had been a kind of work zeal and positive aura around his working
place. The drive of work came from a goal stimulation that by 2010 they would build
Shanghai to become an outward, modern, and multi-functional city. Because the
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prospects were so beautiful, everybody had been working toward such a beautiful
common goal. 309
In short, government officials in this sample enjoyed their jobs very
much. Their self fulfillment had merged into collective development. They did not
experience tension between nationalism and democratic ideals because democratic ideals
were not included in their value system. For them, the individual’s self-seeking
subjectivity had merged with the collective common goal.
(2) The Enterprise People
Interviewee No. 4 worked at a foreign company. He showed a high
degree of self-confidence about his self role. He had a high degree of self fulfillment and
self efficacy: he could completely control his life. He had a high evaluation of the
Shanghai government, saying that they were pro-business, efficient, and transparent. And
he said that nationalism would not be a problem for his company because his company’s
development in China and training of Chinese indigenous talents had long-term benefit
for Chinese national car industry. He did not show any sign of nationalist feelings; he just
enjoyed very much his current job, his talents and experiences, and the prospects for his
career. This was a man of high degree of self fulfillment. There was no tension between
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nationalism and the western business culture: He had successfully merged these two
aspects, though he did not mention democratic ideals. He just enjoyed his self fulfillment
very much, but did not mention his social concerns. So in this case, there was no tension
between nationalism and democratic ideals, and there was no tension between the
self-seeking individual’s subjectivity (the self fulfillment) and the collectivist, family-like
ethics (the social concerns). 310
Interviewee No. 5 worked in a big foreign company. He showed
strong nationalist feelings; he even thought of jumping into national industries to help his
country, so that Chinese national industries would be able to compete with world
industries. In other words, he was patriotic even if he worked in a foreign company. He
wanted to play a role of communication to share with his friends and acquaintances new
ideas, new concepts, and new ways of management that he learned from the big western
company. He was in a position of high-level management, so the degree of self
fulfillment was high. So in this case, the interviewee successfully merged his nationalism
with western ideas, concepts, and ways of management, and his self fulfillment or
self-seeking subjectivity included collectivist social concerns, wanting to exert his talents
to help Chinese national industries. He did not mention democratic ideals, but he saw the
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western ideas, concepts, and ways of management as new knowledge that his countrymen
should learn. 311
Interviewee No. 6 also worked in a foreign company. She emphasized
the fusion of Chinese culture and western culture. She said that one should understand
Chinese philosophy and history and the world’s philosophy and history. She also wanted
to play a role of bridge to help her countrymen catch up with the west and understand the
modern business manner, and more broadly, the world culture. On nationalism, she said
the more she contacted foreigners, the more she loved her own country. So she wanted to
help her countrymen to become modern. So in this case, the interviewee’s nationalism
merged with the western culture, or western business manner. Her self fulfillment or
self-seeking subjectivity merged with her social concerns that her countrymen still lagged
behind the modern, global business manner, or modern, global culture. She expected the
future as a fusion of Chinese culture and the western culture. 312
Interviewee No. 7 was a boss of a small company, and was a
Taiwanese. He had a high evaluation of Shanghai’s government for its administrative
efficiency. He said that they were doing their job well, and we should give them time and
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should not demand things too many from them. He enjoyed his self fulfillment very much
since he was a successful businessman. Because he was from Taiwan, he did not have
Chinese nationalism. So in this case there was no problem of reconciliation of the tension
between nationalism and democratic ideals (or, western culture); also, his self fulfillment
or self-seeking subjectivity was to become a successful businessman, so he did not have
social concerns (or, collectivist, family-like ethics that saw the society as a family)
extending to the mainland Chinese society. 313
Interviewee No. 8 was a successful businesswoman from Taiwan; she
opened a teashop and sold tea in Shanghai. She was very good in dealing with people and
things; she was capable in business. Because she was from Taiwan, she did not have
nationalism for China. Therefore, the problem of reconciliation between the tension of
nationalism and democratic ideals (or western culture) did not exist for her. She had
many opinions about the Shanghai people and about China, and she said it was hard for
China to catch up on modern concepts and modern culture, unless China sent a lot of
students and talents overseas to learn from the west. So her self fulfillment or
self-seeking subjectivity was to earn money and had little to do with Chinese social
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improvement. 314
Interviewee No. 9 was a partner of a small logistics company. His
concerns were to survive economically and be able to open the market from foreign
enterprises or big enterprises. He did not deal with the government much except applying
for the license and paying the tax. He did not show any sign of nationalism or any
concern about democratic ideals. His pressure came from economic survival and opening
the market. His self fulfillment was to succeed in logistics business, and he showed no
sign of collectivist spirit. So in this case, nationalism or collectivist, family-like ethics
was just irrelevant. All his concerns centered on business success because his company
was small and needed to survive first. 315
In short, the enterprise people in this sample can be divided into two
groups. The first three interviewees (No. 4, 5, and 6) all worked in a foreign company,
and they merged nationalism and the western culture (new concepts, new ideas, and new
ways of management) very well: they loved their country and hoped that their
countrymen could catch up with a new, modern, and global business manner. Their self
fulfillment also merged with their social concerns very well. For this group of enterprise
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people, western culture was not the enemy of their nationalism; rather, they saw the
western strengths and wanted to help their countrymen to absorb and learn these strengths
to become modern or be able to compete globally. The second group of interviewees (No.
7, 8, and 9) did not have Chinese nationalism in their mind and heart either because they
were from Taiwan or because the problem of survival surpassed other concerns. Also,
their self fulfillment was about business success, and they did not show social concerns
or collectivist, family-like ethics toward this society. None of the six enterprise people
ever raised democratic ideals for discussion. Most of them evaluated highly the quality,
capability, and efficiency of the Shanghai government.
(3) The Media Professionsls
Interviewee No. 10 was a young lady working in a newspaper. She
expressed her anxieties about three things: personal development, her expectations about
future love relationships she might have, and the city’s development. She was very clear
about what her life pursuits were and the barriers for her to attain those pursuits. She also
mentioned the government’s role, that an individual’s ideals were dependent on the grand
environment, which depended on the government. She did not show strong feelings of
nationalism, but talked about the negative role that the government played in restricting
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the reporting of news. She was concerned about the development of society, thinking that
those in power did not have enough wisdom to govern the city well: they might
understand modernization but lacked the knowledge about the good points of traditions.
So in this case the interviewee loved her country and the society (natural nationalism and
collectivism), but saw the government as a negative factor for the development of both
the media and the media professionals. Though she did not talk about democratic ideals
directly, she would expect that in the future the restrictions on the media should be
dismissed. Certainly she would welcome democracy. Also, the problems that she
mentioned in her social concerns could only be resolved when the media became a public
voice channel rather than a voice channel for the party-government. She belonged to the
young generation, so she saw self fulfillment and life pursuit as natural, and the
government’s restrictions as unnatural which should be dismissed in the future. In short,
the interviewee had a natural reconciliation of the tension between nationalism and
democratic ideals, and between the collectivist, family-like ethics (i.e., social concerns)
and self-seeking subjectivity (i.e., self fulfillment or self efficacy). 316
Interviewee No. 11 also worked in a newspaper. He said that he
would not expect too highly of the media because of outside (i.e., political) factors. The
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media was under the control of the government and was in a situation of absurdity: Some
people were put into jail because of their insistence of news conscience and correct
reporting. Therefore, one should not make a mistake of political childishness and expect
too highly of the media. Yes, the media was powerful, but it was not controllable by the
individual or a group of people who insisted on news conscience. Nevertheless, this did
not mean that there was nothing one could do. One should not give up one’s ideals, and
should do one’s best in one’s position and leave the result to heaven. So in this case, the
interviewee certainly loved his country and would embrace democracy if that was
possible, and this meant that the interviewee had a natural reconciliation of the tension
between nationalism and democratic ideals, and between the collectivist, family-like
ethics (i.e., social concerns) and self-seeking subjectivity (i.e., self fulfillment or self
efficacy). 317
Interviewee No. 12 worked in a newspaper. He said that now (2004)
the problem most raised [by the media professionals] was Shanghai’s strong government.
The power of this government was everywhere: it was in big public policies, it entered
into the field of market, and it also entered into the field of private thoughts. Now
privately everybody was talking about how to supervise, restrict, criticize, and regulate
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the operation of the government. But the hardships of such a process had made most
people feel tired both physically and psychologically. Nevertheless, the interviewee still
felt that “this is the best age, and this is the worst age.” At least opportunities were more
than the pressure. He still felt that the current China (2004) had hopes and positive
prospects that still surpassed the negative possibilities. So in this case, though the
interviewee did not have strong feeling of self efficacy (to change the society), he had
attained a reconciliation between his nationalism (love of this country) and democratic
ideals (to supervise and restrict the government’s power), and between the collectivist,
family-like ethics (i.e., social concerns for the disadvantaged) and self-seeking
subjectivity (i.e., self fulfillment or self efficacy as a media worker.) 318
Interviewee No. 13 paid much attention to the weakness of his
generation, and the problems that would emerge in the process of Shanghai’s
development. In short, young people today were impetuous; they were concerned about
wealth, social status, and power, and could not tolerate developmental stagnation or
slowness. They were less concerned about the quality of life, health, and the balance
between development and contents of life. The government had similar problems: they
were concerned only about the speed of development, and lacked the concerns of the
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relationship between human beings and nature, the distribution of industries, and the
balance between development and stability. Therefore, the individual, the media
profession, and the city development were all in a state of rush, impetuosity, and
overdraft. The interviewee was concerned about how the individual, the media profession,
and the city development could calm down and think of a reasonable plan and find the
core competitive power that would be irreplaceable. He said, one should answer the
question of the bottleneck of development instead of the speed of development. So in this
case, the interviewee’s social concerns and self fulfillment had attained a reconciliation.
Though he did not mention nationalism and democratic ideals, he had praised highly the
quality of containing power (i.e., the power of being able to include and intermingle all
kinds of differences or absorb all others’ strengths.) Such quality would make him see
democratic ideals as one of many things that Chinese had to learn. Thus, democratic
ideals would be seen as benefiting China, and a reconciliation between nationalism and
democratic ideals would be attained by the interviewee. 319
In short, the media people all saw the government as a negative factor
that impeded the development of the media and the media professionals. None of them
mentioned democratic ideals, but they all acknowledged that the government needed to
319
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be supervised, criticized, restricted, and regulated in its use of power. The four cases of
the media professionals all reconciled the tension between nationalism and democratic
ideals, and between collectivist, family-like ethics (i.e., social concerns) and the
self-seeking individual’s subjectivity (i.e., self fulfillment.)
(4) The Intellectuals
Interviewee No. 14 was a professor of a university. He said that from
the highest leaders to the ordinary people, everybody knew the importance of
development because China had not developed for so long a time. If China would not
develop and stayed backward, China would be beaten [by the strong powers] again. The
modern history of China was a history of being beaten. That was why the policy of
reform and openness could gain so much support from the people. Everybody wanted
development, and that was the driving force of national and Shanghai’s development and
change. In other words, he was saying that nationalism was the driving force of national
development and change. He enjoyed a great deal of the feeling of self fulfillment, saying
that the school did not interfere in their research object and research method. So in this
case the interviewee enjoyed his self fulfillment very much, and at the same time his
social concerns revealed that he had the spirit of traditional Chinese intellectuals: He
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loved his country, was concerned about the society’s problems (the people’s quality) and
saw that development had brought national wealth and power to this country. He did not
mention democratic ideals, but praised highly the freedom he enjoyed in doing research.
He had natural feeling of nationalism, enjoyed the current state of the government since
there was no interference in his research. From his talks we might not be able to say that
he had attained a reconciliation of the tension between nationalism and democratic ideals,
but we can say that the reconciliation was between nationalism and independent, free
scholarship. Also, he had attained the reconciliation between the tension of collectivist,
family-like ethics (i.e., social concerns, and love of this society) and his self-seeking
subjectivity (i.e., self fulfillment and self efficacy-- the feeling that he could control his
life and make contributions to the academic field.) 320
Interviewee No. 15 was a professor in a university. He said that
Chinese modernization went a long curve on its road. From the Opium War to 1911, the
road was correct. Then China diverted from the mainstream of world development and
went to the least promising road during the cold war: the Soviet Union’s road which
would lead to a dead-end. He said Deng Xiaoping’s historical role was to move China
back to the track of modernization. All his life witnessed that this country move
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backward for 70 or 80 years, and then back to the original starting point and restart again.
He said that for the reform and openness, his most urgent wish was that China could pass
the challenges of modernization, and this included two things: economically, the
privatization of property rights; politically, constitutionalization and democratization. If
externally Taiwan did not go the independence route, and internally irrational conflicts
and confrontations did not happen, then the economic reform would clear up the dated
institutions and mainland China would become a democracy. So in this case, the
interviewee had attained a reconciliation of the tension between nationalism and
democratic ideals, and between collectivist, family-like ethics (i.e., social concerns, and
love of this society) and self-seeking subjectivity (i.e., self fulfillment, or self efficacy.) 321
Interviewee No. 16 was a graduate student and would advance to the
Ph. D. program in three months. He said that as a student of liberal arts, of course he was
concerned about public issues, but the most urgent need for him was to resolve personal
economic pressure. He wanted to complete the Ph. D. degree and find a teaching job in
the university so that he could repay the love and sacrifice from his families. He said that
from his experiences in the inland area and Shanghai, the market institution was in
general successful, and that although the lack of reform in political institutions was
321
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something to worry about, the great direction of the reform should be carefully optimistic
and should be going upward. So in this case the interviewee had attained a reconciliation
of the tension between nationalism (love of his country) and democratic ideals (the
expected reform of political institutions), and between the collectivist, family-like ethics
(social concerns, and love of this society) and self-seeking subjectivity (self fulfillment,
or self efficacy.) 322
Interviewee No. 17 was a professor of a university who taught and
worked on philosophy. He said that although the goal for China should be democracy, the
way to achieve the goal should be gradual improvement. It was very important for China
to have a strong central government to maintain order; for without that, the pursuit of
democracy would make China plunge into warlord conflicts like the years after 1911
revolution, or plunge into national chaos like during the Cultural Revolution. His
argument centered on this point that if China let go of control now (2004), the whole
country would be in chaos. So in this case the interviewee did not reconcile the tension
between nationalism (love of his country) and democratic ideals; rather, he saw
democracy more as a source of chaos, a source of factional conflicts that might lead to
war! He criticized those intellectuals who advocated democratic ideals in China as
322
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singing bombastic words and disregarding Chinese reality. He was the defender of the
current Chinese political system. His self fulfillment or self-seeking subjectivity was
about academic work; he saw himself as a philosopher and teacher and enjoyed such a
role very much. At the same time, from his strong criticism towards the liberal
intellectuals, he showed very strong collectivist spirit (i.e., social concerns) and the
family-like ethics (love of this society.) 323
Interviewee No. 18 was a professor of a university who taught history.
On the role of intellectuals he said that intellectuals should be free and independent
intellectuals; the government should not interfere in or suppress the scholars’ speeches.
The responsibility of the government was to listen and to choose, and the role of
intellectuals was to comment. On his self fulfillment he said that he also had the spirit of
traditional [Chinese] intellectuals: being concerned about the fate of this nation, and the
history, and he had a sense of social responsibility. So he distinguished himself from
more westernized intellectuals: he was more critical of the development of this nation,
and he thought this was true patriotism. So in this case we saw clearly that the
interviewee successfully integrated his self fulfillment and the social concerns. His
self-seeking subjectivity had merged with his collectivist, family-like ethics. He did
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mention democracy and democratization of China. He said China should not rush on
democracy; it should adopt a path of gradual change because it needed the conditions to
become mature. It [also] needed exploration on how to democratize. His self fulfillment
was to comment on the problem of Chinese development, and to educate students. So for
him, true patriotism (or, nationalism) was to criticize the problems of this nation’s
development, and one of the problems was the restriction of the government’s power. So
here he attained a reconciliation of the tension between nationalism and the democratic
ideals. 324
In short, the intellectuals in this sample all carried the spirit of the
traditional Chinese intellectuals: being concerned about the fate of this nation, its people,
and the society. Their self fulfillment, besides professional academic pursuit, was to serve
those collectivist concerns by education or writing articles or books. Except for one of
them, their nationalism made them see that democratic ideals would benefit this nation,
and the way to build democracy in China needed further exploration. In other words, their
nationalism merged with the democratic ideals, and their self fulfillment merged with
their collectivist, social concerns: they used their profession to serve development, the
process of modernization, and the prospects of democratization in China.
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(5) The Conclusion
In this sample, except two persons, both the media people and the
intellectuals all could naturally attain a reconciliation of the tension between nationalism
and the democratic ideals, and between collectivist, family-like ethics and the
individual’s self-seeking subjectivity. Even one of the exceptional persons (interviewee
No. 17) expected that China would become a democracy when economic development
reached a certain level. Another person (interviewee No. 14) was uncertain; we can only
say that he had attained a reconciliation between nationalism and independent, free
scholarship because he did not mention democratic ideals or western culture. So we have
here seven out of nine persons in the media group and the intellectual group who were
pro-democracy. In addition, three out of six persons in the enterprise group could
successfully reconcile the tension between nationalism and the western business manner
or the world culture; we can count these three persons as pro-democracy in the long-term
(20 years: 2004 to 2024). Another three persons in the enterprise group either were from
Taiwan or focused on the economic survival, so they lacked Chinese nationalism and
democratic prospects for China in their mind and heart. And all three of the government
officials did not include democratic ideals in their value system. So finally we can only
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say that 10 out of 18 persons (55.5 %: three enterprise persons, four media professionals,
and three intellectuals) were pro-democracy. Four out of 18 persons (22.2 %: three
government officials and one intellectual) were not pro-democracy. Three out of 18
persons (16.6 %: the three enterprise persons) were not concerned about the issue of
democracy in China, and one out of 18 persons (5.5 %: the intellectual) was uncertain.
Again, the Shanghai sample was used by me to represent a long-term trend towards
democracy, not to represent China’s overall situation in 2004. So if this small sample is
representative of the larger populations from which they are drawn, we can now say that
the prospects of democratization (to a multiparty democracy) in China in the next 20
years (2004 to 2024) are good.
What might this democracy look like? Here we may change the
question to: Is the nature of this democracy a system based on each self-seeking
individual’s subjectivity? My answer to that question is: Yes, but not based on
individualism. In the above sample, only four persons (22.2 %: interviewee No. 4, 7, 8,
and 9) in the enterprise group did not show obvious social concerns, the other 14 persons
(77.7 %) all merged their self-seeking subjectivity with the collectivist, family-like ethics.
In other words, their self fulfillment was to use their profession to make a contribution to
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the society that they were in, whether it was the Shanghai society, or more broadly, the
Chinese society. So if China achieves successful democratization, such democratization
likely will lead to a communal or social democracy 325 because of the collectivist nature
of Chinese culture.
This will be a democratic system that combines traditional elements
(communal spirit) and modern elements (based on an independent individual’s
self-seeking subjectivity). Under such democratic system, a free, independent individual
will not just be concerned about himself or his interests, he will also, under his free will,
be concerned about other people’s welfare. On the macro level, the Confucian ideal of
“Great Harmony” will be the political and cultural goal of such a democratic system, so
the culture likely will be a democratic form of Confucianism, and the political system
likely will be a Confucian democracy that both respects each individual’s free will and
self-seeking subjectivity, and has Confucian spirit of sharing, fraternity, love, and mutual
support. On the micro level, the balance in the combination and integration of traditional
elements and modern elements will depend on each individual’s free will and free choice,
so it will be different from person to person, and it may fall on a point on a spectrum with
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liberalism at the one end, and Confucianism at the other end. We can expect most
individuals to incorporate that balance in their personal value systems.
How will democratization happen? In the above sample, the
government officials did not include democratic ideals in their value system, so the
process of democratization likely will not start from the government. The business group
foresaw the fusion of Chinese culture with the western culture as the Chinese future, but
their development relied on the government’s policy, so they could be the supporters but
not the starters of the democratization process. The media belonged to the government
and was under the strict control of the government, so the media group could not start the
process. Only the intellectuals enjoyed a certain degree of independent scholarship, and
all intellectuals in the sample displayed a spirit of traditional Chinese intellectuals: being
concerned about the fate of this nation, the development of this society, and the welfare
of the people. Just like Hu Shi, they had the power and tool of education in their hands;
they can help students and readers change their worldviews. Since the Opium War, this
has always been the case: the first group to awaken (to the crises) has always been the
intellectuals, and then their efforts help awaken other elite strata and, following them, the
whole nation could be mobilized. In the above sample, the intellectuals did demonstrate
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understandings that are supportive of democratic outcomes over the long term. I have
found substantial evidence of favorable prospects for democracy. So my conclusion is:
China has favorable prospects for becoming a multiparty democracy; any democratic
system that emerges likely will be a Confucian democracy (communal or social
democracy); the Chinese culture will become a combination of liberalism and
Confucianism; the balance of traditional elements (Confucianism) and modern elements
(liberalism) will depend on each individual’s free will and free choice; the process of
democratization will start with the intellectuals, and then spread to the whole nation.
Finally, will this democratization process likely happen in the next 20 years (2004 to
2024)? I will give a positive answer based on responses from the people I interviewed.
(6) The Theory of Deep Democracy and the
Difference It Will Make to Chinese Democracy
(A) The Concept of Deep Democracy
In this section I am going to introduce a novel theory of “deep
democracy” developed by Haider Khan and see what difference it can make to Chinese
democracy. There is important distinction between deep democracy and the formal
democracy. Haider Khan explains:
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Khan (1994, 1998, 2007) presents deep democracy as a structure in
addition to formal democratic apparatus such that the practice of such democratic
life can be reproduced with the basic values intact. Change is not precluded. But all
such changes should deepen democracy, not weaken it. Deep democracy in this
sense is intimately connected with economic and social justice. Ultimately, it calls
for a transition to a culture of creativity, diversity and tolerance. 326
Such a concept of democracy emphasizes “full economic and social justice,” and
becomes possible when a cluster of conditions is fulfilled. These conditions fall into three
categories: economic, political, and social-cultural. 327
(B) Three Categories of Broad Conditions for Deep Democracy
Khan explains these three categories as follows: 328
1. At the economic level an adequate conceptualization of the relationship
between the market and non-market processes in the context of high technology is
necessary in order to promote what Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum have called
capabilities (Sen, 1992; Crocker, 1995; Nussbaum, 1995). It is important to be
aware of the role that differences such as gender, regions (ethnicity), etc. can play
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here. Different (types of) people may have different needs. A democratic economy
must address those needs as adequately as possible, given the productive capacity.
Technology would need to be conceptualized anew in democratic terms. . . .
2. At the political level, adequate means and resources must be provided in
order to ensure free deliberation and participation by all the different groups in
society. This must apply to the development and evaluation of technology system as
well. . . .
3. At the social-cultural level valuing differences by promoting social and
cultural relations that display freely a radical heterogeneity in society can be seen as
the crucial cultural condition. No single determination of human capacity but a free
play of all the social forces necessary to bring about the active, participatory,
emancipated human culture is what is implied by this set of requirements. To use
Felix Guattari’s phrase only a ‘molecular revolution’ at the level of small groups
and individuals can bring this about. . . .
As stated above, at least a cluster of conditions (that fall into these
three categories) needs to be fulfilled for the concept of deep democracy (“with full
economic and social justice”) to be “tenable.” Thus Alan and Khan offered the following
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cluster of conditions. 329
(C) Cluster Conditions for Deep Democracy
1. Ending of economic and other status inequalities;
2. Public emphasis on furthering democratic autonomy, internationalism, and
individuality;
3. Adequate incomes for all socially recognized work, as well as for children, the
handicapped, the aged, and others not able to work in order to promote equality of
capability; 330
4. Respect for and articulation of differences in public life and within parties;
5. Downward democratic congruence of and within ordinary social institutions,
including work place democracy;
6. Debate over the history and future of the movement-the nature of deep
democracy-in neighborhood assemblies and schools;
7. Cultivation of respect for civil disobedience, strikes, and other acts of protest on
major public issues;
8. Integration of local and national leaders into features of ordinary economic and
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political life and creation of arenas for criticism;
9. Curtailment of all direct political intervention in the arts, religion, and personal
life;
10. Establishments of independent judicial, policy, communication and electoral
review bodies;
11. Diversity of perspective in communications and education;
12. Use of differential, serial referenda on central issues;
13. Public funding of issue-oriented committees as well as parties;
14. Takeover of some security and civil judicial functions by neighborhood or
regional democratic associations; abolition of centralized, especially secret police
powers and units;
15. Universal public service, military or community; restructuring of armed forces in
a defensive, civilian-oriented direction; removal of authoritarianism of rank and
status, and institution of policy;
16. Proportional representation of parties;
17. Abolition of patriarchy;
18. Adoption of democratic child-rearing practices;
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19. Full freedom of social intercourse of diverse groups;
20. Full freedom of diverse cultural expression;
21. Encouragement of the arts and varying modes of expression so that every
individual can experience and struggle with the challenge of non-dominating
discourse;
22. Practice of radical forms of individual and group subjectivity leading to what
Guattari has termed the molecular revolution;
23. Adoption of technology and innovation systems which will reinforce the
conditions above, rather than undercutting them.
Khan further emphasizes the complete nature of deep democracy: “Deepening democracy
is thus an integrated process where all the dimensions of social life are implicated. These
diverse processes must work together and reinforce one another.” 331
In condition 3, the equality of capability is important and is to be
promoted. Khan thinks it “useful to clarify and elaborate upon the idea of social
capabilities,” and “summarize following Nussbaum and Sen and give a social
interpretation of all the capabilities.” 332 This social capability approach focuses on the
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micro-level: each individual should have equal capabilities to live his life “up to the limit
permitted by natural possibilities.” 333
(D) Summary of Social Capabilities 334
1.Being able to live to the end of a complete human life, as far as possible.
2. Being able to be courageous.
3. Being able to have opportunities for sexual satisfaction.
4. Being able to move from place to place.
5. Being able to avoid unnecessary and non-useful pain and to have pleasure
experiences.
6. Being able to use the five senses.
7. Being able to imagine.
8. Being able to think and reason.
9. Being acceptably well-informed.
10. Being able to have attachments to things and persons outside ourselves.
11. Being able to love, grieve, to feel longing and gratitude.
12. Being able to form a conception of the good.
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13. Capability to choose; ability to form goals, commitments, values.
14. Being able to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s own life.
15. Being able to live for and to others, to recognize and show concern for other
human beings, to engage in various forms of familial and social interaction.
16. Being capable of friendship.
17. Being able to visit and entertain friends.
18. Being able to participate in the community.
19. Being able to participate politically and being capable of justice.
20. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants and the
world of nature.
21. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.
22. Being able to live one’s own life and nobody else’s.
23. Being able to live in one’s very own surroundings and context.
24. Capability to have self-respect.
25. Capability to appear in public without shame.
26. Capability to live a rich and fully human life, up to the limit permitted by natural
possibilities.
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27. Ability to achieve valuable functionings.
As Khan points out,
These capabilities are distinct and of central importance. One cannot easily trade
off one dimension of capability against another. They cannot be reduced to a
common measure such as utility. 335
Also, following Croker, 336
‘Capability ethic’ has implications for freedom, rights, and justice going far
beyond simple distribution of income considerations. If one accepts the capability
approach as a serious foundation for human development, then it follows that going
beyond distributive justice is necessary for a complete evaluation of the impact of
economic policies. 337
Khan further points out,
In evaluating any policy regime. . . from this perspective, not only do we wish
to pose the question of efficiency but also the whole set of questions regarding
human freedom, in particular, the positive human freedom to be or to do certain
things. 338
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(E) What Difference Does Deep Democracy Make to Chinese Democracy?
The theory of deep democracy, together with the social capability
approach is consistent with Confucian political ideal (“Great Harmony”) and the ideal of
political liberalism. The most urgent problems for China today are corruption of
government officials and social injustice on the distribution of income. The institutional
origin of all the problems in China is its one party dictatorial rule. Deep democracy and
the social capability approach, with its nature of completeness, do address these problems
both in the immediate need of overcoming corruption and seriously unjust social division
and in the long-term need of overcoming political dictatorship. The immediate problems
need to be solved as soon as possible, and the long-term problem of democracy needs to
be solved in a gradual, step-by-step way. If we see it from the perspective of the three
categories of the conditions for deep democracy, it will become even clearer. At the
economic level, a democratic economy addresses the needs of different types of people as
adequate as possible. Thus, social injustice will be overcome. At the political level, free
deliberation and participation by all the different groups is to be achieved for sure. Thus,
political dictatorship will be overcome. At the social-cultural level, “a free play of all the
social forces necessary to bring about the active, participatory, emancipated human
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culture is what is implied by this set of requirement.” Thus, not only the fusion of
Confucianism and political liberalism can be achieved naturally, but also different
cultures of ethnic groups will be able to be expressed freely and completely. In short,
deep democracy and social capability approach is exactly what China needs: Chinese
democracy, under the practice of deep democracy and social capability approach, will be
rich, active, flourishing, and emancipated. The practice of deep democracy in China will
be able to lead this country to overcome domination and control in any form. 339
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APPENDIX
访谈的问题
是什么样的力量在驱动着 (或限制着) 这个城市的发展与变迁 推动着它向未来二
十年迈进？
1. 总的 一般性的
了解
2. 国家的角色 (正
面的与负面的)
3. 自我的角色 (正
面的与负面的)
包括行业的角色
(正面的与负面
的)
4. 对未来的期待
(正面的与负面
的)
访谈的对象包括四种群体的人：
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

政府官员
学者 (知识份子)
企业人员 (商人)
媒体人员

每一个人可以谈大约 30 分钟，或者更多，如果他 (或她)这样选择的话。这个问题
是开放式的，而且是半结构式的，如以上所示。 这个研究是在
_______________________
由丹佛大学的「人作为研究主体之保护的制度审查委员会」所通过。
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